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Abstract 
 
Secularisation is at the centre of a vibrant debate in the sociology of religion. 
In the last two decades, literature has started to challenge old predictions and 
interpretations of the future of religion, but few studies present a detailed contextual 
examination of religious change in contemporary societies. Offering a comparative 
analysis of Scotland and Sweden, two nations in the relatively secularised Northern 
Europe, this thesis argues that diverse historical and political trajectories shape 
distinct patterns of religious beliefs and practices. Scotland and Sweden are two 
secularising nations characterised by historically dominant Protestant churches, but 
which nonetheless differ largely in their experiences of religious decline.  
In order to discern and differentiate key aspects of religious change in each 
nation as well as to explore contextual meanings of religion, a mixed methods 
approach was adopted, comprised of secondary quantitative data analysis as well as 
in-depth interviews. Data analysis identified and highlighted broader patterns and 
individual understandings of religious beliefs as well as three dimensions of religious 
belonging: church attendance, religious identification and membership, and 
participation in rituals.   
Results show that on measures of religious beliefs and church attendance, 
Sweden appears further secularised than Scotland. Arguably, Sweden has seen rapid 
and relatively early secularisation, with important social structural and political 
changes that occurred in the second half of the 19th century. With noticeable 
generational differences, data on Scotland point towards the mid-20th century as a 
crucial time of religious decline. Additionally, the remaining functions of the 
national churches differ considerably in the two nations. A majority of Swedes 
identify with the Church of Sweden, which serves a largely secular purpose as part of 
a cultural heritage and as a provider of life cycle ceremonies. By contrast, the Church 
of Scotland has maintained a stronger commitment to religious doctrine in a nation 
that is more religiously diverse. 
The findings ultimately draw attention to the importance of context in the 
study of diverse and complex processes of religious change. As a result, they reveal 
limitations to attempts in the contemporary sociology of religion set out to generalise 
and dichotomise European trends of religious belief and belonging.  
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 This thesis examines current trends and diverse meanings of religious beliefs 
and belonging in contemporary Scotland and Sweden. Using a mixed-methods 
approach comprised of secondary quantitative data analysis and in-depth interviews, 
the research investigates processes of religious and cultural change in two 
secularising, Protestant European nations and highlights the superficiality of 
describing a general European trajectory of religious change. Instead, it provides key 
insights into diverse processes of secularisation and the different remaining functions 
of churches in two national contexts.  
          My interest in the sociology of religion developed as a result of four years of 
studying and working abroad. As an undergraduate student in California, I was 
intrigued by the noticeable cultural differences between my native country, Sweden, 
and the United States, where the latter appeared much more explicitly religious than 
the former. My personal experience of religion in Sweden was a very weak 
connection between the Church and religious beliefs. I was confirmed in the Church 
of Sweden and attended church weddings and funerals with the perception that this 
had historically had a religious meaning, but that for most people, in this day and 
age, it was simply an acknowledgment of a special moment in life. Religion was 
typically not discussed, and it certainly was not a matter I contemplated, but as I 
adapted to life in California, I was compelled to examine and reconsider the 
assumptions I had arrived with.  
 This was formally incorporated in my studies when I took a course in 
economics of religion. The course was predominantly focused on Stark and Finke’s 
(2000) rational choice theories of the religious economy. While their ideas were 
fascinating and persuasive, I found that they underestimated the importance of 
context, particularly in their accounts of religion in Europe and I, consequently, 
began questioning the notion of a common European experience. This was the 
beginning to what has developed into a strong interest in the comparative sociology 
of religion. 
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1.2 The Research Problem 
	  
1.2.1 Secularisation in Europe? 
	  
 At a time of major shifts in social structure, early prominent social theorists 
(e.g. Durkheim, 1912/1995; Marx, 1844/2007; Marx and Engels, 1848/2012; Weber, 
1904/2009) questioned the future of religion. They predicted a decline in various 
aspects of religion as society modernised, a process labelled as the secularisation 
thesis.1 Throughout most of the 20th century, secularisation theories remained 
relatively unchallenged, but during the past few decades, it has been at the centre of a 
lively debate in the sociology of religion, where the link between modernisation and 
a diminishing presence of religion has been criticised and re-evaluated. The extent or 
nature of decline that some of the early sociologists prophesised has not been 
realised, and it has been questioned whether the contemporary world has in fact seen 
a decrease in religious beliefs (e.g. Davie, 1994, 2002a; Stark and Iannaccone, 1994; 
Stark and Finke, 2000; Warner, 2010).  
 Nevertheless, most sociologists of religion agree that there are aspects of 
religion, in particular church attendance, that have seen a decrease in Europe and 
that, in this sense, Europe is less religious than the rest of the world. (e.g. Berger, 
1999; Berger et al, 2008; Bruce 1996, 2002a; Davie, 1994, 2002a; Stark and Finke, 
2000; Warner, 2010).2 In relation to this, ample attention has been given to exploring 
and explaining religion and secularisation at a “European level.” Davie (2002a:ix) 
refers to lower rates of attendance and calls Europe “the exceptional case.” She 
describes that, overall, Europeans believe without belonging in that they still believe 
in God even if they no longer actively participate in the church.3 As a consequence, 
rather than speaking of secularisation, she asserts that characteristics of religious 
beliefs and practices are changing. Berger (1999:2) believes that Europe is a key 
exemption to a world that is becoming more religious than it has ever been; and 
Bruce (1996) argues that secularisation originated in Europe with the foundations of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See section 3.3 (pp. 62-68). 
2 However, recent evidence suggests gradual religious decline in other modern societies, such as the 
United States (e.g. Pew Research Center, 2013).  
3 See section 3.4 (pp. 68-71).  
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modernity. Consequently, the European setting provides an ideal starting point for 
looking at contemporary processes and experiences of religious decline.  
 However, few studies have presented a thorough analysis of what 
secularisation means in different European contexts. This thesis argues that speaking 
of a “European case” (Davie, 2002a:2), and describing Europe as believing without 
belonging is problematic. It is debatable whether this is in fact an accurate depiction 
of religion in Europe as largely different conclusions are reached depending on how 
such terms are conceptualised. Furthermore, Davie’s account is ineffective in 
describing a meaningful pattern in Europe, which is far from homogeneous. 
Arguably, it is insufficient to treat Europe as a unit of analysis when detailing or 
refuting religious decline. As a result, this thesis offers a comprehensive examination 
of secularisation in Scotland and Sweden, two different, relatively secularised, 
European contexts,4 with the overall aim to address the question: To what extent are 
Scotland and Sweden secularised and how does this fit into previous 
conceptualisations of religious belief and belonging?  
 
1.2.2 A Secularising Church?  
	  
 This thesis seeks to examine the connection between religion, history, culture, 
and community in secularising societies. It is possible for a church to maintain a 
significant role in a society characterised by declining levels of religious beliefs, in 
line with Bruce’s argument that “religion diminishes in social significance, except 
where it finds work to do other than relating individuals to the supernatural” 
(2002a:30). However, relatively little attention has been given to exploring and 
explaining non-religious purposes of churches in secularising societies. Along with 
this, Zuckerman (2008:166) asserts that individuals who are nominally religious and 
participate in religious rituals without believing in the supernatural aspect are a group 
of people that are “nearly always overlooked in discussions, surveys, and analyses 
that claim to address and reflect the state of religion in our modern world today.” 
This applies particularly well to Swedes, but to a limited extent, and in a 
fundamentally different fashion, it also describes the relationship that many non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See section 1.3 (pp. 16-18). 
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religious Scots have to the National Church. This thesis argues that many Swedes are 
culturally religious5 (e.g. Demerath, 2000; Zuckerman, 2008), in that they are largely 
non-religious but maintain a strong bond to the Church as a cultural heritage. Many 
Scots, on the other hand, associate the Church with belonging to a community.6 
Looking at Scotland and Sweden within this realm illuminates the complex link 
between religion and belonging to a social group, a contrast that needs further 
attention. As a result, this thesis seeks to address the following question: How can 
national context explain differences in religious belonging and how the key functions 
of national churches are maintained, transformed, or abandoned? 
	  
1.3 Contexts of Study 
	  
1.3.1 Protestant Europe 
	  
 When sociologists of religion speak of Europe as considerably more 
secularised than the rest of the world, it is important to highlight that this, in 
particular, refers to historically Protestant nations, primarily located in Northern 
Europe, and to a much lesser degree the Catholic and Orthodox countries. Davie 
(2002a:6-7) presents data on religious belief and participation throughout Western 
Europe and a clear pattern emerges: With the exception of Northern Ireland, 
primarily Protestant nations present low levels of church attendance, while the same 
measure in majority Catholic nations, apart from France, remains much higher. 
Similar but less drastic differences can be seen on the measure of belief in God. In 
other words, while Europe is characterised as being secularised on a global scale, this 
appears to be particularly true for Protestant nations. This, once again, shows both 
the difficulties of describing meaningful patterns of religion in Europe as a whole, as 
well as the need for a further study of secularisation within Protestant Europe 
specifically. For this purpose, Protestant Europe pertains to areas where 
Protestantism is (or was) the most common religious denomination, that is the United 
Kingdom, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, and parts of 
Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands (Cipriani, 2010:442) (see Figure 1.1). As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See section 3.7.3 (pp. 83-85). 
6 Discussed in section 3.8 (pp. 85-89).	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presented in Chapter 2, the introduction of differentiated state churches in Protestant 
countries may have influenced both the shaping of a national church culture as well 
as a decline in religion. However, while Protestant nations with national churches 
may, in some aspects, experience a similar process of secularisation, in others they 
are separated to an extraordinary degree. This is argued through an analysis of 
Scotland and Sweden. 
 
Figure 1.1: Protestant Reformation, c. 1560 
 
Source: Spielvogel, 2009:396 
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1.3.2 Scotland and Sweden 
	  
 Examining Scotland and Sweden as two case studies from Protestant Europe 
provides a better understanding of the fundamental importance of context in relation 
to processes of religious change and the shaping of distinct meanings of religious 
beliefs and practices. Scotland and Sweden possess a number of similarities, which 
make a comparison useful. These two fairly small, Northern European nations 
adopted Protestantism7 at the time of the Reformation and experienced a long history 
of a state church, since disestablished (explored in Chapter 2). Second, both nations 
appear to be secularising, with relatively low levels of religious beliefs, particularly 
“traditional” beliefs (Chapter 5), declining levels of church attendance (Chapter 6), 
religious identification (Chapter 7), and participation in religious rituals, such as 
marriage and baptism (Chapter 8).  
 However, it is clear that there are key differences in how the decline in these 
aspects of religion has developed. Since the Reformation, Scotland and Sweden have 
experienced largely different historical and political trajectories that have come to 
shape current trends of religious beliefs and belonging (Chapter 2). Moreover, even 
if there has been a steady decrease in religious identification and participation in 
rituals since the separation of church and state, a majority of Swedes still identify 
with the National Church (Chapter 7) and traditions that mark key points in the life 
cycle, for example baptism, marriage, and religious funerals, remain important and 
common parts of Swedish culture (Chapter 8). By contrast, Scots have, to a much 
more marked extent, ceased to identify with the National Church and to participate in 
its rituals. This is particularly intriguing given that Swedes appear less religious 
(Chapter 5) and less active in the church (Chapter 6). This suggests two very 
different relationships between religious beliefs and belonging in Scotland and 
Sweden. As a result, these two nations are ideal cases in studying the complex and 
contextualised processes of secularisation in contemporary societies.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 However, the Church of Scotland is Calvinistic/Presbyterian, in contrast to the Church of Sweden, 
which is Lutheran. This is explained further in section 2.2 (pp. 23-27).  
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1.4 Thesis Outline  
	  
 With Introduction and Conclusion, this thesis consists of nine chapters. Two 
are broadly theoretical, one presents methodological observations and research 
design, and four chapters discuss research findings. One findings chapter focuses 
specifically on religious beliefs and three relate beliefs to three separate dimensions 
of religious belonging; church attendance, religious identification and membership, 
and participation in rituals. Examining these distinct aspects of belonging provides a 
more nuanced understanding of the role of churches in secularising societies and 
brings to light how fundamentally disconnected distinct measures of belonging may 
be.  
Chapter 2 offers a historical account of religion and the national churches in 
Scotland and Sweden. Four key aspects are highlighted as possible reasons for 
differences in current trends of secularisation. (1) Distinctive Lutheran and Calvinist 
theological stances concerning rituals, individualism, and a connection to the state. 
(2) The fact that the Scottish Reformation was led by largely popular demand, while 
Swedes had Protestantism instated by the king. (3) The extent to which, in Sweden, 
but not in Scotland, the Church has been intimately intertwined with secular politics. 
(4) The fact that Scotland has historically been more religiously diverse than 
Sweden. These suggest that the two nations have experienced quite distinctive 
religious trajectories since the Protestant state churches were established at the time 
of the Reformation.  
Chapter 3 outlines and critically evaluates key theories and concepts in the 
sociology of religion that may be applied to current trends in Scotland and Sweden. 
Secularisation theories, believing and belonging, the religious economy, and religion 
and security discuss mechanisms of religious change. Cultural religion, cultural 
defence, and religion and social capital describe latent functions of the church in 
contemporary society. This chapter addresses each of these theories and argues that 
aspects of each approach can, taken together, offer useful insights that may shed light 
on processes of religious decline and the alleged link between the church and 
belonging to a social group.  
 Chapter 4 discusses methodological concerns in relation to a comparative study 
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of religion, specifically regarding the fluidity of meanings across social contexts. The 
chapter further describes and justifies a mixed methods research design. Quantitative 
analysis of secondary data was conducted in order to provide a broader idea of just 
how secularised Scotland and Sweden are on measures of belief, church attendance, 
religious identification, and participation in rituals. To achieve a better and more 
nuanced understanding of what these trends mean, in-depth interviews were 
conducted with married couples who had chosen a religious or a secular wedding 
ceremony.  
Chapter 5 presents quantitative findings that suggest that religious beliefs are 
more common in Scotland than in Sweden, but that “spirituality” appears to be 
equally widespread in both nations. However, interview findings show that it is 
debatable whether many individuals who claim to be spiritual are in fact religious, 
suggesting that Davie’s (e.g. 1990, 1994, 2002a) categorisation of Europeans as 
believing without belonging is ineffective given limited understandings of diverse 
meanings and interpretations of measures of religious beliefs. Furthermore, 
differences between Scotland and Sweden illustrate that a secularising society 
experiences a decreasing social significance of religion. This means that a highly 
secularised society will have a low prevalence of atheism explained by the lack of a 
need to define oneself in relation to religion. 
 Chapter 6 demonstrates clear differences between how Scots and Swedes 
approach church attendance. Church attendance levels are decreasing in both nations, 
and both national churches are experiencing particular difficulties in attracting 
participants. Both Swedes and Scots highlight the need for the national churches to 
renew themselves and describe their services as “boring.” Scots are more likely to 
attend regularly or never while Swedes typically attend occasionally, though largely 
for non-religious reasons. Additionally, changes in church attendance levels suggest 
more apparent generational differences in Scotland, with changing attitudes towards 
the church emerging around the mid 20th century. In Sweden, attendance levels over 
the past century have been remarkably low, suggesting an earlier breach with 
attendance.  
 Chapter 7 discusses religious identification and/or membership. In relation to 
church attendance, this is a fundamentally different form of religious belonging. This 
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suggests a weakness in Davie’s typology of believing and belonging largely as a 
result of her avoidance of conceptualising these terms. On many measures, Swedes 
seem to belong without believing with a strong connection to the Church of Sweden 
as an often non-religious sense of belonging to a cultural heritage. As a result of 
religious diversity, most Scots appear to neither believe nor belong or believe and 
belong, where identification with the Church of Scotland typically implies religious 
beliefs, but sometimes, a community or family connection.  
Chapter 8 discusses participation in rituals as a third form of religious 
belonging. In both nations, levels of religious life cycle ceremonies are declining in 
favour of non-religious alternatives. Yet the Church of Sweden still holds a 
remarkably strong position as a provider of ceremonies, particularly funerals. Despite 
disestablishment of the state church, there has been a relatively low demand for 
alternatives, and instead, many Swedes ask for a “secular church wedding.” Scots, on 
the other hand, are perceived to make more active choices among a wider range of 
alternatives and describe non-religious church ceremonies as either hypocritical or as 
a sign of respect to family wishes. 
Chapter 9 concludes by restating the limited value of assuming a general, 
European, experience of religion. Europe may be further secularised than elsewhere 
in the world, and Protestant nations arguably share key similarities that set them 
apart from the rest of Europe. Scotland and Sweden are two historically Protestant, 
Northern European nations that appear to be secularising. While the commonality of 
secularisation is of crucial importance, this is arguably where the similarities end. 
The concept of religious belonging has fundamentally different meanings in these 
two contexts, highlighting the value of conducting comparative mixed methods 
research on religion. As such, there are unlimited possibilities to further study 
religious patterns and experiences in a comparative and contextualised fashion and, 
as a result, significantly contribute to, and extend, the debate on secularisation in the 
contemporary world.  
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As a historical process, the Protestant Reformation of the 16th century still 
influences religious landscapes throughout Europe. Scholars largely agree that 
Europe, and in particular Protestant Europe is, at least on measures of participation, 
less religious than the rest of the world (e.g. Berger, 1999; Berger et al, 2008; Bruce, 
1996, 2002a; Davie, 1994, 2002a; Inglehart, 2000; Warner, 2010). As a result of 
distinct religious histories, there is a clear division in measures of religious 
participation and identification between Catholic Southern Europe and Protestant 
Northern Europe (Davie, 2002a:6-7; Inglehart, 2000:91). In order to understand 
current trends of secularisation in Protestant Europe, it is therefore necessary to 
investigate the historical past. Consequently, the aim of the first part of this chapter is 
to describe implications of the Reformation, and the possible links between 
Protestantism and secularisation.  
The second and third parts of the chapter present a detailed historical account 
of Scotland and Sweden as two separate contexts within Protestant Europe. The 
Reformation had a decisive impact on both countries. During this period, Scotland 
adopted a Calvinist state church known as the Church of Scotland and Sweden 
established a Lutheran equivalent, called the Church of Sweden. Since the 
Reformation, the two nations have developed two very different paths of 
secularisation. With the aim to shed light on these differences, this chapter further 
discerns and examines possible historical reasons for the diverse patterns and 
experiences of religion in Scotland and Sweden.  
 
2.2 Protestantism and Secularisation 
	  
 There are several theories as to why Protestant Europe is particularly 
secularised. Weber (1904/2009) asserts that secularisation is an unintended 
consequence of capitalism that emerged following the Reformation. He states that 
“People who are saturated by the capitalist spirit today tend to be indifferent if not 
	   24	  
openly hostile to religion” (1904/2009:82). While the Catholic Church stressed a 
religious commitment through separation from the secular world, truly devoted 
Protestants could show their commitment to God with a strong work ethic and 
through taking pride in vocational achievements (Weber, 1904/2009:89-90).  
The Calvinist branch of Protestantism adheres to the doctrine of 
predestination, the belief that salvation is predetermined with no means to ascertain 
who is chosen. This is a clear distinction between the Catholic Church and the 
Calvinist Church, whereas in the former, one can earn salvation through the 
sacraments (Weber, 1904/2009:107). As a result, Calvinists turned to the material 
world to find signs of their salvation. This is argued by Weber as he states, “Work 
without rest in a vocational calling was recommended as the best possible means to 
acquire the self-confidence that one belonged among the elect” (1904/2009:111). 
Luther did not subscribe to the idea of predestination as he believed every person 
regardless of social status could be saved. However, similar patterns in Lutheran 
societies may be explained by the fact that, as a way to obtain salvation, Luther 
emphasised the importance of a strong work ethic and a sense of pride in the specific 
circumstances that God had granted each person (Weber, 1904/2009:92-93, 105).  
Highly influenced by Weber’s (1904/2009) work, Taylor (2007:77) agrees 
that Protestantism is a mechanism of secularisation. He states that the single most 
important reason for secularisation in the contemporary world is the disenchantment 
that Weber (1904/2009) portrayed as a far-reaching demystification of the world 
around us, particularly characterising Protestant societies. Reformed churches 
commit to the doctrine of sola scriptura, the notion that the Bible alone signifies 
divine authority. With the dismissal of sacramentalism and various forms of church 
magic, Taylor believes that the Protestant Reformation was an “engine of 
disenchantment” (2007:77). Destiny was, for the first time, in the hands of 
individuals as opposed to operating through, for example, magical objects 
uncontrollable by any one person.  He explains that with the conviction that we reach 
salvation by our own doing, disenchantment was unavoidable (Taylor, 2007:772). 
Both Calvinist and Lutheran theology subscribe to the doctrine of sola 
scriptura, effectively discarding papal authority. However, there are key differences 
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not the least that Calvinism made a more complete break with Catholicism (Matzke, 
2010:148). Kersten explains that:  
 
In Calvinism neither human merit nor the mediation of the church through the sacraments is 
considered to be a factor in receiving or losing grace; in Lutheranism, however, through 
Baptism, Holy Communion, and the proclamation of the Word the church becomes the 
channel through which grace is received (1970:24).  
 
 
This may be a partial explanation for differences between Scotland and Sweden. In 
the latter, Lutheran theology has emphasised the importance of church traditions and 
rituals and these are still perceived to hold a key importance in Swedish society.8 
Scotland’s Reformation, on the other hand, imposed more radical restrictions on the 
celebration of rituals. This is exemplified by burials where “the dead are to be buried 
without singing or reading of prayers” (Balfour, 1911:31-36).  
 Several scholars of nationalism studies focus on the Reformation as a 
decisive historical event in relation to origins of national consciousness, as well as its 
effects on religion in general (e.g. Anderson, 2006; Hastings, 1999; Llobera, 1994; 
Marx, 2005). In line with Weber (1904/2009) and Taylor (2007), Anderson (2006) 
describes a reduction in sacredness and mysticism with the Reformation, but 
highlights a different reason. As a result of Protestantism emphasising scripture, 
literacy spread throughout Protestant Europe. This began with the introduction of 
vernacular language in churches, leading to a widespread demystification of religion. 
Through the translations of the Bible, clergy was able to share the Christian message 
to a large population, including the illiterate masses (Anderson, 2006:12-15; 
Hastings, 1997:192). Anderson (2006:11) consequently argues that, in this way, 
religion was brought to the people in a language they could understand, resulting in a 
transformation of the religious message from mysterious and otherworldly to 
comprehensible and ordinary. He further explains that this brought about a national 
consciousness.9  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See section 8.2 (pp. 234-248).  
9	  In line with this, Scotland’s very high levels of literacy after the Reformation were strongly linked to 
the demand for a national church that could bring together Scots and offer a sense of a common 
identity (e.g. Houston, 2002:18). Similarly, there is a close connection between the Church of 
Sweden, literacy, and a national consciousness, given that the Church of Sweden administered reading 
tests to all citizens through household examinations – see section 2.3.3 (pp. 31-32). 
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Building on Anderson’s (2006) argument, Anthony Marx (2005) devotes 
attention to the importance of the state in relation to religion and nation at the time of 
the Reformation. To this day, the connection between the state and the church is 
arguably one of the most crucial aspects in understanding contemporary 
secularisation, particularly in Protestant Europe. Marx (2005:14) explains that 
leaders in the early modern times were aware that social cohesion is the main factor 
in achieving a stable level of power. Thus, social institutions, such as the church, are 
of utmost importance. It was not until the Reformation that state churches developed 
in their fullest form and the universal religion of Catholicism transformed and 
adapted into very diverse Protestant state churches. This is in line with Llobera’s 
ideas that national consciousness was more vigorous in Protestant than Catholic 
nations since “once the unity of Christendom was broken, the oneness of society 
could only mean that the national church completely coincided with the national 
state” (1994:135-136).  However, this notion is less applicable to Great Britain post 
1707, when there were, at one point, four established churches with the Presbyterian 
Church of Scotland alongside three Anglican churches (Gilley and Sheils, 1994).  
Llobera further explains how “national churches” became subject of the state, 
but that the state generally did not interfere with spiritual matters. In that way, 
churches became conveyors of more than religious values. In line with this, Marx 
contends that Protestantism was a focus of “secular allegiance” (2005:27), and Bruce 
(2004) presents claims of a link between Protestantism and the development of 
liberal democracy, suggesting a possible explanation not only for decline in religion, 
but also for the connection between a national culture and religion, even in the 
secular realm. Many sociologists of religion (e.g. Berger et al, 2008; Bruce, 1996; 
Casanova, 2001; Davie, 1994; Furseth and Repstad, 2006; Zuckerman, 2008) 
acknowledge this connection, which has, nonetheless, received considerably less 
attention than secularisation and religious decline.  
 Moreover, while state churches were introduced throughout most of 
Protestant Europe, a key distinction between Lutheranism and Calvinism is their 
ideas of how church relates to state. Lutheranism is generally more positive towards 
a close relationship with the state. Calvinism, in contrast, challenges secular 
authority and regards religious doctrine as “absolute and all-encompassing, ideally 
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controlling government and the entire society” (Matzke, 2010:148). This is largely 
different from the Anglican Church of England, which to a further extent shares 
similarities with the Church of Sweden with Episcopal governance and a close 
connection between the Church and royal power. The Church of Scotland, on the 
other hand, does not have a head of the church as they regard this to be God’s role 
(Church of Scotland, 2012). Furthermore, Lutheranism is, relative to Calvinism, 
particularly individualistic. Lutheranism emphasises that everyone can, despite 
diverse circumstances in life, reach salvation as a result of personal commitment to 
highly individualistic paths to God. As a result, Lutheranism devotes less attention to 
community and, generally, “opposes the effort of social reform of the church” 
(Kersten, 1970:25).   
These differences between Lutheranism and Calvinism may serve as a reason 
for the close relationship between church and state in Sweden, and the historically 
higher level of independence of the Church of Scotland from the state.10 It may also 
shed some light on the notion that relative to the Church of Scotland, the Church of 
Sweden appears to have a much weaker association with community. While these 
theological differences are noteworthy, in order to understand contemporary trends, 
different historical trajectories are of key importance. Consequently, historical 
backgrounds on religion in these two nations are presented below with the aim to 
provide a detailed description of the contexts of study, as well as to highlight both 




2.3.1 The Early Christian Period 
	  
 Around the 9th century, Christian missionaries arrived in Sweden, primarily 
from the British Isles, Germany, and the Byzantine Empire. At the time, the religious 
landscape in Sweden was overwhelmingly influenced by Norse paganism. About 200 
years later, an attempt was made to officially introduce Christianity in Sweden with 
the first baptism of a Swedish king, Olof Skötkonung in 1008 (Bäckström et al, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Highlighted by the 1707 shift of authority from Edinburgh to Westminster - see section 2.4 (p. 44).  
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2004:22; Zuckerman, 2008:122). Zuckerman describes that this, nevertheless, had 
limited influence on the population as a whole and argues that: 
 
It is quite possible that for most of the time after Christianity was nominally introduced into 
Northern Europe, the actual beliefs of Christianity didn’t seep too deeply into the hearts and 




He further explains that there is no convincing evidence that Swedes in reality 
became Christian on a larger scale, perhaps because the conversion to Christianity 
was initiated by the elite and had little impact on the everyday life of most Swedes. 
At the same time, Bäckström et al (2004:22) argue that the foundation for the strong 
bond between church and state was formed during this early Catholic period. For 
example, in 1164, Uppsala was established as an archbishopric, and it has remained 
as such to this day, both throughout Sweden’s Catholic and, after the Reformation, 
Lutheran history. 
 
2.3.2 The Reformation in Sweden 
	  
The Reformation reached Sweden in the early 16th century when Martin 
Luther’s student Olavus Petri brought Lutheranism to the country, which initially led 
to vivid debates between Catholic clergy and Lutheran proponents (Kraal, 2010:376). 
The Lutheran side eventually convinced King Gustav Vasa, and in 1540, he officially 
introduced the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Sweden (Alwall, 2000:147; Keller 
and Stewart, 1927:251; Martling, 2008:140; Zuckerman, 2008:124). Keller and 
Stewart (1927:251) describe the religious change that took place in Sweden in this 
period as friendly and far from a revolution. They state that “When Gustav Vasa 
introduced the Gospel into Sweden, no statues of saints had to be burned and no 
windows broken. This ancient church has kept her bishops and can claim apostolic 
succession by the same token as does the Anglican Church” (1927:251). They further 
describe this as a popular change as they argue that “People and Bishops adopted the 
new faith. The entire country became Evangelical. Gustavus Adolphus who saved 
the Protestant cause in the Thirty Years’ War, remains the great hero of church and 
state” (Keller and Stewart, 1927:251). Presenting a more convincing case, 
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Zuckerman describes the introduction of Lutheranism as nothing but a political 
strategy initiated by Gustav Vasa alone as a means to achieve more power and 
wealth, and argues that: 
 
This was clearly done – again, not by the popular will of the masses – but by those in 
power…And again, it seems that this major ‘religious’ transformation - The Protestant 
Reformation in Denmark and Sweden – was not so much theologically motivated, but rather, 




Bäckström et al (2004:23) note that the ties between church and state that had 
started to form in the Catholic period strengthened considerably with the 
Reformation and the break with Rome. Church doctrine was translated into Swedish 
for the first time and mass was conducted in Swedish, which led to a newfound 
interest in the church. Fearing a counter-Reformation, Uppsala Synod met in 1593 
and officially decided that the Lutheran Church was to operate as the national 
Church of Sweden (Alwall, 2000:147; Bäckström et al, 2004:23; Martling, 
2008:132). 
 
2.3.3 The Church of Sweden in the 17th-19th Century 
	  
Bäckström et al (2004:23) describe Sweden after the Reformation as an 
agrarian society where people knew little of the world beyond their local setting. 
There was a strong focus on family, stability, and continuity and the Church served 
as an advocate for these values and functioned as an integral part of the community. 
Swedes had a close relationship with the Church, not least through life cycle rituals 
such as baptism, confirmation, weddings, and funerals, but also on a more frequent 
basis through the weekly service that in addition to being a religious sermon also 
functioned as a social event and a place to obtain and share information and news. In 
addition to its religious commitment, the Church also took on more secular roles in 
the parish. The local minister served as administrative head of the parish and all its 
functions, such as welfare, healthcare, and education. Bäckström et al further direct 
attention to the important role of the Church in people’s concept of the world around 
them.  
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Up until mid 19th century, church and society were connected in a way that may be hard to 
imagine today. Church and state, parish and municipality were one unit. A certain number of 
members of parliament had to be ministers and were therefore an integrated part of 
government and of the development of society (2004:23, my translation).  
 
 
However, Zuckerman (2008:122) argues that despite people’s close connections to 
the Church as well as the fact that most people were superstitious,11 it did not 
necessarily mean that they adopted Christian beliefs. He cites Barton (1986) and 
states that, “well into the late 1700s, the Christianity of most Danes and Swedes was 
not theologically or biblically grounded, but simply part of a larger worldview” 
(Zuckerman, 2008:124).  
Interestingly, it is not only the piousness of the people that has been 
questioned. Tomasson argues that the Enlightenment had a strong influence on the 
Church of Sweden and that “by the early 19th century, the Church had become rather 
rationalistic, even quite secular” (2002:76). In the mid 19th century, the appointment 
of bishops was done on a basis of scholarly achievements, and important figures in 
the community were regularly offered high ecclesiastical positions. Tomasson 
(2002:77) further highlights the diminishing orthodoxy of the Church as he argues 
that the Church showed a high level of tolerance for what may, by wider Christian 
standards, be viewed as sins, such as premarital sex.  
At the same time, the church stood firm on its role as the only religious body 
for all citizens. In 1686 Church Act, legislation was implemented that prohibited 
other religions from operating in Sweden. Alwall explains this as he states that: 
 
The Lutheran faith should be held by ‘all within our kingdom and its subject countries,’ 
which meant that a person’s religious status was entirely linked to his citizenship. For 
Swedes, this meant that no other religious adherence than that to the Evangelical-Lutheran 
faith was made possible. The punishment for those who apostasized from the Lutheran faith 
or spread ‘delusive doctrines’ was exile…and [they] would be deprived of their rights as 
Swedish citizens” (2000:149).  
 
 
 Zuckerman (2008:125) explains that the government strictly enforced church 
matters on the people, not the least by punishing those who could not correctly recite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Zuckerman (2008:122) and Martling (2008:167-171) describe that Swedes commonly believed in 
ghosts, witchcraft, and similar.  
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the Lutheran catechism at one of the mandatory household examinations12 and for all 
Swedish citizens, participation in the Holy Communion was required at least once a 
year. The government was, in other words, convinced of the importance of cultural 
homogeneity in the creation and maintenance of a strong national state. In 1726, the 
government took further steps to secure the connection between a Swedish identity 
and Lutheranism by forbidding any religious assembly or worship outside the family 
unless an appointed clergyman was present. Those who resisted faced fines or 
imprisonment, but the law was not strictly implemented, and was finally revoked in 
1858 (Tomasson, 2002:76).  
The status of the Church of Sweden was heavily criticised by Christian 
revivalists as well as liberal and socialist movements that gained popularity in the 
mid 19th century. This led to a growing demand for religious freedom. As a result, 
further deregulation occurred in the 1860s, beginning with the first step towards 
religious freedom when citizens could, for the first time, legally exit the Church of 
Sweden, but only for specifically approved denominations (Alwall, 2000:150-151; 
Bruce, 2000:34; Gustafsson, 1990:3). Methodists, Baptists, Catholics, and Jews 
received approval at this stage, which nonetheless excluded most free churches that 
formed in this time period (Gustafsson, 1990:4). Second, ministers no longer served 
in the parliament simply as a result of their profession (Bäckström et al, 2004:24). 
Third, up until 1862, the parish functioned as the local jurisdiction in charge of 
religious as well as non-religious matters, but from this year, municipalities were 
introduced to govern secular institutions13 (Gustafsson, 1990:7; Martling, 2008:31). 
Fourth, the requirement of the mandatory Holy Communion was removed at this 
time (Bäckström et al, 2004:24).  
Beginning in 1749, the Church kept detailed records of every Swedish 
citizen, a register that includes information on births, marriages, deaths, religious 
participation, as well as results of household examinations. According to data on a 
region of parishes in central Sweden, there was a substantial drop in the percentage 
of people who participated in the Holy Communion at least once a year after the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The Church Act of 1686 stated that each Swedish citizen had to learn how to read and to understand 
Lutheran doctrine. This was enforced through household examinations conducted by the minister on 
all citizens in the Parish (Johansson, 2009:889).  
13 Which at this time did not include schools (Gustafsson, 1994:7). 
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requirement was removed. Just fifteen years after deregulation, only 30 percent of 
the population still participated yearly, and by 1890, it was even lower, at around 5 
percent (Bäckström et al, 2004:25). Interestingly, this suggests that a majority of 
Swedes only participated in the Holy Communion at that time because it was 
compulsory. In line with Zuckerman’s (2008) ideas, this brings into question the 
extent to which Swedes, even 150 years ago, were committed Christians.14 Similarly, 
Martling (2008:260) suggests that particularly in central Sweden, church attendance 
and participation in the Holy Communion had, at the turn of the century, practically 
vanished.  
 
2.3.4 Industrialisation and Social Change 
	  
Bäckström et al (2004:25) explain declining participation at the end of the 
19th century as the result of a changing social structure.15 They suggest that as 
Sweden began to industrialise, people started associating Christian traditions with the 
old agrarian lifestyle. Martling (2008:262) describes this time period as an identity 
crisis of the Church. Those moving to urban areas for new opportunities largely 
abandoned their old way of life, which included their relationship with the Church. 
While there was indeed a steep decline in participation in the Holy Communion and 
household examinations in both rural and urban areas, farming communities held on 
to these traditions considerably longer (Bäckström et al, 2004:25).  
 Industrial society was characterised by a strong focus on rationality and a 
division of labour, including a specialisation of various social institutions. The 
diverse roles of the church (such as in education and healthcare) shifted. This 
conforms to Berger’s notion of secularisation as “evacuation by the Christian 
churches of areas previously under their control or influence” (1967:107). In line 
with this, Alwall argues that, “the end of the nineteenth century was a time of rapid 
secularisation in Sweden, accelerating considerably with growing industrialization 
and urbanization” (2000:151). With industrialisation and modernisation, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 In particular given that they were only asked to participate in the Holy Communion yearly, and 
surely, even a somewhat devoted Christian should be able to accomplish that simply by attending on a 
few occasions throughout the year.  
15 Similar negative trends emerged among men and women as well as within almost all age groups 
(Bäckström et al, 2004:25). 
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community or family based social structure largely evaporated, not just in Sweden, 
but also on a broader scale (e.g. Esping Andersen, 1990:13).16 As a result, the 
Swedish welfare model folkhemmet17 formed out of the need for a new safety net 
(Bäckström et al, 2004:27). At this time, liberal and socialist movements and social 
democratic ideology, in particular, gained ground (Alwall, 2000:150; Martling, 
2008:251). Up until the beginning of the 20th century, the church intensely defended 
itself against these movements and upheld its commitment to the pre-industrial order. 
This made Social Democrats, above others, openly hostile towards religion. 
Protestant churches throughout Europe generally adapted well to modernisation. 
However, similar to what happened with the Catholic Church in France (Bellah, 
1968:41), Tomasson argues that the Church’s initial unwillingness to adjust to the 
structural changes had a secularising effect, as he states, “That the church committed 
itself so completely to the values of the old order during the early period of 
modernization is the crucial factor in the development of the far-reaching 
secularization that occurred in the industrial working class and the educated middle 
class in Sweden” (2002:79).  
 
2.3.5 The Church and the Welfare State 
	  
A social democratic government was formed in 1920, 24 years after the first 
Social Democrat entered the parliament, and although it faced opposition from the 
political right, they steadily gained popularity (Socialdemokraterna, 2013). During 
the second decade of the 20th century, an attempt was made to resolve the conflicts 
with the Church of Sweden,18 and gradually, a strong relationship grew between the 
Social Democrats and the Church of Sweden (Tomasson, 2002:79). It was seen as a 
mutually beneficial relationship in that the government found that the Church could 
serve as a key component in the construction of the Swedish welfare model, 
folkhemmet, and the Church could simultaneously solidify its position as the nation’s 
official religious denomination (Bäckström, 2004:29). This may be a reason for why 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For Scotland, see section 2.4.7 (pp. 48-51). 
17 Folkhemmet (the people’s home) is based on the idea that the Swedish society functions as a large 
family where everyone is taken care of.  
18 Bishop Nathan Söderblom convinced the church that it needed to be politically independent to 
remain successful (Tomasson, 2002:79).    
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dissatisfaction19 with the church-state relationship (Alwall, 2000:151) did not result 
in disestablishment until a century later. Nonetheless, this inevitably meant that the 
Church was forced to compromise on its principles in order to best serve the need of 
the welfare state.  
Along with this, Bäckström et al (2004:29) describe how the organisational 
structure of the Church evolved hand in hand with the needs of the growing welfare 
state. They highlight the interwar period as the most crucial stage in the development 
of Sweden as a welfare society, which led to crucial changes for the Church. In 1929, 
the theological model of the folk church was devised (Martling, 2008:275; Thidevall, 
2000:300) which involved the requirement of the Church to serve the entire nation 
and all citizens in line with other public benefits available in the developing welfare 
state. However, instead of strengthening the organisational structure of the Church, 
these reforms gave the state gradually increasing power over it. The Church was, in 
turn, provided with financial security (Bäcktröm, 2004:30). Martling (2008:289) 
describes that this was the beginning of a long period of a complete politicisation of 
church power. For example, in the church motion of 1929, it was suggested by 
church leaders that people should be free to leave the church, but the parliament 
disagreed and stopped this plan for the reason that having people leave the Church of 
Sweden would undermine the foundations of folkhemmet and risk fragmentation of 
the Swedish community (Thidevall, 2000:301).  
The social democratic government was more concerned with the formation of 
a church that fit neatly into their welfare state model rather than the Church’s 
theological foundations. This went on for most of the 20th century and met little 
resistance from the Church, not only because of the funding it received, but also 
because the government assigned clergy at the bishop level as well as in other high 
positions and was perhaps more concerned with appointing “liberal, progressive, 
non-fundamentalist, or ‘modern-thinking’ men and women” (Zuckerman, 2008:119) 
and less with their religious convictions. Although a state church was of key 
importance to the Social Democrats, Zuckerman (2008) further highlights the fact 
that they were generally opposed to religion as a key reason for why Sweden is so 
secularised. He states that: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Around the turn of the century, discontent spread and motions were presented in the parliament for 
changes to the law (Alwall, 2000:151).  
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More than any other political party, the Social Democrats have dominated the parliaments of 
Denmark and Sweden, with their nearly hegemonic strength only diminishing in recent years. 
The Social Democrats have always been relatively anti-religious and anti-clerical and have 




However, given the high level of social democratic involvement in the Church, anti-
religious is a better description of the party than anti-clerical. Social Democrats 
often sought administrative positions within the Church, but not necessarily for any 
religious reasons. In other words, they effectively separated the Church from religion 
and sought to reinforce the former while not valuing the latter.  
In the first half of the 20th century, the social democratic government 
initiated important reforms that meant diminishing room for Christianity in the 
Swedish educational curriculum (Tomasson, 2002; Zuckerman, 2008). Tomasson 
(2002:71) explains that in 1919, the parliament ended the teaching of the catechism 
in elementary schools, which had been common practice for around 400 years. At the 
same time, less time was allocated to teachings of Christianity, and such teaching 
was to focus on ethics above theology, which meant a first step towards a secular 
curriculum.  
The 1950s saw a number of important religious reforms. First, the social 
democratic government continued its mission of a secular education system and from 
1950, Christianity could no longer be taught in schools in an evangelical style. 
Instead, students were taught about Christianity, as well as other religious 
philosophies,20 specifically through a social-scientific approach (Tomasson, 2002:71; 
Zuckerman, 2008:119-120).21 Second, 1951 marks the year of official freedom of 
religion in Sweden, when it was, for the first time possible for a citizen to formally 
exit the Church of Sweden for no religious denomination.22 This occurred later in 
Sweden than in the other Nordic nations (Alwall, 2000:152; Bäckström et al, 
2004:30; Bruce, 2000; Gustafsson, 1990:4; Martling, 2008:302). Gustafsson (1990:4) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Bruce argues that this is an important agent of secularisation as he states, “Greatest damage to 
religion has been caused, not by competing secular ideas, but by the general relativism that supposes 
that all ideologies are equally true (and hence equally false)” (2002a:117).  
21 That said, the law explicitly favoured teachings about Lutheranism (Tomasson, 2002:71), likely for 
historical reasons, as well as because it was still the official national religion.   
22 Whereas between 1860s and 1951, Swedes could only exit the church for another approved 
religious denomination. See section 2.3.3 (p. 31). 
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explains that this had little immediate impact as only 0.3 percent of members left the 
church during the first two years. Third, in 1958, the Church officially lost control 
over religious education in secondary schools (Martling, 2008:312; Tomasson, 
2002:71). As a result of increasing secularisation and immigration, the church-state 
investigations began that same year, with the purpose of re-evaluating the 
relationship between the Church and the state. It nonetheless did not result in a final 
proposition until 1994 (Alwall, 2000:166; Bäckström et al, 2004:31; Gustafsson, 
1990:9; Martling, 2008:303).  
 
2.3.6 The Church of Sweden 1960-2000 
	  
 Alwall (2000:166) describes the period following the changes of the 1950s as 
characterised by increasing demands for disestablishment of the State Church, 
mainly as a result of immigration and further secularisation. Bruce (2000:34) gives 
attention to emerging secularisation in Sweden. Citing Gustafsson (1978), he states 
that weekly attendance at mass had fallen from 17 percent of the population in the 
beginning of the century to 2.7 percent in 1965. In 1968, the committee in charge of 
the church-state investigations presented a proposal regarding the continuing role of 
the Church. The proposal had four alternatives ranging from maintaining the state 
church to completely removing all ties between the state and the Church of Sweden 
including the Church’s right of taxation. The committee emphasised the importance 
of religious liberty and to treat all religious denominations equally. At the time, this 
was a very controversial proposal and the parliament decided not to proceed (Alwall, 
2000:166-167; Martling, 2008:304; Statens Offentliga Utredningar, 1964:13; Statens 
Offentliga Utredningar, 1968:11).  
During the 1970s, political parties started to take an interest in the local 
parish elections. Several parties, if not all, were often represented on the ballots 
(Gustafsson, 1990:9). At the same time, church membership was slowly but steadily 
decreasing. In 1970s and 1980s, between 0.1 and 0.15 percent of members of the 
Church of Sweden actively exited the Church yearly (Gustafsson, 1990:4). Given 
increasing immigration as well as a new interest from the Church to examine its 
position in relation to the state, in 1978, new but less radical proposals were put 
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forward, this time focusing on membership through baptism rather than simply 
membership through birth (given that both parents had not left the Church) (Statens 
Offentliga Utredningar, 1978:1). Most clergy as well as bishops were in favour of the 
new proposition as membership would require an active choice (at least by the 
parents) and possibly result in a higher level of commitment among members. 
However, in addition to clergy, the Synod also consisted of elected representatives 
from the local parishes. This group largely disagreed with the proposed changes and 
saw it as “a threat to the traditional openness of the Swedish Folk Church” 
(Gustafsson, 1990:11). As a result, the Synod of the Church of Sweden rejected the 
proposal (Alwall, 2000:167). However, it is important to note that the resistance 
towards disestablishment was not a result of a highly flourishing church culture. 
Gustafsson (1990:6) describes that in 1981, half of Swedish church members 
attended a service less than once a year and as few as 9 percent attended at least 
every other month.  
In 1982, the government encouraged further democratisation of the church 
organisation and formed the General Assembly of the Church of Sweden, which was 
made up of 251 elected representatives without seats assigned specifically for clergy 
or bishops (Gustafsson, 1990:11). This, in turn, meant that church governance shifted 
further and further away from clergy and bishops and became increasingly political. 
This meant that virtually all decision making power was in the hands of the political 
parties in that “the price that the Church of Sweden has had to pay for its continued 
privileged position has been to succumb to the increased influence of the political 
parties both at the local and at the national levels of Church life” (Gustafsson, 
1990:12-13). Along with this, the social democratic government, far from 
theologically motivated, continued to view the Church as a basic human need that 
ought to be supported in line with the welfare state model. However, also other 
political parties were in favour of maintenance of the State Church, and it was only 
the Liberal Party and parts of the Conservatives who supported disestablishment 
(Gustafsson, 1990:13).  
As a result of an emerging post-industrial society with a stronger focus on the 
service sector and the individual, the 1990s were characterised by deregulation of 
several state monopolies in particular within communication and infrastructure 
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(Bäckström et al, 2004:31-33). Around this time, the church-state investigations that 
had begun in the 1950s led to a series of changes within the Church of Sweden. 
Bäckström et al (2004:33) believe that the church reforms came as a result of these 
larger structural changes in society. In 1991, the church relinquished the civil 
registration of births, deaths, marriages, personal identity numbers, addresses, 
citizenship, and data on spouse, children, and parents to the tax authorities, and in 
1996, the earlier proposal of church membership through baptism as opposed to birth 
was accepted (Alwall, 2000:168-169; Bäckström et al, 2004:40). In 1994, the final 
report in the church-state investigations was submitted in which a proposed 
separation between church and state was mainly motivated by a wish for the state to 
remain neutral in relation to various religious denominations (Martling, 2008:307; 
SOU 1994:42). In spite of this, in particular free churches argued that this 
proposition did not constitute a complete separation and that the Church of Sweden 
would still be privileged in the eyes of the state (Alwall, 2000:168).   
 
2.3.7 Disestablishment of the State Church 
	  
 The first of January 2000 marks the date when church and state were officially 
separated in most matters (Alwall, 2000:168; Bäckström et al, 2004:40; Martling, 
2008:307; Tomasson, 2002:79). The church tax previously collected by the Church 
of Sweden from all citizens now serves as a membership fee that is still collected as 
part of the income tax on all members (Bäckström et al, 2004:41). All individuals 
who were already part of the Church before the disestablishment are still members, 
provided they have not actively made the decision to leave. The government 
historically appointed all bishops, but they were now, for the first time, 
democratically elected by church members. Just as before the disestablishment, 
church elections continue to be characterised by political party interests (Tomasson, 
2002:80). A further example of how church matters are becoming more and more 
political, and arguably secular, is illustrated by the fact that just prior to the 
disestablishment, the General Assembly was given the right to decide on theological 
matters, which was previously handled by the bishops. In relation to this change, 
Tomasson quotes Swedish journalist Zaremba (1999) who states, “The new Swedish 
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church is a unique contribution to the history of religion: the world’s first religious 
association where bishops are denied to vote in matters of faith, and where the 
meaning of Christianity is established by the political parties” (Tomasson, 2002:80).   
 While the Church of Sweden no longer serves as a formal state church, it 
nevertheless plays a role as a national church. Specific legislation governs the 
organisation’s structure, leaving an important tie to the state that other religious 
organisations operating in Sweden do not have. This includes the Church’s 
undertaking in providing funeral services for all citizens, the requirement to remain a 
democratic organisation, its commitment to serve the entire nation, serving as the 
official and mandatory religion of the monarch, and to be open for all to take part in 
(Alwall, 2000:169; Bäckström et al, 2004:41). Because of this, Pettersson (2011) 
argues that a true separation has, in fact, not yet taken place.  
 Although the Church of Sweden is, by far, the largest and most influential 
religious organisation in Sweden, there are a number of smaller Protestant free 
churches and, as a result of recent immigration from Iraq, Iran, Somalia, Turkey, 
Boznia-Herzegovina, former Yugoslavia, and Poland, a significant number of 
Muslims and Catholics (Alwall, 2000; Bäckström et al, 2004:52; Statistics Sweden, 
2012). In spite of this, Sweden still experiences a relatively low degree of religious 
pluralism.23 However, membership rates within the Church of Sweden have 
decreased slowly but steadily since the beginning of the 1970s, going from above 95 
percent to just under 70 percent in 2011 (Svenska Kyrkan, 2013).24 Nevertheless, the 
considerable drop after the disestablishment in 2000 is unlikely to be explained by 
other denominations recruiting previous members of the Church of Sweden as the 
eight largest Christian denominations25 aside from the Church of Sweden have also 
seen a significant decline between 1975 and 2001 (Bäckström et al, 2004:51).  
 In spite of the declining membership rates, the Church of Sweden is relatively 
well off financially compared to free church organisations operating in Sweden 
(Bäckström 2004:50). Membership fees are, on average, one percent of each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 For more on pluralism, see section 3.5.2 (pp. 72-74).  
24 See section 7.2.1 (pp. 196-200).  
25 The Pentecostal Church, the Missionary Church, the Evangelical Free Church, the Baptist Church, 
the Salvation Army, the Alliance Church, the Methodist Church, and the Adventist Church 
(Bäckström et al, 2004:51).  
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member’s income26 (Svenska Kyrkan, 2013). The Church of Sweden also receives 
around 218 million Swedish Kronor27 yearly in gifts and charities. The Church has 
22 000 employees, and a large number of volunteers, such as choir leaders and 
leaders of children’s groups. There are over 100 000 choir participants within the 
Church of Sweden, and 55 000 members are active in parish sewing groups. Through 
selling textiles and other crafts for the benefit of the Church, these groups make 
around 48 million Swedish Kronor yearly.28 Every year, approximately 250 000 
children participate in one of the church groups, though the Sunday schools that were 
popular in the past are largely disappearing (Bäckström et al, 2004:50).  
 In addition to falling membership, Sweden is characterised by continuously 
declining levels of church attendance29 (Tomasson, 2002:62). Nevertheless, 
Bäckström et al (2004:44-45) explain that a majority of Swedes are members and 
participate in ceremonies in the Church whether or not they believe in God or attend 
regularly.30 Tomasson (2002:62) argues that Sweden is the most secular nation in the 
world with low levels of belief as well as attendance and that this is displayed as 
indifference towards religion, and not atheism.31 In line with Bäckström et al (2004), 
he explains that the church is seen as an important part of Swedish culture 
(Tomasson, 2002:64), and Furseth and Repstad (2006:127) describe how many non-
religious Swedes remain members of the Church as it offers a sense of security and a 
common identity.   
 As a result of the historical processes described throughout this chapter it may 
be argued that the long history of the often internally secularising state church and, 
perhaps most importantly, the over 1000 year close connection to the state are key 
elements in explaining the current religious landscape in Sweden. Unsurprisingly, 
while similarities exist, historical events shaping social structure as well as church 
history are largely different in the case of Scotland. This is consequently the focus of 
the remainder of this chapter.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Excluding the burial fee of 0.25 percent for all citizens (Svenska Kyrkan, 2013).	  
27 Approximately £20.5 million. 
28 Approximately £4.5 million. 
29 For more on levels of attendance, see Chapter 6 (pp. 159-192). 
30 See chapters 7 (pp. 193-232) and 8 (pp. 233-262).	  	  
31 See discussion of social significance of religion and atheism in section 3.4.3 (pp. 70-71). For more 
on measures of belief, see Chapter 5 (pp. 123-157).	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2.4 Scotland 
	  
2.4.1 Religion in Scotland Pre-Reformation 
	  
 Christianity reached Britain through Roman presence in the region. Pagan 
states that when the Romans came to Britain, “the old gods had to give way first to 
the Roman gods, and then to Christianity” (1988:10).32 A precise time period for the 
beginning of Christianity in Britain is difficult to pinpoint. Pagan (1988:12) explains 
that Christian settlements were found in Scotland dating from as early as the 4th 
century C.E., Lynch (1994:100) and Donaldson (1960:7) suggest that Christianity 
first arrived to Scotland with Ninian in the 5th century, and Bonner (1994:24) dates 
the emergence of Christianity in Britain to the end of the 6th century. However, the 
conversion to Christianity from the Celtic religions was a slow and gradual process 
(Bonner, 1994:24; Brown, 2001:1), and it was not until the 12th century that the 
Celtic Church was completely overtaken by Roman Catholicism (Balfour, 1911:1).  
 Donaldson (1960:20) explains that the introduction of parish churches in the 
12th century had a profound and long-lasting impact on the religious landscape in 
Scotland. With this organisational change, the church enhanced its place in the 
community. Hill (1994:45) describes churches in the early Christian period33 as 
closely involved in people’s lives through christenings, weddings, funerals, and 
mass. The church functioned as the place where the community congregated and it 
also served to maintain morals and justice. Furthermore, the church was in charge of 
important societal functions even before the formal introduction of state churches 
(Hill, 1994:45). Moreover, Donaldson (1960:9) asserts that the church played an 
important role in the shaping of the Scottish nation in the early 11th century as the 
church, in fact, preceded the formation of the nation. This may serve as one reason 
for the emerging bond between the state and the church in Scotland. Lynch further 
states that, “The papacy and the Scottish Crown had long enjoyed a special 
relationship, and the emergence of a Scottish Church had owed as much to 
successive Kings of Scots as they had relied upon it to underpin their own authority” 
(1994:99).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Nevertheless, the Romans had a relatively weak impact on Scotland, symbolised by Hadrian’s Wall 
in Northern England and Antonine Wall in Scotland built as defence from invaders (Pagan, 1988:10).  
33 Beginning in the early 11th century (Hill, 1994:45).  
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2.4.2 The Reformation in Scotland 
	  
 Keller and Stewart (1927:241) explain that the Reformation reached Scotland 
half way through the 16th century challenging the, what they call, corrupt Roman 
Church. Lynch, on the other hand, is more cautious in judging the condition of the 
church at this time and describes it as “a patchwork of endemic faults and new 
initiatives” (1994:123). The early 16th century was characterised by a growing 
interest in Luther’s writings. Scotland’s Parliament, far from happy with the 
challenge to the established religion, made a legislative effort to prohibit these 
writings. However, restricting religious freedom may indeed have had an opposite 
effect by empowering those who demanded reform (Cameron, 1994:131; Donaldson, 
1960:50; Pagan, 1988:74). In spite of opposition from some elites, the Reformation 
in Scotland was reasonably nonviolent (Brown 1997:14), and to some extent 
welcomed among the people (Keller and Stewart, 1927:241). Cameron (1994:132), 
however, argues that the Reformers faced intense persecution, but that it was, 
nonetheless, a short-lived struggle.  
Led by John Knox, the Reformed Church was established in 1560 when the 
first General Assembly organised in Edinburgh (Balfour, 1911:21; Donaldson, 
1960:53; Keller and Stewart, 1927:241; Pagan, 1988:92). That same year, the 
Parliament endorsed the faith of the Reformed Church and prohibited the mass 
(Balfour, 1911:22; Cameron, 1994:134; Donaldson, 1960:549;). The Reformation 
successfully overtook the Catholic Church throughout Scotland34 (Brown, 1997:14). 
Donaldson (1960:61) explains that from this point on, the connection between the 
nation and the church strengthened further to the point where they were indeed 
inseparable. However, in terms of the authority over the Reformed Church, Scotland 
was distinctly different from England and the Lutheran nations. In these nations, the 
power over the church was in the hands of the crown, solidifying an official bond 
between church and state. This did not happen in Scotland due to the fact that Mary 
Queen of Scots could not serve as the Supreme Governor of the Church as she was 
Catholic. Donaldson states that, instead, “the substitute for the royal supremacy, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Except from a few communities in the north-eastern and far-western parts of the nation (Brown, 
1997:14).  
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which the Scots could not have, was found in a general assembly consisting of 
representatives of the same three estates of the realm which at the time formed a 
Scottish parliament – barons, burgesses and clergy” (1960:61).35 
 
2.4.3 The Struggle for Presbyterianism 
	  
 The Reformed Church was, at the time of the Reformation, Calvinistic in its 
theology, but not yet Presbyterian in its organisation36 (Donaldson, 1960:63). After 
the Reformation was complete, an intense struggle followed between Presbyterians 
and Episcopalians, but it is important to note that this struggle was not over doctrine, 
but simply over the organisational structure of the church (Donaldson, 1960:80). 
John Knox criticised episcopacy as simply another version of Catholicism37 (Balfour, 
1911:61; Brown 1997:14;). In relation to this, Brown states that, “rule by bishops 
under episcopacy was merely ‘popery’ in another guise. Episcopacy was seen as the 
religion of the royalty and aristocracy and but a short step from Catholicism” 
(1997:15).  In 1578, the General Assembly, in essence, approved Presbyterianism by 
rejecting the divinity of bishops as well as royal power over the church. Instead, the 
Church was to be governed by kirk sessions, presbyteries, synods, and the General 
Assembly, all consisting of ministers and elders. However, this was met with 
opposition from the government, who saw independence of the Church as a threat to 
their position (Cameron, 1994:137; Donaldson, 1960:72-73; Pagan, 1988:119). As a 
result, the government declared royal supremacy over the Church and ruled to retain 
the role of the bishops in the Church’s organisational structure (Balfour, 1911:69; 
Donaldson, 1960:73). That controlling the Church, and thus the divine, was key to 
maintain power was well understood by King James I of England and VI of 
Scotland. Consequently, he ordered the General Assembly to acknowledge royal 
authority as well as appointed bishops (Cameron, 1994:138).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The structure of the General Assembly as representative of all parts of the nation is also explained 
in Cameron (1994:135-136).  
36 Presbyterianism has a democratic structure of kirk sessions for each parish made up of ministers 
and elders. Some of these ministers and elders, in turn, represent the parish in the presbytery, which 
then sends representatives to the General Assembly (Brown, 1997:18).  
37 Because of their adherence to bishops and royal power (Brown, 1997:14-15).  
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 The battle between the Episcopalians and the Presbyterians continued over 
the 17th century (Brown, 1997:14; Keller and Stewart, 1927:242). Donaldson states:  
 
The whole period of the controversy between the Presbyterian and Episcopalian parties in the 
Church of Scotland from 1575 to 1690, has the appearance of alternating phases of one 
system of church order and the other – episcopacy in 1584, presbytery in 1592, episcopacy in 
1610, presbytery in 1638, episcopacy in 1661 and presbytery in 1690…It was all a little like 
parliamentary government, in which two parties alternately achieve power (1960:75).  
 
 
Finally in 1690, a settlement was reached in which Presbyterianism was reinstated on 
a more permanent basis, which meant abolishing the authority of bishops. However, 
this did not come without a price. The Kirk (The Church of Scotland) was not 
recognised as independent from the state, and simultaneously, no longer had 
representation in Parliament. In other words, the Presbyterian Church ultimately 
responded to Parliament, which oversaw the Church as a secular body and which did 
not claim any divine rights (Balfour, 1911:111; Donaldson, 1960:91-92; Keller and 
Stewart, 1927:242; Pagan 1988:74). Along with this, Donaldson (1960) states:  
 
The establishment of Presbyterianism was further tied to the statute of law in 1707 when 
parliaments of England and Scotland were united, for it was then declared to be 
“fundamental and essential” condition of the union that the existing government of the 
Church of Scotland should be maintained (1960:92).  
 
 
The fact that Scotland ceased to be a sovereign state in 1707 meant that the Kirk had 
a very different position as a state church than the Church of Sweden in the same 
time period, illustrated by the fact that the Church of Scotland had to defend and 
protect religious unity in Scotland with opposition from the British state. In 1712, the 
newly established British parliament went against the Kirk’s wishes to reject 
Episcopalians within the law and, while they faced unequal terms, other faiths were 
now allowed to operate alongside the Established Church (Brown, 1997:188; 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 This essentially meant religious diversity in Scotland as early as five years after the union.  
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2.4.4 Divisions within the Presbyterian Church 
	  
Brown (1997:16) states that not only did the Presbyterian National Church 
experience turmoil and opposition from Episcopalians, but also from within. 
Donaldson (1960:94) argues that this came as a result of the decision to allow 
different religious denominations to operate in Scotland. The 18th century was 
characterised by increasing dissatisfaction with the Established Church. However, 
the cause of the discontent was neither the Church’s administration nor its 
fundamental doctrine (Balfour, 1911:18), but rather with the state’s control as well as 
liberal tendencies within the Church (Brown, 1997:17; Donaldson, 1960:96). This 
eventually resulted in parts of the clergy and the adherents breaking away from the 
Established Church. In 1733, the first dissenting church was created, and many more 
followed (Brown, 1997:19; Keller and Stewart, 1927:242).  
Brown (1997:17) explains that towards the end of the 18th century, the 
demand for a separation of church and state was widespread. Eventually, the bitter 
conflict led to the Disruption of 1843, where the Free Church of Scotland broke from 
the Kirk and attracted almost forty percent of both clergy and adherents. The Free 
Church of Scotland set out to replicate every aspect of the Kirk, including its 
theology, and its mission to serve the whole nation by a presence in each parish.39 
This meant that aside from their position in relation to the state, little differentiated 
the two churches (Brown, 1993:12, 1997:21; Bruce and Glendinning, 2010:108; 
Donaldson, 1960:98; Keller and Stewart, 1927:242; Robbins, 1994:366; Smout, 
1986:187). Donaldson (1960:98-99) explains that at this time, the seceding churches 
together outnumbered the Established Church. He further argues that it was perhaps 
a fundamental weakness in Presbyterianism that caused this fragmentation since it 
was fairly easy for a dissatisfied minister to start a new church within his own 
Presbytery. Moreover, Brown (1997:22) asserts that the Established Church lost 
adherents at a very steep rate, which can be illustrated by the fact that at the end of 
the 19th century, the Kirk only attracted 15 percent of the population. It is important 
to note that the remainder of the population did not exclusively belong to a dissenting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 As a result, once the two churches unified in 1900, there was an oversupply of churches throughout 
the nation.  
	   46	  
Presbyterian church, but that, as explained below, other denominations were also 
gaining momentum in this time period.  
 
2.4.5 Increasing Religious Diversity 
	  
Since the Toleration Act of 1712, the Episcopal Church slowly but steadily 
grew, predominantly in southern Scotland (Donaldson 1960:104). By the end of the 
18th century, they were increasingly influential in Scotland, but just like the 
Established Church, they were plagued with schisms particularly in relation to the 
association with English migrants as well as the rich and the middle class (Brown, 
1997:34; Donaldson, 1960:104; Strong, 2002). In the early 18th century, the Catholic 
Church only had minor presence in Scotland, estimated at around 17 000 adherents 
and corresponding to around one percent of the population (Brown, 1997:31). 
However, the situation changed drastically in the 19th century when the Catholics 
saw a twentyfold increase. This came, almost entirely, as a result of increasing 
immigration from Ireland (Brown, 1997:31-32; Donaldson, 1960:108; Pagan, 
1988:178). Bruce and Glendinning (2010:109) state that, at this time, Catholics in 
Glasgow participated more actively in a church than they had prior to leaving Ireland 
as it was an important way to establish social networks. This ultimately serves as a 
historical foundation for the role of Scottish churches as a cultural or ethnic 
defence.40    
Interestingly, while the Act of 1712 opened up for religious pluralism, it was 
arguably the social structural changes of the 18th and 19th century that led to the 
enormous diversification of religion in Scotland. This time period was characterised 
by increasing mobility. In line with this, Brown states that: 
 
On the threshold of the agricultural and industrial revolutions, Scotland was not 
homogeneous in religion…It was the economic and social changes of the 18th and 19th 
century which were to introduce a belated but very rapid and extensive process of pluralism 
in religion” (1997:17).  
 
 
As individuals migrated and settled down in new areas, it was not surprising that 
communities were formed centred around common religious backgrounds. This was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 See section 3.8.1 (pp. 85-87). 
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a devastating blow to the Established Church, which had enough to struggle against 
with Presbyterian dissent. Brown states that the 18th century saw a further steep 
decline within the Kirk, and explains that, “In the space of just over a hundred years 
the Church of Scotland had shifted from a position of near monopoly in religion to 
that of one denomination amongst several” (1997:22).  
 
2.4.6 Unification of Scottish Presbyterianism 
	  
 During the second half of the 19th century, a growing desire for unification 
emerged among the dissenting churches (Pagan, 1988:156). As stated above, the 
Presbyterian churches did not clash on doctrine or internal organisation, but mainly 
in relation to the issue of independence from the state. In line with this, Balfour 
states that, “the Free Churchmen had still cherished the principle of a National 
Church, and would gladly have returned to alliance with the State on the acceptance 
of their own terms as to spiritual independence” (1911:149-150). He further states 
that they were not optimistic and rather than trying to reach an agreement with the 
Established Church, the dissenting churches sought allegiance with one another. In 
1847, the United Presbyterian Church was formed as a coalition of dissenting 
Presbyterian churches (Balfour, 1911:150; Brown, 1993:16, 1997:22; Pagan, 
1988:156; Robbins, 1994:367; Stewart and Keller, 1927:242). Up until 1900, there 
were three larger Presbyterian churches in Scotland; the Free Church, the Church of 
Scotland, and the United Presbyterian Church. In the late 19th century, the Free 
Church gradually distanced itself from its mission to serve as an established church 
in favour of a voluntary principle. This attracted further negotiations for a reunion in 
particular with the United Presbyterian Church, and in 1900, they merged as the 
United Free Church41 (Balfour, 1911:153; Brown, 1997:27; Pagan, 1988:156-157; 
Smout, 1986:189; Stewart and Keller, 1927:242).  
 The beginning of the 20th century saw an increasing willingness to bring the 
Presbyterian churches together. The process of breaking the bond to the state began 
in 1904 and the Church of Scotland was eventually disestablished as a state church in 
the 1920s following the Act of 1921, where the parliament recognised spiritual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 90 % of the United Presbyterian kirk sessions and 95% of the Free Church presbyteries agreed to 
union (Brown, 1997:27). Some dissenters have stayed out to this day (Pagan, 1988:157).  
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independence of the Church, and the Act of 1925, in which ownership of church 
property was shifted from the state to church trustees (Brown, 1997:145). Brown 
(1997:28) states that from the time it was formed until the disestablishment of the 
state church, the United Free Church discussed a reunion with the Kirk. In 1927, 
Keller and Stewart wrote that “the union of the United Free Church and the Church 
of Scotland is only a matter of months” (1927:245). Finally, in 1929, the Kirk 
merged with a majority of the dissenting Presbyterian churches and was thereafter 
known as the “National” Church of Scotland (Brown, 1997:22, 1993:17; Cheyne, 
1983:186; Pagan, 1988:157; Smout, 1986:189). 
 
2.4.7 Religion in Scotland at a Time of Social Change 
	  
In 1851, a church attendance census42 revealed a number of important 
characteristics about the state of the Established Church and its competitors, as well 
as the level of commitment of the people. The accuracy of the census has been 
debated, but it is nevertheless the key source of information on religious activity at 
this time. Brown (1997:60) argues that church attendance was high at this time and 
that it rose during the second half of the century. He presents figures suggesting that 
Presbyterian free churches and non-Presbyterian churches made up 68 percent of all 
churchgoers in the nation, while the Church of Scotland only constituted 32 percent. 
Interestingly, in Edinburgh, the Kirk attracted only 16 percent of churchgoers 
(1997:45). Brown further mentions that a century earlier, the Kirk was attended by 
approximately 90 percent of Scottish churchgoers (1997:46). Largely a function of 
the Disruption, this sharp decline meant that the Established Church only represented 
a minority of the Scottish people in an increasingly religiously diverse Scottish 
society.  
 However, Brown (1997:47) further argues that membership and attendance 
in the Established Church actually increased steadily in the second half of the 19th 
century. Additionally, he describes the turn of the century as the peak in church 
activity with levels that have not since been measured in Scotland (1997:62). Smout 
(1986:184) asserts that at the beginning of the 20th century, religion had become less 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 This was also repeated in 1882 and 1890 (Smout, 1986:198). 
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and less important to the Scottish people, characterised by an increasing indifference. 
In line with this, Cheyne (1983:177) states that around year 1900, more than a third 
of the population had no connection to a church.  
Smout (1986:198) suggests that church attendance was more frequent in the 
Highlands and other rural areas. He states that rural Scots still cherished the religious 
activities that the church organised, but that urban areas as well as areas with a high 
concentration of migrant labour, saw a sharp decline in religious participation. 
Brown (1993:29; 1997:60) strongly disagrees with this observations and, in fact, 
argues that church attendance was much higher in the cities, and thus, that the case of 
Scotland is a clear example of how urbanisation does not cause religious decline. In 
fact, he states that, “Scotland, like both England and Wales and the United States, 
exhibited strong growth in church attendance per capita from 1840 to 1905 – the very 
era of rapid urbanisation and industrialisation” (1993:30).43 However, this was likely 
due to Catholic immigration that peaked in this time period (Brown, 1997:32).   
Brown further directs attention to the effect of migration, both in terms of 
urbanisation and foreign immigration, on social fragmentation. As churches were 
places to go to for “jobs, accommodation, friends, leisure, charity, and culture” 
(1993:131), they became representations of social groups and communities external 
to the religious realm.44 Church affiliation similarly became a marker of social class. 
In middle class areas, the Church served as a popular organiser of various leisure 
activities for adults as well as children. In time, it began devoting more time to 
community building45 and less to evangelicalism and inclusion of the working class 
(Brown, 1997:130-131).  
As in Sweden,46 the end of the 19th century and the first two decades of the 
20th century saw an increasing attention to social inequality in Scotland. The church 
remained responsive in that a social theology was devised and a Christian-socialist 
movement was instated (Brown, 1997:133-135). Brown states that doing this was 
wise as, “to have directly opposed labour and adopted a coherently reactionary 
political stance would have intensified – or, as in Germany, completed – the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 For more on participation, see Chapter 6 (pp. 159-192). 
44 This is arguably the origin of cultural defence of religion in Scotland - see section 3.8.1 (pp. 85-87).   
45 Increasingly consisting of secular activities (Brown, 1997:131).  
46 See section 2.3.4 (pp. 32-33). 
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alienation of the working classes from the churches” (1997:139). However, attempts 
to unite the Church and the labour movement had different levels of success. 
Conservative leadership of the Church in the 1920s further polarised not only the 
Church and the working class, but also the Presbyterians and the rapidly growing 
Catholic community (Brown, 1997:140-141; Pagan, 1988:178).  
At this time, Presbyterians started experiencing more and more competition 
from Catholics, who almost doubled in number between 1890 and 1939. While there 
had been tension between Catholics and Protestants since the Reformation, it 
increased with Irish immigration in the 19th century and further heightened in the 
early 20th century. In 1918, the government brought Catholic schools into the state 
system, a decision that was very progressive at this time given that Scotland was the 
first nation where a Catholic minority received full recognition and support from the 
government (Brown, 1997:144; Field, 2001:166). Yet, Catholics commonly faced 
discrimination in the work place, such as being discouraged from applying to 
specific occupations based on their religious affiliation alone (Brown, 1997:191-
194). This further alienated Catholics from Protestants, and instilled a stronger bond 
within the Catholic community. In line with this, Pagan states that, “It was not only 
poverty that bound the Catholic community together, but also the resentment it 
experienced as an immigrant community alternately exploited as cheap labour doing 
the jobs no one else would do or seen as a threat when times were hard” (1988:179). 
Most importantly, as explained further below, religious conflict has historically 
played a key part in the expression of a religious and cultural identity in Scotland 
(Weller, 2004:9).   
Brown (1997:154) explains that while the first half of the 20th century did not 
see Presbyterian revival, yet, the number of adherents remained relatively stable. 
Cheyne (1983:186), on the other hand, attributes a Scottish religious decline in this 
period to profound social changes, particularly emphasising the decreasing sense of 
stability and security around the economic depression and the World Wars. In line 
with this, Bruce and Glendinning (2010:124) argue that a decline in affiliation can be 
attributed to the changing structure of the family during the Second World War. 
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Brown (1997:162) agrees that the wars, in particular the Second World War,47 had a 
negative effect on the churches, but that this was, nevertheless, short term. He further 
argues that Presbyterianism experienced an upsurge at the end of the war48 and that 
“evidence suggests that the strong interest in organised religion was amongst young 
people, perhaps especially those born just before and during the war years” 
(1997:162-163). However, Bruce and Glendinning (2010:115-117) argue that even if 
there was an upswing at this time, levels of affiliation were still lower than in the 
1920s and 30s, and that the largest decline in church affiliation can be seen among 
those who were born in the 1940s and 1950s.  
 
2.4.8 Religion in Scotland since 1950 
	  
 After the increase in church adherence at the end of the wars, the newfound 
interest in religion quickly began to diminish in the second half of the 20th century 
(Brown 1997:164; Smout, 1986:207). Brown (1997:165) mentions that one of the 
reasons for this was the re-housing schemes between the 1950s and the 1970s that 
led to a sudden loss of a sense of community and connection to a church. Secondly, 
he asserts that churches were nonresponsive to the changing Scottish political 
climate. He explains that while the Labour Party had become increasingly popular 
beginning in the early 1950s, a large majority of elders in the General Assembly 
were Conservatives. The Kirk therefore experienced increasing difficulties in 
attracting Labour voters and was thus unable to adjust to emerging social and 
cultural changes.  
Brown highlights that the difficulties facing the churches were less a product 
of social class49 and more a matter of culture as he states that, “the inability to 
maintain religious or church-based leisure in the weekly life of the people has been a 
major cause of the declining role of the church as a focus in urban community life” 
(1997:168). More specifically, as it was opposed to many aspects of youth culture, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 This likely had a modest impact on religion in Sweden, primarily because of its neutral stance, but 
also because church attendance was already very low at this point in time - see Chapter 6 (pp. 159-
192). 
48 The number of Presbyterian adherents rose by 175 000 in 1946 alone (Brown, 1997:162).  
49 Brown explains that there is little evidence that lower social groups were any less religious, 
particularly when considering the strength of the Catholic Church within the working class 
(1997:166).  
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such as drinking and gambling, the Church failed to attract younger people to their 
activities. Furthermore, increasing rights along with changing values for women in 
the 1960s led to a decline in adherence, explained by the fact that women, as the 
traditional driving force behind religious participation, were pushed further away 
from the Church (1997:204). This has, nonetheless, been contested by the fact that, at 
this time, there had already been a large decline in male participation in the church, 
and the female decline merely reflected this (e.g. Bruce and Glendinning, 2010:113). 
Brown argues that the changes explained above can be illustrated as a generational 
shift in attitudes and behaviour in regards to religion between those born before 1950 
and those born after, and that a similar change can be seen in the Catholic 
community 20-30 years later (Brown, 1997:169, 174).  
While tension between Catholics and Protestants continued into the second 
half of the 20th century, the focus of the conflicts left the workplace and became 
increasingly involved with leisure activities. This was, primarily, seen in Glasgow 
with, oftentimes, violent football matches between Rangers, “representing” 
Protestants, and Celtic, who emerged from the Irish Catholic community. Brown 
(1997:194-195) explains that secularisation in this time period caused the conflicts to 
fade along with a decline in perceived importance of religion. Field (2001:166) 
argues that the state’s support for separate schools for Catholics is a remaining cause 
of strain, and that a majority of the people, in fact, oppose this arrangement.50  
Furthermore, Brown argues that one reason for the decreasing intensity of 
sectarianism is that “for the Protestants, the Church of Scotland, in the late twentieth 
century has failed to arouse enough interest or passion to ‘defend’ it against 
perceived threats” (1997:196). While conflicts between Catholics and Protestants are 
still a reality in parts of the country (Brown, 1997:196; Field, 2001:165; Walls and 
Williams, 2006), several scholars claim that this has been exaggerated and that 
sectarianism in Scotland is, today, generally weak (e.g. Bruce et al, 2004; Rosie, 
2004). Along with this, Paterson and Iannelli (2006) discuss diminishing differences 
in educational opportunities between Catholics and Protestants and show findings 
that suggest an absence of religious discrimination in the Scottish labour market.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Interestingly, just half of Catholics support having their own state schools (Field, 2001:166).  
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2.4.9 Religion in Scotland Today 
	  
 As is presented above, it has been a long time since the Church of Scotland 
served as a majority church in Scotland, despite its history as the Established Church.  
In 2009, the Church of Scotland had around 464 000 members, which accounts for 
around 9 percent of the population (The Church of Scotland, 2012).51 The Church of 
Scotland has 1564 congregations throughout Scotland and serves as a democratic 
organisation with multiple administrative levels. On the parish level, there are kirk 
sessions made up by elders and ministers, on the district level, the church is 
represented by presbyteries with ministers and a selection of elders, and the General 
Assembly of Scotland on the national level. The Church of Scotland has around 43 
000 elders, 1100 ministers, and 2000 volunteers. Their annual budget is around £39 
million, most of which constitutes donations made by members to local 
congregations (Flint et al, 2002:51; The Church of Scotland, 2012). The Church 
provides a vast range of activities for the community. Congregations commonly run 
children’s clubs, crèche facilities, cultural events, and transport services for the 
elderly.52 Additionally, more than half of the congregations provide meeting rooms 
and community halls that are used by various local organisations (Flint et al, 
2002:60-61). To become a member, a person needs to be baptised and to be added to 
a local congregation’s communion roll. No formal membership fee is required, but 
donations are encouraged (The Church of Scotland, 2012).  
 The strong bond between the Kirk and the state has long been severed, and 
today, a majority of Scots agree that the church should refrain from taking a stand in 
political issues (Field, 2001:167). Nevertheless, while the Kirk is not formally tied to 
the state, it has a nation-wide mission and is widely considered as the national 
Church of Scotland, and in line with this, the church itself states that “Little remains 
of the Church's previous establishment, but it retains a strong sense of a national 
responsibility to bring Christ's Gospel to the whole of Scotland” (The Church of 
Scotland, 2012).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 For more on membership, see section 7.2.3 (pp. 203-208). 
52 Between 20 and 40 percent of congregations provided these services in 2000. Other services that 
were provided by a small minority of congregations include non-religious education classes, special 
needs services, support groups, tutoring, preschool clubs, and support to the homeless (Flint et al, 
2002:60-61). 
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 As presented above, the National Church in Scotland has encountered a fair 
share of struggles throughout its history. Even though the Church of Scotland has a 
special place as the National Church and the former Established Church, they have, 
nonetheless, experienced competition from multiple religious organisations since the 
time of the 1707 Union. Religious affiliation has undoubtedly served as an important 
component of community or group identification, and, thus, the Scottish people have 
never been united behind a single religious body. Given this, identification with the 
Kirk and participation in its rituals are not seen as the cultural norm in Scotland to 




 This chapter discussed the notion of Protestantism and the Reformation as 
agents of secularisation. However, even if this may be the case, it is clear that as two 
Protestant European nations, the historical experiences of religion differ considerably 
in Scotland and Sweden. This chapter highlighted four key historical aspects that 
may serve as part of an explanation for contemporary differences in secularisation in 
the two nations. The first reason centres on an understanding of theological 
differences between Lutheranism (Sweden) and Calvinism (Scotland), where the 
former to a further extent than the latter emphasises church rituals, individualism, 
and a close relationship to the state. 
 Second, the Church of Sweden’s intimate connection to the crown may have 
been secularising in itself.  In Scotland, from the time of the Reformation, various 
interests were involved in church governance through the early establishment of a 
general assembly, and the Church of Scotland was one of the rare national churches 
in Europe where the church was not closely tied to the crown. Along with this, the 
Reformation in Scotland was, if not a revolution, at least led by passionate Scottish 
people against opposing elites. In Sweden, on the contrary, there was never a popular 
demand to abandon Catholicism (which had been similarly imposed on the people by 
the state 500 years earlier). 
 Third, in Scotland, the Church was never as closely tied to secular politics as it 
has been in Sweden throughout its history. This can be seen until this day where 
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decision making power within the Church of Scotland is in the hands of people who 
are actually religious (ministers and elders) and not like in Sweden, where the 
Church is, despite official independence from the state, an increasingly secular 
institution run by elected politicians.  
 The fourth aspect relates to the differences in religious diversity between the 
two nations. The Church of Scotland experienced turmoil and struggle from the time 
of the Reformation. With high levels of immigration around the period of 
industrialisation and urbanisation, Scottish religion became a differentiating marker 
of a group identity. By contrast, the Church of Sweden had a comfortable and 
practically unchallenged position as a singular church for the Swedish people for 
over 400 years.53   
 Scotland and Sweden share several similarities in relation to their religious 
backgrounds. Both nations converted to Christianity around the same time and had 
Protestant state churches established at the time of the Reformation that have since 
been disestablished. Moreover, both the Church of Scotland and the Church of 
Sweden serve as national churches that, to this day, are the largest religious 
organisations in their respective nation. Nevertheless, the historical differences 
described above show how these processes largely diverged from the time of the 
Reformation. These dissimilarities may arguably assist in explaining important 
contemporary trends in religiosity and secularisation in Scotland and Sweden. Along 
with this, the next chapter will present key theoretical concepts that, in conjunction 
with the historical backgrounds, will be used to explain contextual differences in 
trends of religion.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 While the direction of the relationship has been debated, religious diversity or pluralism is widely 
regarded as having an effect on religiosity - see section 3.5.2 (pp. 72-74). 
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 This chapter is divided into three parts, beginning with a discussion of 
various dimensions and definitions of religiosity. The fluid meaning of religiosity 
arguably makes it difficult to conceptualise, which is of key importance in 
understanding much of the contemporary debates within sociology of religion. The 
second part of the chapter focuses on theories of secularisation and religious decline, 
starting with the fundamental debate on secularisation. This is followed by a 
discussion of three important theoretical and conceptual contributions to this debate. 
First, I focus on Davie’s (1990, 1994, 2002a, 2004, 2007) conceptualisation of 
believing and belonging, where I highlight the benefits and limitations of applying 
such a typology on the Swedish and Scottish cases. Second, I will present theories of 
the religious economy as presented by the American sociologists of religion (e.g. 
Iannaccone, 1991, 1992, 1995, 1998; Stark, 1999; Stark and Bainbridge, 1987; Stark 
and Finke, 2000; Stark and Iannaccone, 1994, 1995; Stark et al, 2005; Warner, 1993, 
2005) and explain why some of their observations may be particularly useful to 
explain differences between Scotland and Sweden and why others are not relevant to 
the contexts of study. Third, I will describe how deprivation theories (e.g. Furseth 
and Repstad, 2006; Glock and Stark, 1965; Glock et al, 1967; Marx and Engels, 
1848/2012; Rice, 2003; Roof, 1976; Stark and Bainbridge, 1980), as well as social 
security, and social welfare (e.g. Gill, 2008; Gill and Lundsgaarde, 2004; Norris and 
Inglehart, 2004) play a role in religious decline as well as offer an alternative 
explanation for differences in measures of secularisation in Scotland and Sweden.  
 This brings me to the third part of the chapter where I primarily focus on 
concepts explaining the remaining functions of religion in secularising societies. 
First, I provide an account of the inherent connection between religion, society, and 
the nation (e.g. Bellah, 1991; Casanova, 2001; Durkheim, 1912/1995; Hervieu-
Léger, 2006; Llobera, 1994; Marx, 2005). This is followed by a description of the 
concept of cultural religion (e.g. Demerath, 2000; Zuckerman, 2008) that can 
convincingly be applied to the case of Sweden. Third and fourth, I introduce key 
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literature on the relationship between religion and social capital (e.g. Bruce 2002b; 
Davie 2002b; Hadaway and Roof, 1978; Hammond, 1992; McIntosh et al, 2002; 
Portes, 2000; Putnam, 2001), and cultural defence (e.g. Bruce, 1996, 2002a; Martin, 
1978; Zuckerman, 2009), two aspects that I believe offer relevant insights not only to 
the secularisation debate, but particularly into the role of religion in contemporary 
Scotland.  
 Devising a theory that can serve as a universal and comprehensive 
explanation of religious belief and behaviour is bound to be both imprecise and 
inaccurate. It is clear that these theories and concepts are only applicable in the light 
of important contextual differences. As a result, my intention is that, in relation to the 
historical background presented in the previous chapter, these concepts and theories 
will serve as tools with which to explore as well as clarify possible reasons for the 
key differences in my research findings on measures of religious beliefs and 
belonging as presented in Chapter 5, 6, 7, and 8.  
 
3.2 Definitions of Religion and Religiosity 
	  
3.2.1 Defining Religion 
	  
 Sociologists of religion generally define the term religion in either a 
substantive or functional manner: what religion is or to what it does (e.g. Wallis and 
Bruce, 1992:9; Davie, 2007:19). Both types of definitions pose certain problems. 
First of all, a functional perspective may, as Wallis and Bruce argue, “count as 
religious things that on the face of it do not look very religious (political ideologies 
or secular therapies) and that are typically regarded as secular by their adherents” 
(1992:9). On the other hand, a substantive definition of religion poses limitations as 
to what is studied. As it most often refers to supernatural entities, this form of 
definition tends to exclude other shapes and forms of religious expression typically 
seen in non-Western cultures (Wallis and Bruce, 1992:10; Davie, 2007:20; Taylor, 
2007:429).   
 Many sociologists of religion adopt a substantive definition of religion (e.g. 
Martin, 1978:12; Stark and Finke, 2000:89; Wallis and Bruce, 1992:10; Zuckerman, 
2008:154). Wallis and Bruce argue that even those who are interested in studying 
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functions of religion can do so successfully with a substantive definition as they state 
that: 
 
While we readily concede the value of exploring similarities between religious institutions 
and other patterns of behaviour that at times seem to serve similar purposes, calling them all 
religious gains very little except some contentious theoretical baggage and loses much 
analytical clarity. A legitimate interest in exploring ‘functional’ equivalents of religion can 
be pursued as readily with a substantive definition of religion as a functional one (1992:10).   
 
 
In line with this, several scholars emphasise the importance of including the 
“supernatural” in a definition of religion. For example, Stark and Finke (2000:89) 
explain that “religion is concerned with the supernatural, everything else is 
secondary,” and largely criticise Durkheim’s (1912/1995) choice of vaguely defining 
religion in relation to the “sacred.” Martin defines religion as “an acceptance of a 
level of reality beyond the observable world known to science, to which are ascribed 
meanings and purposes completing and transcending those of the purely human 
realm” (1978:12). Zuckerman also stresses the importance of the supernatural and 
states that “Religion refers to concepts, rituals, experiences, and institutions that 
humans construct based upon their belief in the supernatural, otherworldly, or 
spiritual” (2008:154). Taylor (2007:429) asserts that a definition revolved around the 
supernatural works better on a Christian or Western context of study. He further 
believes that Wallis and Bruce offer the most appropriate definition of religion in 
relation to a study on secularisation:  
 
Religion for us consists of actions, beliefs, and institutions predicated upon the assumption of 
existence of either supernatural entities with powers of agency, or impersonal powers or 
processes possessed of moral purpose, which have the capacity to set the conditions of, or to 
intervene in, human affairs (Wallis and Bruce, 1992:10-11). 
 
 
 In line with the scholars above, I believe that a substantive definition is the 
most useful for this study. In a study of secularisation in Protestant Europe, the 
notion of the supernatural is key as functional aspects of religion can remain in a 
context that is to a considerable degree void of supernatural beliefs. I agree with 
Wallis and Bruce (1992:10) that a functional definition would essentially overlook 
important distinctions between religious and secular behaviour. Even though I aim to 
explain functions of religion in a secularised society, many of these so-called 
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“religious functions” serve largely secular purposes, suggesting that it is of crucial 
importance to emphasise the distinction of secular and supernatural aspects of 
religion.  
 
3.2.2 Dimensions of Religiosity 
	  
There is a widespread agreement that as a marker of personal importance or 
commitment to religion, religiosity is most appropriately conceptualised as a 
multidimensional construct (e.g. Cornwall et al, 1986; De Jong et al, 1976; Glock 
and Stark, 1965; Hackney and Sanders, 2003; Lenski 1961). As a result, there are 
countless definitions and conceptualisations of religiosity in general and of specific 
elements of belief and practice in particular.54 Cornwall et al (1986:226) explain that 
there are large variations in both conceptualisation and number of dimensions as a 
result of different methodological approaches to measuring religiosity. 
Glock and Stark (1965) identify five dimensions of religiosity, including 
belief, knowledge, rituals, experience, and consequence (referring to secular attitudes 
on religion). Hackney and Sanders (2003:45) speak of cognitive, emotional, 
motivational, and behavioral aspects of religiosity. Norris and Inglehart (2004:41) 
include participation, values, and beliefs in their definition of religiosity. De Jong et 
al (1976:886) argue that there are primarily three key dimensions, which are belief, 
experience, and religious practice. Christian belief includes different traditions, 
interpretations and emphases on, among other aspects, God, Jesus, life after death, 
heaven and hell, prayer, and the Bible. Experience consists of feelings of closeness to 
the divine and having had a “religious experience.” Religious practice includes, 
among others, church attendance, membership, and financial contribution. 
Perhaps the most common approach in the sociology of religion involves 
categorising religiosity into two broad measures around practice and belief. Cornwall 
et al (1986:227) refer to this as “personal and institutional mode,” and explain that 
personal mode is made up of beliefs, feelings, and commitment and institutional 
mode of formal attachment to, participation in, and acceptance of formalised religion 
in relation to a church or denomination. Contemporary contributions to this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 For a discussion of methodological difficulties in measuring religiosity, see section 4.2 (pp. 92-
100).  
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categorisation include for example Stark and Finke’s (2000:103) distinction between 
objective and subjective religiosity, Davie’s (1990, 1994, 2002a, 2004, 2007) 
typology of believing and belonging, and Gill’s (2008:116) conceptualisation of 
private belief and public expression. 
Stark and Finke (2000:103) describe that objective religion refers to how an 
individual behaves within the framework set out by a religion, such as participation 
in rituals, church attendance, and conformity to rules. Subjective religion, on the 
other hand, involves the internal aspect of religion, such as values, beliefs, and 
attitudes. Davie’s (1990, 1994, 2002a, 2004, 2007) typology of believing and 
belonging is, although she does not operationalise these concepts, in a way a 
distinction between objective and subjective religiosity. She includes measures of 
subjective religion in believing (such as belief in God, need for regular prayer, 
finding comfort and strength in religion, and defining oneself as religious) and 
objective religion in belonging (such as church attendance, baptism, and religious 
weddings) (Davie, 1994:79).  
The distinction between objective and subjective religiosity (or believing and 
belonging) is essential since they do not necessarily go hand in hand. Davie (1994:2, 
2002a:5. 2007:138) speaks of a continued high level of belief with declining levels of 
belonging,55 Roof (1979) calls for a systematic study of interrelationships between 
different dimensions of religiosity in order to provide a thorough notion of 
religiosity. Similarly, Voas and Day state that “While it is not unreasonable to 
assume that Christian practice in the modern world implies belief, the connection 
between the two deserves empirical investigation” (2010:4-5). Additionally, certain 
measures of objective religiosity may have a close (and in some cases closer) 
connection to cultural heritage and identity than to religious beliefs. This research 
investigates the possibility that secularisation, particularly in the Swedish context, 
has progressed in such a way that a traditionally religious ceremony is no longer 
religious.  
Nevertheless, while it may serve as a generalised conceptual model of 
religiosity, a distinction between measures of subjective and objective religiosity 
may be less appropriately applied to particular contexts. The issue of inclusion of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Believing and belonging is discussed in detail in section 3.4 (pp. 68-71). 
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what may, in reality, be largely secular practices in the definition of functional 
religion may be similarly problematic when assuming that an aggregate measure of 
objective religiosity, including indices such as affiliation, attendance, and ritual 
practice all measure largely the same phenomenon. This highlights a key 
methodological issue, particularly in relation to a comparative study of two different 
contexts.56 The difficulties attached to accurately describing religion, religiosity, and 
secularisation are sources of disagreement and debate within sociology of religion. 
Specifically how this leads to diverse opinions on secularisation is discussed in the 
next section.  
 
3.3 Secularisation Theories 
	  
3.3.1 Defining Secularisation 
	  
 Secularisation theories can collectively be used to describe the wide range of 
views on levels and aspects of religious decline in the modern world. As previously 
stated, the disagreement does not primarily lie in whether or not there has been, in 
certain places, a decline in various measures of religiosity, but rather, how to 
interpret these changes as well as the processes behind them (Taylor, 2007:426).  
While specific opinions vary from one scholar to another, they can largely be 
subsumed under three main groups (Warner, 2010);  
(1) Proponents of the broad thrust of classical secularisation theory  (e.g. Berger, 
1967; Bruce, 1992a, 1996, 1999, 2002a, 2006; Comte, 1896; Durkheim, 1912/1995; 
Marx, 1844/2007; Marx and Engels, 1848/2012; Wallis and Bruce, 1992; Weber, 
1904/2009; Wilson, 1966, 1982, 1988, 1992). 
(2) Scholars adopting what Warner (2010:41) calls a “modified version” of the 
classical secularisation theory, accepting parts of it while discarding others (e.g. 
Berger, 1999; Berger et al, 2008; Casanova, 1994, 2001, 2009; Davie, 1990, 1994, 
2002a, 2004, 2007; Hervieu-Léger, 2000, 2006; Martin, 1978; Taylor, 2007). 
(3) Academics refuting the secularisation theory entirely (e.g. Finke, 1992; 
Iannaccone, 1991, 1992, 1995, 1998; Stark, 1999; Stark and Bainbridge, 1987; Stark 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 This is discussed further in section 4.2 (pp. 92-100).  
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and Finke, 2000; Stark and Iannaccone, 1994, 1995; Stark et al, 2005; Warner, 1993, 
2005).  
The main premise of the classical secularisation theory is a causal link 
between modernity and secularisation assuming a decline in religiosity and the 
importance of religion as society modernises (Berger et al, 2008:2; Bruce, 2002a:2; 
Taylor, 2007:429; Wallis and Bruce, 1992:8-9; Warner, 2010:2). Scholars in the 
sociology of religion commonly use Wilson’s (1982) idea of secularisation (e.g. 
Hanson, 1997:161; Stark and Finke, 2000; Stark and Iannaccone, 1994:230; Wallis 
and Bruce, 1992:11), in which he consequently defines secularisation as, in response 
to modernisation, “religious institutions, actions, and consciousness will lose their 
social significance” (Wilson, 1966:xiv, 1982:146). Here, social significance refers to 
the place of religion in social systems (Wilson, 1992:150), or more explicitly, the 
importance of religious beliefs and actions to social institutions and the individual 
(Bruce, 2002a:3; Wallis and Bruce, 1992a:11). In line with this, Taylor (2007:2-3) 
refers to three dimensions of secularity:57 the public space, religious practice, and 
belief. 
Wallis and Bruce (1992:11) assert that social significance involves a 
multidimensional understanding of religious change. Notably, variations in 
interpretations of what this means may be the most crucial source of disagreements 
within the debate on secularisation theory. Taylor (2007:427) and Hanson 
(1997:161) rightfully observe that the positions taken around the debate are 
oftentimes grounded in conceptual issues, meaning that the theory can be disputed or 
accepted based on particular definitions of what secularisation entails. It is in this 
aspect that reasons for rejecting the secularisation theories appear unconvincing. It is 
arguably ineffective to look at secularisation as an even decline across various 
measures (or indeed a decline in all measures) of religion.58 Even though this may 
often be the case, I agree with Taylor (2007:818) and Bruce (1992a:2) that 
supernatural beliefs should be considered above other indices. This particularly holds 
true for the purpose of this research, where several functional aspects of religion can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Secularity refers to “the opposite of ‘religious,’” and “indicating an absence of religious motivation 
or content” (Voas and Day, 2007:96). 
58 This is also argued by Bruce (2002a:39).  
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be observed in otherwise secularised societies.59 In line with this, Bruce makes a 
crucial point that:   
 
Although it is possible to conceptualise it in other ways, secularization primarily refers to the 
beliefs of people. The core of what we mean when we talk of this society being more secular 
than that is that the lives of fewer people in the former than in the latter are influenced by 
religious beliefs (Bruce, 1992a:6).  
 
 
It is unconvincing to deem a nation that scores low on measures of religious belief, 
but which nevertheless has high levels of what is typically considered objective 
religiosity (such as religious participation, membership, or identification), as non-
secularised or as an example of a limitation to the secularisation theory. Wilson 
mentions this, as he states that: 
 
Loyalty to a specific religious group, even if commitment to its creed has become largely 
notional, may continue to evoke response, and these generalized, perhaps at times nostalgic, 
dispositions might continue to provide the basis for voluntary associations to promote 
particular causes in the field of social welfare, but they do not in themselves show sustained 
religiosity as such (1992:202).   
 
 
Religious belonging and rituals may hold a secular meaning to non-believers, 
suggesting that in some circumstances, it may not in fact be a measure of religiosity 
but of something entirely different. In many aspects that something may well be non-
religious, that is not concerned with the supernatural at all. Nevertheless, this 
requires extensive investigation. 
 
3.3.2 Classical Secularisation Theory 
	  
 Classical social theorists such as Marx60 (1844/2007; Marx and Engels, 
1848/2012), Comte (1896), Weber (1904/2009), and Durkheim (1912/1995) made 
extensive contributions to the understanding of the sociological significance of 
religion. Notably, they all predicted religious decline as society industrialised. For 
Marx, religion ultimately helped the elite uphold oppression as it offered comfort and 
an alternative worldview for the unprivileged masses and an ideology of natural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Here, I do not deny Bruce’s (2002a:3) important point that a close relationship exists between these 
dimensions of religion, even if they can vary substantially.  	  
60 Influenced by the ideas of Feuerbach (1841/2008). 
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order to justify elite privilege. He therefore expected a loss in significance of religion 
once a revolution had taken place by the working class (Marx and Engels, 
1848/2012; Warner, 2010:17). Comte argued that certain aspects of modernisation, 
more specifically reason, rationality, and science would lead to the demise of religion 
(Comte, 1896; Warner, 2010:20). Durkheim (1912/1995) argued that the increased 
awareness of multiple religions would lead to the “cancelling out” of the different 
religious ideologies. Furthermore, Weber (1904/2009) argued that as people become 
more and more absorbed by the capitalist society, their focus on religion would 
decline in that increasing focus would turn to material well-being, as opposed to 
spiritual needs. 
 Such predictions have not been realised to the extent that the classical social 
thinkers expected. Religion still plays an important role in many fully industrialised 
societies and Inglehart (2008:131) asserts that we are today in fact moving beyond 
the materialist agenda suggesting that post-material needs such as self-expression are 
more pronounced than the material values that were the focus of the classical social 
theorists. Although increasing rationality may be a factor in the process of 
secularisation (e.g. Bruce, 1996, 2002a; Wallis and Bruce, 1992), contemporary 
sociologists of religion (e.g. Bruce, 1996:48-49, 2002a:117; Stark, 1999; Stark and 
Finke, 2000; Taylor, 2007:4) dispute Comte’s (1896) claim that scientific knowledge 
brings about a decline in religious belief.  
 However, far from rejected outright, the idea that social structural changes 
bring religious decline have largely been redefined and defended by several 
sociologists of religion, most notably Bryan Wilson (1966, 1982, 1988, 1992), and 
Steve Bruce (e.g. 1992a, 1992b, 1996, 2002a, 2002b, 2006). They uphold the view 
that some characteristics of modernity are incompatible with religion. More 
specifically, increasing differentiation of social life and structure, a decrease in the 
importance of community, religious pluralism, and an increasingly rational and 
bureaucratic society lead to the decline in the importance of most aspects of religion 
(Berger et al, 2008:31-32; Bruce, 1996:39; Wallis and Bruce, 1992:9; Warner, 
2010:32; Wilson, 1982:154). Their ideas have been met with profound criticism from 
scholars in the field who adopt a different interpretation of both secularisation as 
well as the current state of religion in modern society.  
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3.3.3 Criticisms of Secularisation Theory 
	  
 Several sociologists of religion that either reject the classical secularisation 
theory entirely or who oppose aspects of it (e.g. Davie, 1994, 2002a; Stark, 1999; 
Stark and Finke, 2000; Warner, 2010) argue that objective religiosity (such as church 
attendance and importance of religion in the public sphere) has declined in Europe, 
but they nevertheless claim that privatised religion, that is, individual beliefs and 
practices removed from the public sphere (e.g. Berger, 2007:iv), is still thriving. This 
is what Davie has termed as believing without belonging.61  Davie, and, among 
others, her American colleagues, Stark and Finke (2000) see a high level of 
privatised religion in the world (including Europe). Davie argues that the decline in 
objective religion has not (at least not yet) been accompanied by a large decline in 
belief (1994:43).  
 Berger (1999; Berger et al, 2008) holds a slightly different view of religion in 
Europe. While he now disagrees with the classical secularisation thesis,62 he to some 
extent agrees with Bruce as he acknowledges that Western Europe has experienced 
declining levels of religious belief, and even more so, participation. He does, 
however, assert that the rest of the world is more religious than it has ever been 
(1999:1; Berger et al, 2008:10). He disagrees with Bruce on the cause of 
secularisation as he argues that it is more likely that Europe is secular because it is 
European (suggesting historically and culturally specific causes) than because it is 
modern. He stresses that there is no evidence that indicates a link between modernity 
and secularisation, and to illustrate this, mentions large differences in all measures of 
religiosity between the United States and Europe (Berger et al, 2008:6-7, 10).63  
 Bruce compellingly argues that such positions are “un-sociological” in that if 
people were believing without belonging, belief would come from nowhere 
(2002a:104). In relation to this, he states that, “The decline of traditional Christian 
beliefs should be no surprise...There is no mystery about why Christian beliefs 
should decline when the institutions that carry them decline. Ideologies do not float 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 For more on believing and belonging, see section 3.4 (pp. 68-71).	  
62 After previously supporting it – see Berger, 1967.	  
63 However, they do not explain how Japan fits in here – modern and secular, but not European. 
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in ether. They need to be preserved” (2002a:72). In other words, if only a select few 
participate and religious institutions end up losing social and political significance, it 
will lead to an inevitable decline in religious beliefs, just as is suggested in his 
statement that, “deep socialization and constant reaffirmation are required to sustain 
distinctive beliefs” (2002a:148). 
 In addition to the diverging opinions on levels of religious beliefs and the 
contested ability of the secularisation thesis to explain the case of the United States 
(e.g. Berger et al, 2008; Finke, 1992; Stark and Finke, 2000), as mentioned above, 
there are several other points of criticism. This includes, first of all, the assertion that 
the theory is only applicable to the European context (Berger et al, 2008; Warner, 
2010:43). Second, as various aspects of religiosity are not decreasing at a similar 
rate, a linear account cannot be assumed (Stark, 1999; Taylor, 2007:461; Warner, 
2010:43). Third, the claim is made that people were not as religious in the past as we 
assume today (Stark and Finke, 2000; Warner, 2010:4-5). Fourth, that secularisation 
theory fails to incorporate the importance of state churches in relation to religious 
free markets (Stark and Finke, 2000; Warner, 2010:4-5), and fifth, the need for 
clarification of whether secularisation is reversible (Warner, 2010:37). 
 Notably, several scholars (e.g. Bruce, 1996, 2002a; Wallis and Bruce, 1992; 
Wilson, 1992, 1998) have refuted most of the points discussed above. Bruce 
(2002a:37) argues that regardless of the trajectories of the rest of the world, the 
secularisation theory is, indeed, applicable to Europe, the place where it originally 
emerged. Furthermore, all measures of religiosity do not have to decline at a similar 
rate (Bruce, 2002a:39; Wallis and Bruce, 1992). Likewise, the theory does not rule 
out temporary resurgence of religious groups, and the theory is, in fact, cyclical 
rather than linear (Bruce, 2002a:173, 176). Moreover, Bruce (1996:29-30) disagrees 
that Europe has never been very religious and, to illustrate this, presents statistics on 
church attendance in Scotland in the 19th century that suggest a strong commitment 
to religious participation. Similarly, Wilson (1998:56) asserts that regardless of 
participation, Europeans were indeed highly superstitious in the past.64 Lastly, Bruce 
(2002a:241) claims that there are no reasons to expect the processes of secularisation 
to reverse.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 As discussed in Chapter 2, while Swedes were superstitious in the past, it is it debatable if they were 
ever highly religious (Zuckerman, 2008). 
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Bruce’s arguments are both persuasive and applicable to Protestant Europe. 
However, his defence of the secularisation thesis in the context of the United States 
is less compelling and, in line with Casanova’s (2001:426) point of view that the 
different sides in the debate tend to overlook each other’s arguments, this research 
acknowledges some useful aspects of the theory of the religious economy as 
described by Stark and Finke (2000), specifically those related to importance of the 
state church on religious vitality.65 Bruce (2002a:155) states that he also agrees with 
some of their observations, but he does not convincingly attempt to incorporate them 
in his defence of secularisation theory. 
While it is undoubtedly the foremost theoretical contribution within 
sociology of religion to this day, the secularisation thesis cannot serve as a singular, 
overarching, theory with the purpose of explaining universal changes in religion. 
However, as presented above, proponents of the theory do not attempt to make this 
claim and I believe that a better understanding within the debate could come from 
acknowledging theoretical, contextual, and definitional differences. In view of that, 
the following three sections explore three key contributions to the debate on 
secularisation and religious decline that may also serve as cornerstones in offering an 
explanation for religious change in Scotland and Sweden.  
 
3.4 Believing and Belonging 
	  
3.4.1 Davie’s Typology  
	  
 With her typology of religious beliefs and belonging, Grace Davie (e.g. 1990, 
1994, 2002a, 2004, 2007) claims that religion in Britain (and most of Protestant 
Europe) can be characterised as believing without belonging. This suggests that 
people still believe in God and identify themselves as religious while they, at the 
same time, do not see the need to participate in formal church activities (1994:2, 
2002a:5, 2007:138). She argues that privatised religion is the most prevalent type of 
religiosity in Western Europe (1994:75) and that “It seems more accurate to describe 
late-twentieth- century Britain – together with most of Western Europe – as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 This is discussed further in section 3.5 (pp. 71-75).	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unchurched rather than simply secular” (1994:12). She agrees that church 
membership and participation are both declining in Britain and the rest of the 
“Protestant North,”66 but that instead of following the same pattern, subjective 
beliefs are increasing (Davie, 1994:13, 43, 2007:138). 
 In “Religious America, Secular Europe?,” which Berger co-authored with 
Davie and Fokas (2008), Davie’s typology is applied, but rather than maintaining 
that Western Europe is generally characterised as just believing and belonging, they 
describe that belonging without believing is somewhat common in parts of Europe, in 
particular the Nordic countries (2008:15). This is in line with Hervieu-Léger’s 
(2006:48) argument that it is possible to belong without believing in that one can 
believe in the social aspect of religion meaning that belonging is therefore part of 
maintaining a community.67 Davie (2007:141) admits that belonging without 
believing may be an entirely accurate description of Scandinavia where church 
affiliation and participation in rituals remain high. She highlights that they 
nevertheless do not participate any more frequently than the rest of Europe. This 
ambiguity of the terms believing and belonging makes Davie’s typology problematic 
to apply to a specific context of study. It appears as though very diverse conclusions 
can be reached depending on what measure is under examination.  
 
3.4.2 Conceptualising Believing and Belonging 
	  
 Davie does not provide a clear definition of either believing or belonging, and 
states that: 
 
The terms ‘believing’ and ‘belonging’ are not to be considered too rigidly. The disjunction 
between the variables is intended to capture a mood, to suggest an area of enquiry, a way of 
looking at the problem...operationalizing either or both of the variables too severely is bound to 
distort the picture (1994:93-94).  
 
 
That said, she primarily uses church attendance as indicator of belonging (although 
she also mentions rates of baptism and religious weddings), and belief in god (and 
occasionally prayer, self identified religiosity, and finding comfort in religion) when 
she refers to believing (1994:79). Although it is a reasonable argument that defining 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 As opposed to the Catholic South with high levels of participation (Davie, 1994:13).	  
67 This is covered further in section 3.8 (pp. 85-89). 
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the terms may be difficult and risks generating a narrower picture of the religious 
landscape, I agree with Voas and Crocket (2005:14) that levels of believing and 
belonging are largely inconsistent depending on which measurement is considered. 
Not defining it more clearly may, as is argued below, distort the picture, rather than 
the other way around.  
 This suggests that, while believing and belonging has the potential to be a very 
useful conceptualisation of religious beliefs and behaviour, careful operationalisation 
is needed. Belonging arguably means much more than just attending church or 
participating in church activities. In fact, the term belonging does not seem to have 
an obvious connection to attendance, but rather to membership (belonging to) or 
identification (feeling that one belongs). Conflating these measures fails to explain 
belonging in Sweden where we find low levels of church attendance and relatively 
high levels of church membership and identification, and frequent participation in 
life weddings, baptisms, and confirmations.68 It also does not recognise key 
differences between Scotland and Sweden, where Scots appear to believe and belong 
or to neither believe nor belong, while Swedes are considerably more likely to 
belong without believing.69 This again shows the importance of conceptualisation. 
While it is understandable that Davie wants to look at an “overall” picture of the 
place and characteristics of religion, she does so without acknowledging these large 
differences in very relevant indicators of believing and belonging. 
 
3.4.3 Non-Belief and Atheism 
	  
 Davie (1994:79) unconvincingly uses the fact that only four percent of Britons 
are atheists as an indicator of believing. However, this is not an accurate indication 
that people of Britain, in fact, believe. She argues that, “few people have opted out of 
religion altogether” (1994:2) yet it is questionable whether the fact that only four 
percent are convinced atheists means that the remaining 96 percent believe. 
Furthermore, secularisation does not mean that everyone becomes atheist (e.g. Bruce, 
2002a:41; Zuckerman, 2008:102). With this notion, she effectively assumes that all 
individuals who are uncertain, who simply do not contemplate religion, or who for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Religious rituals and life-cycle ceremonies are explored further in Chapter 8 (pp. 233-262). 	  
69 See section 7.4 (pp. 224-230). 
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various reasons are non-religious but refrain from identifying as atheist, in fact 
believe, when these measures are a far better indicator of secularisation.70 In line 
with this, Bruce states that, “Most people did not give up being committed Christians 
because they became convinced religion was false. It simply ceased to be of any 
great importance to them. They became indifferent” (2002a:235). Religion becomes 
less and less important and people lose interest or are not socialised into it by 
increasingly indifferent parents (Bruce, 2002a:104, 241). In other words, looking at 
the number of people who express that they are atheist will present a distorted 
picture.71 
 While Davie’s typology of believing and belonging may apply as a very broad 
generalisation of certain indicators of religion, it has limitations both in relation to 
accuracy and precision. Given the multidimensional quality of religion as explained 
in section 3.2, this typology is less useful in providing a careful account of religious 
beliefs and practices in Scotland and Sweden and, as we will see, fails to pick up 
even the most apparent differences between these two Protestant and Northern 
European nations.72 I briefly return to Davie’s typology in section 3.7, where various 
secular functions of religion are discussed. First, I present two additional 
contributions to the understanding of secularisation in the contemporary world, 
beginning with the application of rational choice theory and economic models to 
religion.  
 




 The theory of the religious economy serves as one of the most thorough 
refutations of secularisation theory.73 It is developed from rational choice theory and 
is primarily associated with American sociologists and economists of religion (e.g. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 For more on atheism and religious beliefs, see section 5.4 (pp. 150-156).  
71 The reluctance of non-believers to identify themselves as atheists in Scotland and Sweden is 
explored further in section 5.4 (pp. 150-156).  
72 A thorough account of indicators of believing and belong in these two nations are discussed in 
chapters 5-7. 
73 And according to Wallis and Bruce (1992:8), the only plausible contender.  
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Finke, 1992; Iannaccone, 1991, 1992, 1995, 1998, Stark, 1999; Stark and 
Bainbridge, 1987; Stark and Finke, 2000; Stark and Iannaccone, 1994, 1995; Stark et 
al, 2005; Warner, 1993, 2005). The United States is likewise the context on which 
this theory is the most persuasively applied.  
 Stark and Finke (2000:193) explain that just like other types of businesses, 
religious institutions operate in a market of supply and demand. Their definition of a 
religious economy is, “all of the religious activity going on in any society: a ‘market’ 
of current and potential adherents, a set of one or more organizations seeking to 
attract or maintain adherents, and the religious culture offered by the organization(s)” 
(2000:193). Several scholars who follow this tradition controversially argue that the 
demand for religion is constant everywhere. In other words, they assert that the 
secularisation thesis is false and that religion is a basic need that humans meet 
through consuming religious goods (Greeley, 1972; Stark and Finke, 2000:193; 
Warner, 2010:78;). As a result, the theory of the religious economy is based on a 
contested supply-side model of religious behaviour (Bankston, 2003:164; Bruce, 
1996:163), where a changing supply of religious goods and services determine the 
level of religious participation. To illuminate this theory and to demonstrate its 
mechanism, the concept of religious pluralism is frequently used. Not surprisingly, 
the effect of religious pluralism is also subject to differing opinions.  
 
3.5.2 Pluralism and Religious Vitality 
	  
 The concept of religious pluralism and its effect on religious vitality is a 
frequently applied and vividly discussed idea within the sociology of religion. 
Pluralism is defined as, “the number of firms active in the economy; the more firms 
there are with significant market shares, the greater degree of pluralism” (Stark and 
Finke, 2000:198).  Bruce (1992b:179-180) carefully explains that this suggests two 
different ways of looking at religious pluralism: (1) the range of options that people 
may choose from and (2) the spread or share of the population over these available 
choices. Pluralism is often used synonymously with diversity (e.g. Bruce, 1992b:178; 
Voas et al, 2002:214). However, Beckford distinguishes between the two and asserts 
that the notion of pluralism means a diversity that is welcomed and seen as a positive 
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aspect within a certain context. He states that, “the mere fact of competition between 
religious groups is therefore far less significant in itself than is the cultural and legal 
context that legitimates and underpins competitive pluralism as a normative value” 
(2001:8), further suggesting that pluralism is more applicable in the context of the 
contemporary United States than elsewhere. 
 According to the theory of the religious economy, low levels of pluralism, by 
definition, limits competition and without the fundamental driving force of free 
market competition, religious organisations become inefficient. In other words, they 
do not adapt and respond to its potential customers, which ultimately leads to low 
adherence74 (Berger et al, 2008:16-17; Bruce, 1992a:5; Stark and Finke, 2000:201; 
Warner, 2010:80). McCleary and Barro (2006) studied this phenomenon and found a 
positive relationship between pluralism and religious participation. However, Bruce 
(2002a:223) is critical of this relationship and refers to Chaves and Gorski’s (2001) 
study, which found that only a minority (12 percent) of all studies done on this 
relationship seem to support the theory of the religious economy. 
 Notably, the mechanisms of religious pluralism and vitality can also, rather 
effectively, be applied to contexts that do not experience the religious free market of 
the United States. State churches, which historically characterise Europe, are entities 
operating in a market with virtual monopoly on religion. In a Protestant European 
context, this is particularly applicable on the Nordic countries where the Lutheran 
churches overwhelmingly dominate the religious market. Although he is generally 
not a proponent of rational choice theory, Zuckerman (2008:112; 2009:58) agrees 
with the idea that the lack of effort presented by state churches in Scandinavia is a 
convincing reason for secularisation in the region. The theory of the religious 
economy as presented by Stark and Finke (2000) predicts an increase in religious 
vitality after a deregulation of a state religion. When pluralism takes hold in a 
religious market, firms will become aware of each other and compete for market 
share. In that way, they become more motivated and thus adapt their services to 
attract customers (Stark and Finke, 2000:200). However, Stark and Finke (2000:201) 
point out that deeply rooted cultural behaviour interferes with this, making the 
process long.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 However, this refers to participation only. Privatised religion will, according to this theory, remain 
high (Stark and Finke, 2000:201). 	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 The idea that religious pluralism increases participation has been met with 
criticism. For example, a usual counter-argument is that an increasingly 
heterogeneous world goes hand in hand with secularisation as a result of increasing 
awareness of multiple religious ideologies (e.g. Berger, 1967; Bruce, 2002a; 
Durkheim, 1912/1995). Bruce (2002a:153), a strong critic of Stark and Finke’s ideas, 
states that the theory of the religious economy is not applicable to Europe. He uses 
the examples of Ireland and Poland as nations with low levels of pluralism and high 
levels of participation. He further states that, “the greatest damage to religion has 
been caused, not by competing secular ideas, but by the general relativism that 
supposes that all ideologies are equally true (and hence equally false)” (2002a:117).75 
What is interesting, then, is that Stark and his colleagues see the world becoming 
more religious, and states that pluralism is one of the reasons for this. At the same 
time, Bruce (2002a:207) argues that Europe and also the United States are becoming 
less religious, and that pluralism is, likewise, one of the reasons for this. A third view 
is that of Voas et al (2002) who suggest that there is no relationship at all between 
pluralism and religious participation.  A final view is the idea that both effects are 
plausible, such as argued by Martin (1978) and Wilson (1966)76 suggesting that the 
idea of pluralism may explain religious vitality and that religious pluralism also leads 
to a reduction in the convictions of doctrine. Nevertheless, these changes need to be 
viewed alongside with historical and cultural processes that largely differ depending 
on context.  
 
3.5.3 Europe and the Theory of the Religious Economy 
	  
 Bruce acknowledges that some aspects of the theory of the religious economy 
are useful: “There is considerable sense in many supply-side observations, and they 
are as likely to be made by secularisation theorists. But it does not follow that they 
can provide a basis for a coherent theory of religion” (2002a:155). It makes sense 
that a church funded by the state will make less of an effort to attract “customers,” as 
they receive the same funding regardless of levels of participation. In some sense, a 
religious organisation can be regarded as a firm operating in a market of religious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 In line with Durkheim’s (1912/1995) notion that “all refute all.” 
76 Discussed by Bruce 1992b:171-172. 	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goods and services and in Europe, churches are often considered a public good rather 
than a competing firm whose goal is to maximise recruitment. However, the nature 
of religious goods and services makes Stark and Finke’s ideas less straightforward. 
They greatly disregard the impact of culture and tradition when they assume that 
people choose religious affiliation in the same way that they decide on everyday 
purchases. Along with this, Bruce (1999) regards this theory to be applicable only in 
a society where “choosing religion has become unimportant and trivial” (Furseth and 
Repstad, 2006:119). Although it is likely that a state-sponsored church will make less 
conscious efforts to attract participants and therefore be an integral cause of 
secularisation in Protestant Europe, it is less convincing that this process would 
reverse by the emergence of pluralism. Evidence from most of Western Europe, 
including Scotland and Sweden, suggest that religious participation and levels of 
beliefs are declining rather than increasing, despite continuous religious 
deregulation.  
  
3.6 Religion and Security 
	  
3.6.1 Deprivation Theory 
	  
 Similar to Marx’ (1844/2007) idea that religion functioned as a coping 
mechanism for unbearable living and working situations, the deprivation theory lays 
out a plausible explanation for a variation in levels of religiosity in contemporary 
society. In line with this theory, when individuals feel deprived in one way or the 
other,77 they seek reasons, comfort, and compensation that can often be provided by 
various forms of religious involvement (Furseth and Repstad, 2006; Glock and Stark, 
1965; Glock et al, 1967; Rice, 2003; Roof, 1976; Stark and Bainbridge, 1980; 
Zuckerman, 2008). Secularisation takes place if the problem is rectified with other 
means, such as reduced poverty and increased social integration (Furseth and 
Repstad, 2006:86-87, 112). Previous works in the area (e.g. Glock et al, 1967; Rice, 
2003) suggest that the deprivation-compensation theory provides an explanation for 
increased religiosity of women, ethnic minorities, and lower social classes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Deprivation in this context arguably has a relative rather than absolute meaning (e.g. Furseth and 
Repstad, 2006:112-113).   
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 Stark and Bainbridge’s (1980), rational choice based model of religious 
deprivation distinguishes between what they call “rewards and compensators.” They 
state that “When humans cannot quickly and easily obtain strongly desired rewards 
they persist in their efforts and often may accept explanations that provide only 
compensators - empirically unsubstantiated faith that the rewards will be obtained - 
not the rewards themselves” (1980:121). They apply this to religion78 and explain 
that religious beliefs may serve as compensators for unattainable rewards, which may 
be happiness, stability, financial security, or indeed immortality. As mentioned 
before, it may be questionable to assume that individuals make calculated choices in 
relation to religion. However, the deprivation theory may compellingly be applied as 
a broader socio-cultural explanation to religious decline as is presented next.  
 
3.6.2 Social Security 
	  
 Recent work by Norris and Inglehart (2004) applies the deprivation theory not 
only on the micro level but also on religiosity at the national level. Nations where 
people commonly experience financial hardships or other forms of struggle in 
relation to elementary feelings of security and stability, are generally more religious 
(Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Zuckerman, 2008:114, 2009:59). In line with this, 
Norris and Inglehart argue that “In relatively secure societies…the importance and 
vitality of religion, its ever-present influence on how people live their daily lives, has 
gradually eroded” (2004:5).   
 Zuckerman (2008:114-115; 2009:59) presents this as one of the key reasons for 
the high levels of non-belief in Scandinavia, and argues that these nations rank 
highly on various measures of security, such as crime, peace, and political stability. 
Religious beliefs and participation are lower in nations that have a long history of 
political autonomy. In this manner, a people that has not regarded their freedom as 
fragile is less likely to need religion. In line with this, Tomasson argues that:  
 
In the near millennium of the existence of the Swedish nation, it has never been oppressed or 
been subservient to another nation...Religion has never been associated with repressed 
nationalism. The opposite situation is found in the most historically religious countries in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 But carefully explain that their proposition of rewards and compensators may be applied to non-
religious aspects as well (Stark and Bainbridge, 1980:121).  
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Europe: Ireland, Poland, and the Balkans (2002a:85).  
 
 
This may also be applicable to Scotland, a nation that does exceptionally well on 
most measures of security, but which nevertheless experiences a current 
constitutional crisis resulting in an upcoming referendum for independence in 2014. 
The argued link between social security and religious decline is indeed persuasive 
and proponents of rational choice theory have acknowledged its usefulness. For 
example, Gill (2008) and Gill and Lundsgaarde (2004) rather successfully bridge 
Norris and Inglehart’s (2004) theory with the theory of the religious economy and 
the role of public policy through welfare spending.  
 
3.6.3 Welfare Spending  
	  
 Gill (2008:116) argues that in addition to religious regulation, social welfare 
spending is another factor contributing to secularisation. He explains that the church 
was traditionally seen as an institution that provides various forms of welfare. As this 
role has increasingly been taken over by the government, churches struggle in 
recruiting new adherents. From Gill’s (2008:116) perspective, this is due to the 
additional “cost” of a religious commitment as opposed to filling one’s welfare needs 
with what is provided by the state. He further suggests that government policy is the 
strongest explanation of secularisation and that this tends to be disregarded by social 
scientists in the field who place too much emphasis on cultural and social structural 
changes and too little on human decision making.79 
 Gill and Lundsgaarde (2004) examine the theory that social welfare spending 
limits religiosity as they test the relationship between, among others, welfare 
spending and non-religiosity,80 church attendance,81 and comfort in religion.82  After 
adjusting for several variables, including religious regulation and religious pluralism, 
level of urbanisation, literacy, rates of owning a television, being considered a 
Catholic country, and countries in Latin America, they find a strong significant 
relationship between welfare spending and non-religiosity, church attendance, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 In line with the rational choice theory (e.g. Stark and Finke, 2000). 	  
80 Percentage of the population who declare themselves as non-religious.  
81 Percentage of the population who attend church weekly.  
82 Percentage of the population who express that they take comfort in religion. 
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comfort in religion. Higher welfare spending is associated with higher levels of non-
religiosity, lower levels of church attendance, and lower levels of comfort in religion. 
Interestingly, Sweden is the country in their very limited sample with the highest 
level of welfare spending and with the lowest levels of comfort in religion, one of the 
lowest levels of church attendance and one of the highest rates of non-religiosity. 
With lower levels of welfare spending, the United Kingdom presents a slightly lower 
level of non-religiosity than Sweden. 
 Gill and Lundsgaarde (2004) present a compelling case, with a plausible theory 
particularly valuable in explaining differences between many European nations and 
the United States, given that the former generally have higher levels of welfare 
spending and non-religiosity than the latter.83 It is possible that in societies with a 
higher level of social support and security, fewer people will go to religion for both 
material and emotional help. Their model does not take historical or other social 
factors into consideration and this explanation is less useful by itself. However, as is 
presented by Gill and Lundsgaarde (2004), welfare spending and other forms of 
social support is likely one influential factor in determining levels of religiosity.  
 The different variations of the deprivation theory as described above are useful 
for this study as they serve as an addition to the secularisation thesis given that the 
most modernised societies also tend to be the most stable and affluent, and, with the 
exception of the United States, also the least religious. It also highlights the effects of 
a progressive welfare policy as implemented by the Social Democrats in Sweden.84 
Furthermore, this theory is applicable even to contexts with high levels of certain 
measures of objective religiosity such as baptism, weddings and funerals in church, 
as they may very well serve a different purpose than comfort during hardships.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 In other words, this theory may partially explain the relatively higher levels of religiosity in the 
United States. 
84 See section 2.3.5 (pp. 28-31).  
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3.7 Religion, Culture, and Society 
  
3.7.1 Religion, Society, and Nation 
	  
Social theorists have recognised the importance of the connection between 
religion and society. Durkheim presents a persuasive argument that religion can be 
seen as a depiction of society itself as he contends that God and society share similar 
characteristics and functions (1912/1995:208; Furseth and Repstad, 2006:33). He 
studied elementary forms of religion in Australia and South America and found that 
many tribes and social groups take part in a religion revolving around a symbol such 
as an animal or a plant (1912/1995:86). Members of these groups believe that they 
are all descendants from this symbol (1912/1995:163) that therefore serves as a 
representation of their society as a whole. Furthermore, he separates objects and 
social facts that are profane (material) with those that are sacred (1912/1995:34). He 
describes that these are held separate with a specific place and time for the social 
group to convene to recognise the sacred, which is consequently how holidays 
developed (1912/1995:313). Moreover, he asserts that, “society cannot revitalize the 
awareness that it has of itself unless it assembles but it cannot remain continuously in 
session” (1912/1995:353). This is consequently the purpose of holidays or specific 
ceremonies as they alter the sacred with the profane. 
One example of this is the sacred representation of certain profane objects, 
such as a flag, that signify a nation and its morals, beliefs, and culture. In this way, a 
ceremony, such as a wedding or a school graduation, regardless of whether or not it 
is religious in nature, can have a place as markers of life stages regardless of levels 
of religiosity, given that the rituals, rather than being tied to religious beliefs, may 
instead be a celebration of a national culture. Similarly, Bellah (1991:170, 2005:40) 
argues that there is an important distinction between Christian beliefs and civil 
religion, a term that he uses to describe the United States. The use of religious 
rhetoric in many dimensions of American public life has, above all, a “ceremonial 
significance,” which may serve as another example of the close relationship between 
society and religion.  
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Durkheim’s observations are acknowledged and applied to the relationship 
between religion and nationalism. Llobera (1994:143) states that nationalism is in 
fact a “secular religion” with the nation as a substitute for God. While nation and 
society (and indeed state) are not one and the same, Durkheim’s theory highlights the 
important link between religion and a sacred expression of culture or community. 
This may hold true even in a relatively secularised society, since the sacred 
representation of traditionally religious rituals such as baptism or a school graduation 
in church may instead be a celebration of society, serving as a complement to or 
altogether a replacement of religion. This is argued by Casanova, who states that, 
“The secular is by no means profane in our secular age. One only needs to think of 
such sacralised secular phenomena as nation, citizenship, and human rights” 
(2009:1064). This inherent link between religion and the social group is crucial in 
understanding religion’s influence on a national identity (e.g. Marx, 2005), which 
has consequently received attention (although arguably limited attention) from 
contemporary sociologist of religion.  
 
3.7.2 Religion, Nation, and National Identity 
	  
 Current scholars in the sociology of religion largely agree on the role of 
religion in building a national identity. Davie (1994:95; 2007:140) describes that as 
religion is part of the history of nations, it is a source of national identity. She states 
that the Kirk is a focus of Scottish national consciousness. In the same way, Furseth 
and Repstad (2006:102) explain that in the Nordic countries and in Britain, there are 
national churches in otherwise secular states and that even people who are not 
affiliated with these religions are influenced by its values as they are ingrained in the 
shared values and morals of a nation. Casanova further builds on the close 
relationship between religion and society and argues that in Europe, “it may be more 
helpful to think of churches, in the Durkheimian sense of the term, as collective 
representations of imagined communities than to think of them, in Weber's sense, as 
monopolistic salvation institutions or firms” (2001:427). 
 Berger et al (2008:25) agree that the church is a strong marker of national 
identity, especially in nations with a close connection between the church and the 
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state. They use Finland as an example85 and state that almost all Finns are members 
of the Church of Finland, and that it is so taken for granted that most public 
ceremonies and national celebrations take place in the Church that they cannot 
conceive of an alternative venue. Similarly, Hervieu-Léger speaks of Danes as 
belonging without believing86 as she argues that they “do not believe in god and 
never attend church but faithfully continue to pay the tax that goes to the Lutheran 
Church because they like to see religious buildings properly maintained for the 
ceremonies associated with rites of passage” (2006:48).87 Berget et al (2008:15) 
further describe the case of Germany where a full eight percent additional income tax 
is allocated to the national church and where most people despite this have not exited 
the church as they may need its services at some point.  
 Davie (2002a:19; 2007:140; Berger et al, 2008:15) uses the term vicarious 
religion to describe the type of religious affiliation of people who do not want to take 
part in the church but who would like it to remain for the potential use of themselves, 
others, and the nation as a whole. More specifically, Davie argues that: 
 
Europeans are not so much less religious than populations in other parts of the world but…are 
content to let both churches and church goers enact a memory on their behalf, more than half 
aware that they might need to draw on the capital at crucial times in their individual or 
collective lives. The almost universal take-up of religious ceremonies at the time of a death is 
the most obvious expression of this tendency (2002a:19).  
 
 
However, Davie unconvincingly assumes that the overwhelming proportion of 
individuals that turns to the churches for funeral services do so for religious 
reasons.88 This is indeed an issue of generalisation, which may be further illustrated 
by Zuckerman’s observations of a similar religious ritual describing that “there is no 
question that baptizing of babies is the most important, lovely, and special 
ceremonies that Swedes and Danes engage in… But it is meaning that is familial, or 
cultural, or traditional in nature. Not supernatural” (2008:160). 
 As was introduced in Chapter 2 with the connection between Protestantism and 
secularisation, nationalism scholars (e.g. Anderson, 2006; Hastings, 1997; Llobera, 
1994; Marx, 2005) convincingly use the establishment of state churches as a reason 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Finland is arguably in many ways similar to Sweden in terms of religiosity and church history. 
86 For more on believing and belonging, see section 3.4 (pp. 68-71). 
87 This may serve as an example of cultural religion. For more on this, see section 3.7.3 (pp. 83-85).  
88 I explain in full why that is in Chapter 8 (pp. 233-262). 
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for a strong connection between nation, national identity, and religion. It is possible 
that by applying this to the case of Scotland and Sweden, one can come to a possible 
explanation for the perceived differences. Brown (1997:184-190) argues that just like 
similar processes in the rest of Western Europe, the Church of Scotland was an 
integral part of the development of Scottish national identity after the union of 1707 
after which Scotland ceased to be a formal state. However, he points to the lack of a 
national cohesiveness in church matters89 as well as the fact that national 
consciousness of Scotland has further been complicated by the union when Scottish 
identity was blurred with a British national identity. Brown further argues that in the 
early and middle of the 20th century, Scotland regained its own national identity and 
as it came at a time of religious decline and after the disestablishment of the state 
church in 1929, a Scottish identity did not have strong ties to the church. In fact, he 
asserts that religious decline is one of the key reasons for the emergence of a political 
and cultural nationalism in Scotland between the 1960s and 1990s (Brown, 
1997:190).   
 While the connection between religion and national identity, particularly in 
Protestant European nations is both theoretically and empirically sensible, I believe it 
is more appropriate to use the term cultural identity to speak of the core connection 
between a religious heritage and key cultural practices and traditions. In most 
Protestant nations, deeply rooted traditions are closely influenced by national 
churches, suggesting that it would be entirely reasonable to speak of religion as part 
of a national identity, such as Bäckström et al (2004) do when they describe religion 
in Sweden as a Swedish rather than Christian identity. However the Swedes and 
Scots I interviewed did not make a conscious connection between their religious 
affiliation or practices and a national identity. Marx defines national identity as, “a 
collective sentiment or identity, bounding and binding together those individuals 
who share a sense of large-scale political solidarity aimed at creating, legitimating, or 
challenging states” (2005:6), and particularly the latter half of his definition is rather 
different from the role of religious traditions in the contexts of study. More 
specifically, a religious identity in these two nations is not about political solidarity, 
nor did interview participants take part in religious rituals and similar to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 See section 2.4 (pp. 41-54). 
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acknowledge or express a Swedish or Scottish national identity. Rather, they 
followed traditional practices because it was simply what others did and what had 
been done for generations, along with Hervieu-Léger’s claim of religion as a “distant 
shared memory” (2006:48).  
 In other words, while the sociologists of religion that speak of the link between 
nation and religion are correct in their observations, only a few scholars have 
devoted in-depth attention to study the meaning of religious traditions and rituals to 
people who live in otherwise secularised societies. Fortunately, the contributions 
made by these scholars (e.g. Demerath, 2000; Zuckerman, 2008) are both extensive 
and to the point. This is consequently the focus of the next section. 
 
3.7.3 Cultural Religion 
	  
The term cultural religion was first coined by Demerath (2000:127) to 
describe a connection between a collective religious identity and a historical past 
external to religious belief and participation. He speaks of this phenomenon in three 
largely different contexts; Sweden, Northern Ireland, and Poland. Despite differing 
levels of religious beliefs and active participation in these nations, religion often 
takes the form of an expression of a historical heritage or legacy. While Demerath 
has introduced the concept of cultural religion, it has been extensively applied by 
Zuckerman (2008) who uses the concept to describe a majority of Danes and Swedes 
in his qualitative description of religion in Scandinavia. His interpretation of the term 
is to some extent further centred around the idea of a void of supernatural beliefs 
while religious traditions and affiliation are maintained, while Demerath (2000) does 
not necessarily see religious beliefs as incompatible with cultural religion.  
Zuckerman defines cultural religion as “the phenomenon of people 
identifying with historically religious traditions, and engaging in ostensibly religious 
practices, without truly believing in the supernatural content thereof” (2008:155). He 
explains that this refers in particular to two main elements: identification with a 
religious group and participation in various rituals and ceremonies (Zuckerman, 
2008:155-156). He makes an important distinction between active church attendance 
on the one hand, and other forms of religious belonging on the other. In other 
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contexts, these measures may be seen as closely related, but in Scandinavia, they are 
fundamentally different phenomena acknowledged and performed as a result of 
different underlying reasons.  
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, Zuckerman (2008:166) notes that 
individuals who identify with a religion and who take part in religious ceremonies 
despite a lack of religious beliefs are, for the most part, ignored in contemporary 
sociological research. Similarly, Demerath (2000:127, 136) argues that even though 
cultural religion may, particularly in Europe, be used to describe one of the most 
common forms of religious identification, it has largely been overlooked by 
sociologists of religion. Notably, he asserts that this is the case despite the fact that 
cultural religion is of key importance in understanding secularisation. He argues that 
this phenomenon may represent the last remains of a historical church culture as a 
“final stage” of secularisation (Demerath, 2000:136-137). Demerath’s statement 
highlights the importance of examining cultural religion and other forms of 
remaining functions of religion in relation to secularisation. 
To further illustrate the applicability of the concept of cultural religion, 
Zuckerman describes that even though a majority of Swedes and Danes are 
socialised into Christianity by learning about bible stories, singing religious hymns, 
observing religious traditions and holidays, and identifying themselves as Christian, 
“hardly any of them believed in the basic theological content” (2008:152).90 This is 
in line with Furseth and Repstad’s (2006:139) observation that in the Nordic 
countries, it is common to use the church for rites of passage regardless of spiritual 
beliefs. Similarly, Bruce asserts that “we can see an increasingly secular people 
losing faith but retaining a nostalgic fondness for it” (1996:35).  
Essentially, cultural religion is the result of an adherence to a collective 
heritage, closely in line with Hervieu-Léger’s (2006:48) idea of a “distant shared 
memory.” In a nation like Sweden that has had almost non-existent religious 
diversity until relatively recently, cultural traditions and practices are naturally 
closely tied to the Church. In line with Durkheim (1912/1995), these rituals have a 
special place in the lives of Swedes and indeed signifies a sacred,91 yet largely non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 This is in line with my research findings fully explored in chapters 7 and 8. 
91 In that it carries “a quality of mysterious and awesome power…attributed to the objectivations of 
human culture” (Berger, 1967:25). 
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religious meaning. The concept of cultural religion successfully acknowledges this 
very crucial aspect, which is often missing in other conceptualisations such as 
religious belonging (e.g. Davie, 1994, 2002a, 2007).   
Demerath’s (2000) use of the term cultural religion can, to some extent, be 
applied to Scotland as well. Demerath describes cultural Catholics and cultural 
Protestants in Northern Ireland as “caught up in the religious legacies handed down 
from family to family, neighbourhood to neighbourhood, and community to 
community” (2000:131). The idea of identifying with a religious group because of a 
family history is present in Scotland as well and can in fact to a certain extent be 
distinguished from religious beliefs. However, this is very much associated with 
community and family and is therefore largely different from the form of cultural 
religion found in Sweden. There, an almost national adherence to more or less 
homogenous cultural traditions is accompanied by an unawareness or complete 
neglect of the supernatural connection to these practices. Cultural religion, then, is 
more readily applicable to Swedes, as a group, than to Scots. Instead, a focus on 
community with the concepts of cultural defence and social capital may more 
appropriately be used in the Scottish context.  
 
3.8 Religion and Community 
	  
3.8.1 Cultural Defence 
	  
Largely influenced by earlier work by Martin (1978), the concept of cultural 
defence was put forth by Steve Bruce (e.g. 1996, 2002a). It serves as an explanation 
of functions of religiosity alternative to spirituality, thereby describing a process in 
which religion can remain relevant even alongside secularisation, or indeed delay 
secularisation altogether. He explains that a common source of cultural defence is 
ethnic pride, which is used to characterise and explain religious tension or conflict 
either at a national or sub-cultural level (1996:96). In other words, in an “us versus 
them” situation when a religious identity is questioned or challenged, it can 
strengthen the sense of community, the attachment to that specific group, and at least 
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in the shorter term, acceptance of the specific beliefs of the group (Zuckerman, 
2009:62).     
 In relation to the secularisation thesis, Bruce (1996:125) argues that religious 
tension may maintain but not create religious beliefs and that, “once a religious 
culture has become fragmented and the close ties between religion and ethnicity lost, 
then no amount of external pressure will create a shared religion” (1996:123). In 
other words, according to Bruce, cultural defence simply delays but does not stop or 
reverse a process of secularisation. He explains that the secularisation thesis can be 
sustained given there are no empirical examples of a secularised culture that has seen 
a significant upsurge in religiosity (1996:125).  
This concept is above all applicable on the Scottish case, both at a national, 
and, perhaps even more so, at a sub-cultural level. Martin (1978:80) argues that a 
strong union between culture and religion is formed when a social group is largely 
separated from the dominant group or culture. Martin (1978:77-78) further describes 
two religio-cultural identities applicable to Scotland on which elements of cultural 
defence may be based. First, a separate national religious identity within a larger 
political union, such as that between Presbyterianism and the British state, and 
second, religio-ethnic minorities within the wider culture, as exemplified with the 
relationship between Catholicism and Protestantism within Scotland.92  
According to Bruce’s (1996) argument, it is possible that religious decline 
takes place in both Scotland and Sweden, but that elements of cultural defence serve 
to delay, but not stop, the process of secularisation, particularly in Scotland. In line 
with this, Zuckerman (2009:62) argues that one of the reasons for the low levels of 
religiosity in Sweden is the virtual nonexistence of the need for cultural defence. He 
further describes cultural defence as, “whenever national, ethnic, or cultural identity 
is threatened, the religiosity of the threatened group will typically be strengthened” 
(2009:62). This may serve as one of the reasons for higher levels of religiosity within 
minority religions, such as Catholicism in Scotland,93 and various free churches in 
Sweden.94 Most importantly, a majority of Swedes adhere to the largely unthreatened 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 This is described further in chapters 2 (pp. 41-54) and 7 (pp. 208-211). 
93 Although, the Catholic Church in Scotland is also seeing decreasing attendance (e.g. Brown, 
1997:158), and participation in rituals – see section 8.3 (pp. 248-261).  
94 For Sweden, see e.g. Kasselstrand and Kandlik Eltanani, 2013. However, it is important to note that 
tension between free churches and the dominant Swedish culture is comparatively weak.  
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and unchallenged95 Church of Sweden, while Scotland is considerably more diverse. 
This may also account for the importance of religiously defined communities in 
Scotland, a phenomenon much less prevalent in Sweden.  
 
3.8.2 Religion and Social Capital 
	  
 Social capital is a multidimensional concept with various meanings revolving 
around the importance of social ties for individuals and society (Portes, 2000). Here, 
I refer to social ties specifically in relation to local community, often exemplified by 
participation in social activities in groups other than family (Putnam, 2000). 
Hadaway and Roof (1978:10) argue that the local community is of key importance in 
understanding social bonds and attachment, and that most social activities take place 
in this setting. In line with this, they assert that when such ties are weakened, so is 
the attachment to the church. Similarly, a strong connection to a community is 
associated with increased church attendance (e.g. Hadaway and Roof, 1978; 
Hammond, 1992). This relationship, which they call the “community factor 
hypothesis” is tested by McIntosh et al (2002:123). They indeed find that strong ties 
within neighbourhoods and community are significantly and positively correlated 
with religious participation.  
 Putnam asserts that religious institutions are the single most important carrier 
of social capital in the United States and that they “support a wide range of social 
activities well beyond conventional worship” (2000:66). With the “Putnam thesis,” 
his famous contribution to the study of social capital and modern democracies, 
Putnam (2000) argues that a decrease in social involvement such as group activities 
and membership is associated with a similar decrease in civic engagement, which in 
turn is an important component of a democratic society. Bruce (2002b) and Davie 
(2002b) have interestingly debated the impact of his work on the secularisation thesis 
through a discussion of religious involvement in the United Kingdom. Bruce (2002b) 
criticises Davie’s view that a decrease in church participation is not linked to a 
similar decline in religious beliefs, and that they are rather effects of wider societal 
trends in line with Putnam’s theory of a decline in public association. He believes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Nonetheless, Zuckerman (2009:62) mentions that it is possible that the increasing presence of Islam 
will bring a growing need for cultural defence. 
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Davie’s claims could only be sustained if a lower interest in religious participation 
was accompanied by other forms of expressions of religious beliefs, but that he fails 
to see this in the British society (2002b:321). In her response to Bruce, Davie 
(2002b) argues that her application of Putnam’s (2000) work to British church 
participation is not done as a refutation of the secularisation thesis per se, but that the 
aim is rather to understand secularisation in relation to other social structural trends.   
 It is of course possible that both Bruce (2002b) and Davie (2002b) are correct 
in their observations, meaning that a decrease in religious participation could come 
as a result of both a general disinterest in social organisations and a decline in 
religious beliefs. I believe Putnam’s work should not be disregarded in the attempt to 
provide a thorough understanding of religious decline in contemporary Protestant 
Europe, but it is evident that active religious participation and belief are closely 
interconnected through socialisation as argued by Bruce (2002a:148).  
 Putnam (2000:281) discusses the common assertion that the disengagement 
observed in contemporary society could be explained by the strength of the welfare 
state and government intervention. This could indeed serve as a plausible explanation 
for the differences between Scotland and Sweden. However, Putnam (2000:281) 
does not subscribe to this theory and shows this with the fact that group membership 
in Scandinavia is, comparatively speaking, in fact thriving. This is also supported by 
Bäckström et al (2004:110) who state that 90% of Swedes are members of a 
voluntary organisation and that Swedes, on average, are members in between 3 and 4 
organisations, not counting the Church of Sweden. They instead convincingly speak 
of the specific role of the Church of Sweden in relation to the organisational sphere, 
which is likely a key reason for the differences between Scotland and Sweden in 
terms of the religious community. They state that the Church of Sweden’s close 
integration with the welfare state has caused a disassociation between the church and 
various social groups and organisations. Rather than fostering a sense of community 
as a result of more active organisational belonging, the Church of Sweden is viewed 
as a government institution providing public service (Bäckström et al, 2004:121).  
 This is arguably largely different in the Scottish context. While the connection 
to the Scottish nation is not non-existent, the Church of Scotland is to a further extent 
than the Church of Sweden regarded as a voluntary organisation among others, to 
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which a membership is an active choice. In other words, it is possible that social 
structural changes that have led to a declining need for social involvement has made 
a negative impact on church participation generally, however, it is, as stated above, 
important to view these changes in relation to both changes in other measures of 





 This chapter aimed to present a broad overview of theories and concepts that 
can serve as a framework with which to explain secularisation and the role of 
religion in secularising societies. With the secularisation theories, I presented key 
perspectives on religious change in contemporary society, particularly as related to 
Europe. The effects of modernity may thus explain a general decline in religion in 
both Scotland and Sweden. With the discussion of believing and belonging I showed 
that using such a typology to describe a highly fluid concept like religion on Scotland 
and Sweden is bound to be inaccurate and limiting, particularly without a clear 
conceptualisation of the terms. The effect of government intervention on religious 
vitality is a valuable aspect of the theory of the religious economy as it may be used 
to explain religious decline in Scotland and Sweden and also account for the 
differences between the two nations. The discussion of religion and security has a 
similar purpose in that it can offer an alternative or additional explanation for 
differing trajectories of secularisation.  
Examining the connection between religion and society can provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of the role of history, culture, and tradition in relation 
to religion and secularisation. It may be used to show that traditionally religious 
rituals can serve alternative functions with a declining focus on the supernatural.  
Likewise, the concept of cultural religion uses a connection to a cultural or historical 
legacy to explain ritual practice and church affiliation such as seen in Sweden. 
Cultural defence assists in explaining a remaining role of religion in a secularising 
society such as Scotland, and religion and social capital highlights a role of the 
church in the formation of community and social relationships. It also offers a social 
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structural explanation to religious decline and emphasises key differences between 
Scotland and Sweden.  
Various contributions attempting to provide a comprehensive answer to 
patterns of religion in contemporary society have all been subject to criticism and 
debate. There are advantages and limitations to every one of these theories and 
concepts, largely dependent on specific research aims and contexts of study. As 
mentioned, I believe that the theories and concepts presented here will, together with 
the historical background presented in Chapter 2, serve as useful framework with 
which to explain similarities and differences in relation to patterns of religion and 
secularisation in Scotland and Sweden.  
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 The previous chapters presented a theoretical and historical framework of 
religion in Scotland and Sweden. They argued that distinct perspectives on 
secularisation are largely a result of different definitions, conceptualisations, and 
specific research settings. In light of this, this chapter suggests that current 
disagreements are also dependent on methodological approaches and different views 
on how to appropriately measure religion. Here, I will highlight potential pitfalls and 
dilemmas in researching religion, as well as present my own research design and 
perceptions from the field.  
In the first part of the chapter, I discuss methodological issues in social 
research in general and sociology of religion in particular. I have chosen to examine 
these concerns from a social constructionist perspective (e.g. Berger and Luckmann, 
1966; Gergen, 1985; 1999; Maines, 2000; Potter, 1996) as I believe that this 
epistemological and ontological orientation offers a particularly valuable 
understanding of the difficulties in categorising and arranging social phenomena 
such as religion. Sociology of religion is a field that is, possibly more so than others, 
structured around individual meanings and perceptions of reality. With a broader 
appreciation of this perspective, many of the common mistakes made in the field of 
sociology of religion may subsequently be avoided.  
In the second part I present a mixed methods research design as well as 
describe advantages and limitations of both mixed methods generally as well as the 
specific quantitative and qualitative elements of the research design. This is followed 
by the final part, an account of my experience conducting this research beginning 
with a discussion of quantitative data collection and analysis and advantages and 
disadvantages of conducting secondary analysis. Furthermore, I describe the 
qualitative data collection process, specifically focusing on the construction of my 
interview schedule, reasons behind participant selection criteria, as well as strategies 
for recruiting participants. This is followed by an account of the process of 
conducting the interviews, including a description of demographic characteristics of 
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the participants, and a discussion of ethical considerations and dilemmas. Finally, I 
present how I went about the analysis of interview data. 
Regardless of the fundamental importance of empirical research to social 
science, it is crucial to acknowledge that the process of conducting research comes 
with certain restrictions. One of the specific aims of this chapter is, therefore, to 
discuss such limitations both to research in general and within the sociology of 
religion specifically.  
 
4.2 Key Methodological Issues and Dilemmas 
	  
4.2.1 General Concerns in Measuring Religion 
	  
As noted in Chapter 3, religiosity is a multidimensional concept that is 
difficult to define. Specific indicators of this construct are also notoriously difficult 
to measure. Hill et al (2000:51-52) argue that many attempts at applying set 
definitions and measures of religiosity have limited value as they often disregard key 
elements of religious experience and belief and that measures of religion and 
spirituality are often too narrow or too general to generate valuable findings (Hill et 
al, 2000:52). Similarly, Luckman (1967:21) asserts that sociological research on 
religion tends to be uncritical, and Means (1970:184) argues that measures of belief 
across contexts lack reliability and that social scientific research of religion merely 
adequately grasps the behavioural aspect.  
Bruce further highlights methodological deficiencies in the field and states: 
 
I frequently find myself at odds with other sociologists of religion about the extent of what is 
variously called ”non-organized” religion, religious potential, receptivity to religion, 
spirituality, implicit religion, and the like. They find a lot of it; I see little. Much of my 
scepticism stems from the conclusion that current work in this area is methodologically 
inadequate (2002a:186).  
 
 
He convincingly argues that some scholars invent latent religiosity by using leading 
questions, questionable cut-off points in categorising and analysing data, by 
wrongfully interpreting largely secular responses as religious, and by failing to adopt 
a critical approach in relation to the meanings behind people’s values and attitudes 
on religion (2002:187).  
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Not isolated to the sociology of religion, these issues form key 
methodological questions within social science research more generally,96 as 
presented by social constructionist scholars (e.g. Berger and Luckmann, 1966; 
Gergen, 1985; Maines, 2000). They emphasise limitations of generalising social 
research findings as meanings and perceptions held by individuals are social 
constructs that are constantly altering. They do not dispute that there are shared 
agreements and patterns in our social world that may be explored through empirical 
research, but argue that findings should be viewed as fluid rather than firm social 
realities. They thereby encourage a more critical attitude among researchers. I find 
value in the social constructionist perspective particularly in relation to the 
importance of adopting a careful approach within all steps of the research process as 
well as to acknowledge fluidity of interpretations above all across (and within) social 
contexts as described below. Nevertheless, I agree with Bruce (2002:187) that 
despite methodological issues in the field, and even if the findings produced are not 
without reservations, the role of a social scientist within the sociology of religion is 
indeed to measure and map out patterns of religiosity regardless of how difficult this 
may be.  
 
4.2.2 Language and Interpretation 
	  
One of the salient features of the social constructionist approach is the 
importance of language as it drives the process of social construction. It is by the use 
of language that meanings are passed on to other individuals through interaction, 
something that is highly dependent on cultural context (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; 
Gergen, 1985, 1999; Potter, 1996). Language is not only the focal point in social 
constructionism, it is also the tool by which researchers collect information.  
A potential problem in the research process revolves around how the fluidity 
of meanings shapes how the participant interprets a certain question or concept. In 
line with this, Davie (2007:115) describes the common problem of question 
wordings as affecting the answers that are given. Voas and Bruce (2004) discuss a 
similar notion with the 2001 Census in the United Kingdom. Scotland’s Census is 
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discussed further in section 4.2.2 (pp. 93-94).	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implemented independently from England and Wales and the fact that survey items 
were ordered differently, that they were worded differently, and that the response 
options were different, contributed to large variations in statistics of religiosity in 
Scotland as opposed to England and Wales. Similarly, Hertel (1980) shows 
significant differences in how respondents interpret the term afterlife as opposed to 
belief in heaven and calls for caution in questionnaire construction.  
Furthermore, in survey research, there is little or no room for the respondent 
to explain their interpretation of a term. Along with this, Bruce (2002a:187) argues 
that many sociologists of religion interpret possibly secular responses as religious. 
An example of this is Davie’s (1994:2) notion that modern Britain is less secularised 
than many scholars claim as only 4 percent are atheists. However, as mentioned 
earlier,97 this does not necessarily mean that the other 96 percent believe, and I agree 
with Bruce’s claim that people may be atheist but choose not to state this explicitly 
because of the connotation of the word itself (2002a:193).98 Survey research also 
does not grasp what respondents mean when they state that they are spiritual. 
Interview findings presented in Chapter 5 suggest that, to many, this might have an 
entirely non-religious connotation.  
Berger and Luckmann (1966:35-36) argue that when one is born, one is 
placed in a reality formed from a web of interactions and agreements. As social 
construction occurs through interaction, the meanings that are imposed upon oneself 
and that one hold as “true” and “objective” do have certain limitations. If an 
individual’s interpretation of the social world is developed from his or her 
interactions with various other individuals, then meanings are based on who interacts 
with whom. While one may argue then that it is possible for each individual to hold a 
unique meaning of certain terms and concepts, specific interpretations are evidently 
more homogeneous within a specific cultural context given that a person’s thoughts 
and meanings are constructed based on social interactions within networks of social 
relationships. This, in turn, shows the importance of social context in research. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 See section 3.4.3 (pp. 70-71).	  
98 Interview findings in relation to the interpretation of the term atheist are presented in section 5.4.2 
(pp. 153-156).	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4.2.3 Contextual Differences 
	  
When studying phenomena highly constructed of people’s individual 
meanings and experiences, it is not only important to consider the general difficulties 
of structuring such beliefs and experiences, but also the added challenge of 
conducting such research at a comparative level. Davie (2007:117) argues that 
comparative research is particularly complex in line with the social constructionist 
principle of the importance of cultural and historical contexts in the interpretation of 
meanings (Gergen, 1985:273). She speaks of the necessity to “take into account 
cultural specificity, historical trajectory, linguistic nuance, and culturally varied 
motivations” (Davie, 2007:114) and calls for a methodology that can account for 
this, a task that she believes survey methods are largely unable to accomplish.  
Quantitative measures of religiosity, in particular those of the cross-national 
kind, generally do not consider the diverse conceptual meanings found in different 
environments and applying set survey items in multiple contexts disregards the 
historical and cultural processes that have shaped the meaning of religious practice 
and belief (Davie, 2007:117). Furthermore, religious identification, spirituality and 
belief may evidently mean largely different things within different religions or 
denominations and thus, one needs to carefully consider such implications when 
analysing large-scale cross-national datasets on religion.  
Not only is an interpretation in itself contextually influenced, a research 
participant may also give a particular answer to a question depending on the 
perceived norms and values of the specific social group (Bradburn et al, 2004:11). 
Potter (1996:52) gives an example of how a respondent may view one answer as 
“correct” when he refers to Atkinson (1978) who asserts that a phenomenon is 
interpreted in different ways depending on values and norms. He uses suicide as an 
example, where respondents from Catholic cultures are less likely to see a certain 
death as a suicide. This could influence how the authorities classify this death, and 
may give a statistic in one society that is not comparable to another. This 
methodological issue also presents a problem within studies such as Durkheim’s 
“Suicide” (1897) where he found that suicide was more frequent among Protestants 
than Catholics.  
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Similarly, Bruce (2002a:206) highlights contextual norms as a problem in the 
sociology of religion. He argues that a more critical examination of respondents’ 
answers is needed. He explains that in the United States, self-reported rates of church 
attendance are strongly inflated. In line with this, Hadaway et al state that, “If 
Americans are going to church at the rate they report, the churches would be full on 
Sunday mornings and denominations would be growing, yet they are not” 
(1993:742). In other words, it is likely that participants give answers that they think 
the researcher wants to hear. Similarly, while it is problematic to speak of general 
European social norms, Berger et al (2008:12) state that Americans exaggerate their 
religiosity while Europeans, on the contrary, inflate their secularity.99  
  The potential pitfalls described above are certainly relevant to a comparative 
study of religious decline in Scotland and Sweden. Perhaps it is even more crucial to 
carefully consider possible differences in two nations that on the surface look very 
similar. As described in Chapter 2, while both nations have a history of a Protestant 
state church, the historical circumstances are very different and have undoubtedly 
shaped the contemporary religious landscape including meanings, motivations, and 
interpretation of religious beliefs and experiences. Furthermore, particular contextual 
assumptions do not only affect the interpretations made by research participants, but 
also those made by the researcher.  
 
4.2.4 The Role of the Researcher 
	  
It is crucial to be aware of how one’s own taken-for-granted assumptions may 
influence interpretations and conclusions. As part of the social world, one goes 
through day-to-day activities making certain assumptions about what one knows and 
what one thinks that everyone else knows. Berger and Luckmann describe this with 
the idea of “objectified reality” (1966:35). Society is constructed, but its components 
are seemingly firm in a way that one does not have to question the meanings and 
characteristics of every aspect of it. Potter introduces the concept of “mundane 
reasoning” to show this, and states that: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Section 6.3 (pp. 172-175) describes how this may influence church attendance levels in Scotland 
and Sweden.  
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When we are discussing features of our world with others – what went on, who did what and 
so on – we make a fundamental assumption. We assume that we all have at least potential 
access to the same underlying reality. Any neutral, competent observer, placed in the same 
position, will see the same thing (1996:53). 
 
 
Consequently, when a researcher conceptualises ideas and variables or interprets 
results, he or she oftentimes assumes that what he or she holds as true, this is in fact 
what everyone else sees as well.  
A researcher often takes his or her interpretations of meanings for granted as 
an objective reality and may therefore fail to capture important but subtle 
differences. This is in line with Bruce’s claim that minor variations in how we 
interpret an answer or statistic can lead to very large differences in conclusions 
(2002a:189). He mentions this as he discusses Bibby’s (1993) study on religion in 
Canada. Bibby draws the conclusion that Canadian church attendance has the 
potential to increase since around 50 percent of the respondents are at least 
“somewhat concerned about the purpose of life” (Bruce, 2002a:188). It is clear then, 
that according to Bibby, contemplating the purpose of life is a Christian matter, 
while the purpose of life might, to others, be an entirely secular matter. This is an 
issue whether the researcher is an insider or an outsider to the context he or she 
studies. A researcher who is from a different culture may adopt his or her own 
experiences of religion and, for example, assume that high levels of membership or 
affiliation means high levels of religiosity or religious participation, when, in fact, 
this may not be the case. In other words, inadequate knowledge of a certain context 
causes limitations to the research findings.  
The insider-outsider dilemma is not only an issue associated with social 
contexts, but also to the researcher’s own opinions, values, and experiences in 
relation to the topic of study.100 Furseth and Repstad (2006:207) ask whether or not it 
is an advantage101 or a limitation to hold religious beliefs or to identify with the 
religion of study. They describe that it is possible that a person may not be fully able 
to grasp a religious belief or experience unless one has lived it oneself, but that, on 
the other hand, as an insider one may not retain enough distance to the phenomenon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 This does not only apply to the study of religion but to social research more generally.  
101 As argued by e.g. Eliade (1959) and Smith (1989).	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of study. If one is an insider and is oneself a church member who believes in God, 
one may assume that everyone else who is a member of the church believes in God 
as well. That said, I agree with Furseth and Repstad (2006:207) that regardless of 
beliefs and values, a competent researcher is committed to producing fair and, to the 
extent possible, objective research findings. Nonetheless, it is an aspect worth 
contemplating since one’s own assumptions are so deeply ingrained in how one 
views the world.  
This may be a concern in quantitative as well as qualitative research, but it 
may be so that quantitative research is particularly problematic with a limited access 
to respondents’ reasons behind a certain statement. This forces the researcher to 
make assumptions about people’s views and values, which, as presented above, are 
inevitably filtered through his or her own view of the social world. Reflexivity is 
thus an important aspect of empirical research (e.g. Foley, 2001; St. Louis and 
Barton, 2002; Watt, 2007). By examining one’s own place in the research process, 
one can come to the understanding that one’s own interpretations could cause 
skewed descriptions, in particular since as a researcher who operationalises concepts, 
one puts limits on the possible responses based on one’s own views. One of the 
specific issues that I contemplated during every step of the research process is the 
insider-outsider problem. I am, myself, from Sweden, and my specific views on 
Swedish society as well as the views I have as an outsider to Scottish society can 
both be favourable and pose problems. In addition, every researcher has his or her 
own reasons for choosing to research a specific topic and while no study can be 
completely objective, it is important to be cautious of one’s own basic 
understandings and how they may cloud one’s interpretations of findings.  
I believe that the research design of a mixed methods approach, described in 
full in section 4.3, is a way to reduce these risks as well as those described in the 
previous sections. However, while it is crucial to adopt a careful approach, I still 
believe that even if the findings produced are not without reservations and there will 
be deviations from the patterns, empirical research is still useful in uncovering main 
themes and relationships, which, just as Bruce mentioned (2002a:187), is certainly a 
key task of a sociologist of religion. What is arguably another task of scholars of 
secularisation is a study of the secular. This may seem like an obvious contention, 
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but has received surprisingly little attention from scholars in the field.  The next 
section consequently discusses this concern as well as emphasises the 
methodological complexities in relation to a study of non-religion.  
 
4.2.5 Researching Secularity 
	  
 Studies of secularisation would arguably benefit from a thorough 
understanding of religious beliefs and practices as well as an examination of values 
and experiences of those who have chosen to “opt out” of religion in one way or 
another. A methodological dilemma that has received surprisingly little attention is 
consequently how one goes about studying the secular. Zuckerman highlights this as 
a key concern as he persuasively states that: 
 
Many scholars have been aggressively debating secularization for years, and yet despite all 
of the books and articles that have been written on the subject, all of them – at least that I’m 
aware of – are generally theoretical and broadly historical in nature, and don’t examine 
secular life as it is actually lived by non-believing men and women in the here and now, or 
the nuances of the secular worldviews of actual individuals who are irreligious (2008:96).  
 
 
Zuckerman (2008:76) further discusses the difficulties in researching the 
absence of something. How do you study secular life, choices, and experiences when 
one cannot simply do so by attending a church and thereby to some extent participate 
in the lived experiences as one can with religion at a place of worship? Davie 
mentions this concern in relation to vicarious religion102 and states that, “how can a 
sociologist document a phenomenon which almost by definition remains stubbornly 
below the radar, at least in its ‘normal’ manifestations?” (2007:112). She calls for 
new approaches to grapple with this issue, and states that “The crucial point to grasp 
in terms of sociological method is the need to be attentive to episodes, whether 
individual or collective, in or through which the implicit becomes explicit” (Davie, 
2007:128).  
The dilemma of studying a “lack of something” is intriguing and an issue 
worth contemplating over in relation to this research. Geertz (1968) argues that the 
most appropriate and accurate studies of religion involve researching and describing 
how religion is experienced in the moment that it is practiced rather than memories 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 See section 3.7.2 (pp. 80-83).	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or opinions of it. It would undoubtedly be a challenge to conduct an in-depth 
ethnographic study of lived experiences of secular life in the same manner as within 
a religious community. This is nevertheless not the aim of this research as the focus 
is not on practices of the secular per se, but rather on life choices, values, and beliefs 
held by religious as well as non-religious people in relation to conventionally 
considered religious ceremonies and traditions. 
Furthermore, I consider the dilemma of studying the secular as less of an 
issue as this research is not focused simply on the secular isolated from the religious. 
Instead, I aim to explain changes to, as well as remnants of, religion in secularising 
societies, which are largely tied to the religious and civil institutions that carry such 
practices.  
  
4.3 Research Design  
	  
4.3.1 Mixed Methods 
	  
 Aiming to overcome, or at least minimise, many of the methodological 
dilemmas and issues discussed above, I used a mixed methods approach, which is a 
research design made up of both a qualitative and a quantitative element (Bergman, 
2008:1; Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007:6). Surprisingly little mixed methods 
research is conducted in the sociology of religion. In fact, I am not aware of any 
contemporary research on European secularisation that utilises such an approach, and 
as explained further below, I believe such a design offers the most comprehensive 
solution to problems of interpretation and generalisation. Furthermore, while both 
methodologies strongly complement each other (Black, 1999:21), I believe my two 
research questions to some extent call for slightly different approaches in order to 
come to a more thorough understanding of patterns of secularisation and the overlap 
between religion and the secular in relation to religious and cultural practices in the 
two nations of study.  
Mixed methods research gained increased popularity in the beginning of the 
1990s and is today the fastest growing method in social science research (Bergman, 
2008:11). Even though the approach has seen an increase in acceptance and 
popularity, it has been argued that qualitative and quantitative methods are 
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incompatible following the specific epistemological and ontological positions taken 
by radical positivist and constructionist scholars (Bergman, 2008:12). While it is true 
that the worldviews differ largely between advocates for qualitative and quantitative 
methods, I do believe that mixing two methodologies is not only possible, but also 
favourable. First of all, it is a gross overstatement that quantitative researchers all 
hold the idea that objective facts can be identified and pinned down like those in the 
natural sciences. One of the core aspects focused on in research training is that 
nothing can be proven and through quantitative analysis we merely suggest that a 
certain relationship exists. Similarly, a qualitatively oriented researcher can find 
value in adopting a quantitative element as an attempt at exploring shared 
agreements and patterns that most scholars, including qualitatively oriented social 
constructionists (e.g. Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Gergen, 1985, 1999; Maines, 
2000; Potter, 1996) state exist in the social world. Therefore, I argue that a careful 
implementation and design of mixed methods research can generate a clearer, more 
comprehensive picture than using one method alone.  
Creswell, Plano Clark, and Garrett (2008:68-69) explain that there are four 
main types of mixed methods designs. A triangulation design consists of a 
concurrent implementation of a quantitative and a qualitative element, which are 
combined into one interpretation of the research problem. An embedded design is 
often used in experimental research when pre- and post-test quantitative or 
qualitative data is enhanced with a component of the other method during the 
intervention phase. Explanatory and exploratory designs are two-phased designs 
with a quantitative (explanatory) or qualitative (exploratory) first phase, followed by 
a second phase of the other method. The second phase is then dependent on the 
results of the first phase. In the explanatory design, the second phase of qualitative 
data collection and analysis is most often implemented to explain or further 
illuminate quantitative results. In the exploratory design, the purpose of the 
quantitative component of the second phase is to generalise or test the qualitative 
results. 
The specific design I adopted for this PhD thesis is a modified version of the 
phased approach called the Explanatory Sequential Design (Creswell and Plano 
Clark, 2007:71). There are two different versions of this design; the follow up 
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explanations model and the participant selection model. The difference between the 
two types consists in the purpose of the quantitative results. In the participant 
selection model, the quantitative results are used to locate specific individuals with 
certain characteristics interesting to the study who are then approached for an in-
depth interview. The follow up explanations model is suitable when the research 
questions call for a methodology where qualitative findings are needed to describe 
and clarify significant differences or surprising quantitative data (Creswell and Plano 
Clark, 2007:72). The latter version of the explanatory sequential design was chosen 
as the most suitable for this study. 
 




quantitative data sets 
Analysis of quantitative 
data sets 





Analysis of qualitative 
data 
Interpretation of results 
Further analysis of 
quantitative data sets 
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While the main structure of my design is sequential, I have implemented a 
modified version with a considerable degree of overlap between the two phases. This 
flexibility has allowed me to return to quantitative analysis concurrently with the 
qualitative data collection. The research design consists of an initial phase with a 
quantitative focus (see Figure 4.1). Here, secondary quantitative data sets were 
collected, examined and analysed, followed by an interpretation of initial results, 
which further identified important findings that needed additional investigation. 
Consequently, the first phase connects to the second through the initial quantitative 
results. In the next phase, qualitative data collection took place through in-depth, 
semi-structured, interviews designed to explore and explain the initial quantitative 
results. Simultaneously, further quantitative analysis was conducted based on initial 
quantitative results as well as perceptions from the interviews. This was followed by 
analysis of the qualitative data and, last of all, interpretation of the results.103  
 
4.3.2 Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 
	  
Davie (2007:111) explains that research in the sociology of religion has been 
carried out using a broad range of methods each generating useful data depending on 
the direction of the research. The aim and reasoning behind my methodology was 
largely in line with her assertion that, “methods should be considered 
complementary: taken together they enable the researcher to build up as complete a 
picture as possible of the phenomenon that he or she is trying not only to describe but 
explain” (Davie, 2007:111). In line with this, I believe a methodology comprised of 
both a quantitative and a qualitative element is the most suitable way to approach my 
research questions.  
A quantitative element makes important contributions to my project and 
ultimately the field for several reasons. Examining quantitative data provides a 
crucial background to the extent and nature of secularisation in Scotland and 
Sweden. With an analysis of large-scale surveys, I may cautiously generalise my 
findings to the population of Sweden and Scotland and thus add important insights to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 A more detailed account of the steps in the research process is presented in sections 4.4 (pp. 107-
110 and 4.5 (pp. 110-120). 
	   104	  
the current debate on secularisation. More specifically, I may contribute to the 
critique of Davie’s (1990, 1994, 2002a, 2004, 2007) study on believing and 
belonging104 by systematically examining relationships between constructs of belief 
and belonging in both nations of study. Additionally, with quantitative data I can 
control for the effect of demographics and other intervening variables and thereby 
isolate the effects of and relationships between my key variables of study (Black, 
1999:44). Furthermore, the quantitative surveys105 that I use are repeated in the same 
manner at different points, which allows for important examinations of trends of 
religion over time (e.g. Davie, 2007:113; Wuthnow, 1976, 1977).  
My qualitative data does not have the ability to explore any general patterns 
of similarities and differences between Scotland and Sweden, which I believe is an 
integral part of a comparative study at the national level. The qualitative data is 
based on a smaller convenience sample,106 and is therefore not representative of the 
population at large, which is nevertheless not the purpose of this data. The methods 
strongly complement each other in that quantitative techniques applied during the 
first phase of my research process provide a concrete understanding of broad social 
trends within which the qualitative data collection was pursued.  
On the other hand, a qualitative component adds other important features and 
serves as a strong complement to the quantitative research. As mentioned in section 
4.2, quantitative data on religion has been fairly inconsistent and scholars are divided 
on how this data should be interpreted (Bruce, 2002a). Religious beliefs and values 
are arguably complex and very personal in nature, making them impossible to pin 
down in a quantitative study. One of the conceived limitations to quantitative 
research is its inability to thoroughly capture individuals’ experiences. The goal of 
survey research is to structure a phenomenon in defined categories and patterns, and, 
following the social constructionist perspective laid out in the first part of this 
chapter, quantitative research does not sufficiently portray the broad range of 
complex relationships in the social world. With the concept of typification, Berger 
and Luckmann (1966:45) argue that as one cannot have an in-depth understanding of 
all patterns and characteristics that exist, typification allows for structuring of one’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 See section 3.4 (pp. 68-71).	  
105 See section 4.4 (pp. 107-110).	  
106 See section 4.5 (pp. 110-120).	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world based on own defined ideas of what something means, but that in doing so, we 
anonymise experiences. When a researcher develops a survey item, he or she puts 
constraints on what a respondent can answer. In line with this, they argue that 
“misinterpretation is more difficult to sustain in face-to-face interaction than in less 
‘close’ forms of social relations” (1966:45). There is, in other word, value in 
adopting a qualitative element to quantitative research to grasp more subtle 
differences in interpretation of meanings.  
Qualitative research also adds depth and texture to the quantitative results 
through contextual explanations from participants. Qualitative research, such as in-
depth interviews used in this research, provide crucial insights that are not attainable 
through quantitative methods alone. This is argued by Zuckerman, who states that:  
 
Surveys can only tell us so much. They can give us snapshots of information – useful 
information to be sure – but it is often information that amounts to little more than quick and 
partial glimpses of various aspects of a given population…by conducting face-to-face in-
depth interviews with as many people as I could over the course of a year, I was able to get a 
much richer, subtler, and more nuanced understanding of what it means to be secular in a 
secular culture than any statistical survey could ever reveal (2008:97).  
 
 
To get a thorough picture of the meanings that people attach to religious belonging, 
beliefs, secular participation and the like, the issue at hand needs to be discussed with 
participants to a considerable depth. I therefore believe that using a mixture of these 
two methodologies provides a strong and solid tool to examine my research 
questions. Nevertheless, as is the case with all research design, my approach comes 
with certain limitations, which are, along with general benefits, discussed below.  
 
4.3.3 Strengths and Limitations of the Research Design  
	  
One of the main advantages with a mixed methods approach is that by using a 
method composed of both a quantitative and a qualitative element, it is possible to 
create a design that highlights the strengths of each method and offsets the 
weaknesses (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004:21). In line with this, using two 
methods creates an opportunity to see the research problem from different 
perspectives (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007:9). As quantitative research tends to 
focus on numbers and qualitative research on words and in-depth meanings, an 
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integration of the two leads to a more comprehensive understanding that may not be 
possible if using one method alone (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004:21). On the 
other hand, it has been argued that a researcher adopting a mixed methods design 
needs considerable knowledge in both quantitative and qualitative methods, and an 
attempt at including a second method in a study to increase its value often leads to a 
research design and implementation that is too simplistic (Bergman, 2008:1). 
Similarly, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004:21) state that the researcher needs 
extensive knowledge on how to appropriately mix the two methods. As with all 
research, I believe such knowledge is something that is, in addition to completing 
training courses on the topics, gained with time and experience and that the benefits 
of conducting such research largely outweigh the potential limitations.  
 There are also strengths and weaknesses associated with the explanatory 
sequential design specifically. Creswell and Plano Clark (2007:74) explain that 
because there are separate phases with quantitative data collection and analysis in 
one and the qualitative approach in the other,107 this particular research design is 
straightforward to carry out. Therefore, a single person can conduct this research 
efficiently. On the other hand, the researcher needs to put thought into the amount of 
time budgeted for each phase and acknowledge that the qualitative phase will require 
more time. While considerable time and attention was be given to the examination 
and analysis of quantitative data, as secondary data sets was used rather than 
collecting this data myself, sufficient time was budgeted to the in-depth interviews 
without having to rush either one of the components. For the follow-up explanations 
model specifically, the researcher needs to carefully select which quantitative results 
need to be explained in the qualitative phase in order for the research design to yield 
meaningful results (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007:74-75). The initial results from 
quantitative analysis highlighted key differences between Scotland and Sweden, 
which consequently informed the content of the qualitative interviews. Further 
quantitative analysis was, as mentioned, conducted concurrently with the interviews 
as they sparked interesting findings that called for additional investigation. I believe 
that with this modification and flexibility, I carefully tailored a methodological 
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approach that involved a research process both suitable and robust for my specific 
research. A detailed account of this process is presented in the next section. 
 
4.4 Quantitative Data Collection and Analysis 
	  
4.4.1 Survey Data  
	  
For the quantitative component of my research, data sets were collected for 
secondary analysis. These data sets are results of surveys that are either entirely on 
religion or have variables of interest included. For the initial stage of the research 
process, I used the International Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP) data on religion 
from 2008. The data was collected simultaneously in multiple nations, including 
Scotland (within a wider British sample) and Sweden. Since the same questions were 
asked to individuals in all nations participating in the survey, a more direct 
comparative analysis of this data was possible, but regrettably the sample size for 
Scotland was relatively small at 173. This data set was used for a majority of the 
quantitative analysis on the Swedish context, but also the previous survey that the 
International Social Survey Programme implemented on religion, in 1998, was used 
specifically to investigate changes over the relevant decade. For Scotland, the 
attention was directed towards ongoing Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys (SSAS), 
with a primary interest in the 2001 data with an extended module on religion. I also 
incorporated trends of church membership and participation in religious rituals with 
figures from the Church of Sweden (Svenska Kyrkan, 2013), and statistics on 
marriage ceremonies from the General Register Office for Scotland (2011). The 
survey questions that make up some of the key variables used in this research can be 
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Table 4.1: Quantitative data sets 
Data Set Nation Unit of Analysis Sample Size 
International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP), 1998 
 
Sweden Individuals 1189 
 
International Social Survey 






Scottish Social Attitudes 
Survey (SSAS), 1999-2011* 
 
Scotland Individuals 1482-1665 
*Excluding 2008. 
 
4.4.2 Quantitative Data Analysis 
	  
In the first phase that took place prior to the qualitative data collection, I 
conducted descriptive analysis in SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences), 
such as frequencies and cross tabulations. The aim of the descriptive analyses was to 
give a broader overview of various measures of religiosity in the two nations of study 
on which further investigation was to be based.108 This was in line with Black’s idea 
that descriptive statistics “can be quite revealing, providing insights that would not 
otherwise be apparent” (1999:46). However, he further emphasises that, “Such an 
approach though, does not provide evidence to support the existence of 
relationships” (Black, 1999:46). Therefore, as the qualitative data collection began, I 
moved on to inferential techniques in order to discern the key factors in each nation’s 
experience. I specifically used techniques such as binary logistic regression, 
multinomial logistic regression, means comparisons, and analysis of variance.109 The 
techniques applied in this research were made possible with the exclusive use of 
secondary data sets. There are both advantages and disadvantages of conducting such 
research, which is further considered below.   
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 See section 4.5.2 (pp. 112-114) for a discussion of the key initial findings on which I structured my 
interview content. 	  
109 More about these specific techniques, variable coding, and significance of the results are presented 
in chapters 5-7. 
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4.4.3 Strengths and Weaknesses of Secondary Data Analysis 
	  
 There is a common misconception that primary data collection and analysis is 
at all times superior to the use of secondary data sets and researchers are regularly 
encouraged to construct and implement their own surveys. However, secondary 
analysis is gaining increasing popularity in contemporary research (Kiecolt and 
Nathan, 1985:9) and it is important to note that such an approach carries both 
benefits and limitations. As a matter of fact, in many circumstances, secondary 
quantitative data analysis may serve as a stronger and more robust method of 
research.  
The perhaps most obvious advantage to secondary data analysis is that it 
requires considerably less time and resources, making a mixed methods approach 
easier to carry out, in particular for a single researcher with limited funds (Kiecolt 
and Nathan, 1985:11). One of the key aims of this research is to explore 
secularisation at a comparative, national level. Survey construction and 
implementation that would yield data generalisable to the populations of the nations 
of study would consequently be a close to impossible undertaking for a sole 
researcher with limited resources. Furthermore, secondary data analysis is associated 
with fewer data collection problems (Kiekolt and Nathan, 1985:11). Many large-
scale surveys are administered by organisations employing experts with extensive 
knowledge on survey construction, sampling techniques, and data collection. They 
further use robust and tested indices and measurements, which enhances construct 
validity (Black, 1999:143). These surveys are likewise commonly put through 
rigorous pre-testing in order to improve the quality of the data by reducing the risk 
for potential problems, such as ambiguous survey items that may lead to 
misinterpretations (Hunt et al, 1982:269-270).  
While the use of secondary data is beneficial for this research, it is important 
to consider a small number of disadvantages. The most problematic issue is the lack 
of key variables needed for the specific research (Kiecolt and Nathan, 1985:14). 
Multidimensional concepts such as religiosity require a set of indicators or 
measurements in order to more accurately capture such phenomena. However, few 
datasets include all such measures of interest. Even the most comprehensive datasets 
on religion, such as the ISSP, have a very limited set of indicators of religious 
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belonging. While religious affiliation and church attendance are included, there are 
no items on religious rituals and life-cycle ceremonies, which are key to this 
research. The second problem specific to this research involves the use of national 
samples. Several large-scale surveys, such as the ISSP, have collected representative 
data on individuals in several countries. However, Great Britain is treated as one 
collective sample, and the sub-sample for Scotland is relatively small. A way around 
this problem is to supplement the data with other surveys (Kiecolt and Nathan, 
1985:13), which is accordingly done in this study with the focus on Scottish Social 
Attitudes Surveys.110 Finally, Nathan and Kiecolt (1985:12) suggest that secondary 
data can constructively be combined with primary data collection in order to present 
a more thorough picture, precisely an objective of this research design. Discussions 
of aspects of the primary data collection process are consequently described below.  
 
4.5 Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis 
	  
4.5.1 Planning the Interviews 
	  
The qualitative component of this research consists of semi-structured in-
depth interviews. A semi-structured interview is one in which the researcher prepares 
broader questions or areas of enquiry that each interview is focused around. Beyond 
these themes and main questions, the interviewer freely probes for more information, 
changes the order in which the questions are asked, and adapts follow-up questions 
depending on the specific information given by the participant (Drever, 1995; 
Fielding, 1993). The semi-structured approach was the most suitable for this research 
as it allowed an exploration of key topics and questions that emerged from the initial 
quantitative phase, but it nevertheless let the participant lead the way to matters 
important to them in relation to the themes and topics discussed (Longhurst, 
2010:103). This allowed for a flexible approach in which I was better able to 
discover the connections made and the meanings held by these individuals in relation 
to the key topics of enquiry (Kvale, 2007).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 See section 4.4.1 (pp. 107-108).	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I conducted 32 interviews, 16 for each nation, with recently married couples 
who had married within the Church of Sweden, the Church of Scotland, or in a non-
religious ceremony (as in a civil or a humanist wedding). As members of the 
contexts of study, these individuals hold feelings, thoughts, and values on religion, 
secularisation, rituals, and beliefs in relation to culture and community. My reason 
for selecting married couples specifically was that this would allow me to speak to 
individuals who have had to make active decisions in relation to religious rituals and 
life cycle ceremonies. Those who had a church wedding may, for example, identify 
with the church for spiritual reasons, social reasons, or out of tradition, and 
consequently, one of the key aims of the interviews was to gain a better 
understanding of what meaning, if any, belonging has to them. Additionally, my aim 
was to investigate why those who chose to have a non-religious ceremony do not 
“belong” to the church to the extent of those choosing a church ceremony and how 
this relates to their religious beliefs. Furthermore, couples are fairly likely to have 
made similar decisions in terms of baptism and religious upbringing for any children 
they may have. The criterion of “recently married” roughly meant having had a 
marriage ceremony in the last five years. I believe this ensured that the interviewees 
would have a relatively clear memory of their experience in relation to their 
ceremony, including detailed decisions that were made, what the ceremony meant to 
them, as well as the feelings that it evoked. 
I acknowledge that only interviewing recently married couples excludes those 
who are not married or who have been married for a longer period of time. Similarly, 
it leaves out any couples that married outwith the national churches or a non-
religious ceremony. However, the aim of my interviews was not to obtain a sample 
representative of the entire population, as is the case in quantitative research, but 
instead to purposively select individuals that may help explore and highlight key 
reasons and meanings of religious belonging in contemporary secularising Scotland 
and Sweden.  
I decided to interview couples together rather than separately. The reasons for 
doing this were threefold. First, marriage is an intimate ceremony between two 
people and I therefore felt that interviewing them separately would not reveal the 
whole picture in relation to the decision-making process. Second, I believe that one 
	   112	  
can tell a lot about religion in today’s society by examining the reactions of the 
spouse when the other person reveals a specific opinion. This consequently showed 
to be the case in the field as it uncovered interesting observations in terms of religion 
as a non-issue (Zuckerman, 2008:102), an interesting finding I would have been 
unable to grasp had I interviewed them separately.111 Third, my perception was that 
having both individuals present created a more relaxed, informal, atmosphere and 
that this benefit outweighed the potential, but unlikely, limitations in the expression 
of their views that having their partner around may cause.  
I derived my interview questions from three distinct but related sources. First 
of all, I considered my sample criteria in order to tailor the themes and questions to 
married couples specifically. Second, I acknowledged interesting debates and 
dilemmas in the literature that I wished to explore further. Third, I examined the 
results of my initial quantitative analysis completed in phase one, from which I 
obtained interesting themes and patterns. With this in mind, I developed potential 
sub-questions in relation to each research question that I hoped the interviews could 
explore. These questions, as well as a general overview of the process of 
constructing the interview schedule are discussed in the following section.  
 
4.5.2 Constructing the Interview Schedule 
	  
 The initial quantitative findings revealed interesting differences and 
similarities between Scotland and Sweden.112 Those raised within the Church of 
Scotland were more likely than those raised in the Church of Sweden to no longer 
identify with their church. Additionally, Swedes who were not raised in a religion 
were considerably more likely than Scots to later in life identify with the national 
church, and a much greater proportion of Scots than Swedes identified with a 
religion other than the National Church. Interestingly, a large majority of Swedes 
who identified with the national church described themselves as non-religious, while 
a small majority of Scots who identified with the Church of Scotland were religious. 
Moreover, the results were very similar between the two nations in regards to the 
groups of people who identified with no religion and other religion, while there were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 See section 5.4.1 (pp. 150-153). 
112 A detailed description of my findings is presented in chapters 5-8.	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substantial differences among those who identified with the national church in 
respective country. This shows why the former state churches are of particular 
interest and that the issue of believing and belonging is both complex and largely 
different in the two contexts of study.  Interestingly, it seems as though belonging to 
the national church means something different to Swedes, where it is relatively 
disconnected from religious beliefs, as opposed to Scots, where religious 
identification is more closely tied (although not entirely), to subjective religiosity. 
This was consequently one of the key problems to explore in the interviews.  
 
Table 4.2: Questions and topics that interviews aimed to address 
Research Question 1: To what extent are Scotland and Sweden secularised and how 
does this fit into previous conceptualisation of religious belief and belonging? 
• How do participants’ religious backgrounds relate to current religious beliefs 
and practices?  
• How salient are the participants’ religious beliefs (or lack thereof) to their 
identity?  
• How do participants perceive society’s norms and expectations on religious 
beliefs? Do they experience a tension?  
• What part do Christian beliefs play in terms of the participants’ religious 
beliefs? 
• Do the participants experience church participation (in different forms) as 
fundamentally connected to their beliefs? 
Research Question 2: How can national context explain differences in religious 
belonging and how the key functions of national churches are maintained, 
transformed or abandoned? 
• What are the reasons behind participation (or non-participation) in formal 
rituals such as weddings, baptisms, confirmations, etc? 
• What do these rituals mean to the participants?  
• How do these rituals relate to their religious convictions? 
• Do the participants experience these rituals as part of belonging to a church, 
community, or wider society?  
• What role does the national church play in participants’ lives (on a smaller and 
larger scale)? 
• In what ways (if any) do the participants “belong” to the church? 
• What are the participants’ opinions on the role of the National Church in wider 
society? 
 
 In relation to these observations, the research questions, and literature review, 
I reflected on the objectives of my interviews. I thereby constructed a list of 
questions that I hoped the interviews could help answer (see Table 4.2). Based on 
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these questions, I created themes and broader topics to discuss during the interview. I 
also prepared very specific back-up questions to, if needed, encourage conversation, 
as suggested by Longhurst (2010:106). The interview schedule is included in 
Appendix I. Just as discussed above, as these interviews were semi-structured, the 
interview schedule was simply a guide to fall back on if needed, and the actual 
interviews were much more flexible and open-ended. Nonetheless, preparing a 
structured set of themes and back-up questions was beneficial in that it underlined 
the connection between my research questions and the interview content. Likewise, it 
served as a constant reminder of the purpose of the interviews and was, in that way, a 
tool with which I could direct the participant if the conversations took different turns. 
 
4.5.3 Sampling Strategy 
	  
The participants were recruited through various different approaches. I began 
by asking friends and family for any contacts. This showed to be the most successful 
strategy as almost all of the couples I was referred to agreed to take part, perhaps in 
part because someone they knew in person introduced me to them. Approximately 
half of the participants were recruited in this manner. This recruiting strategy worked 
particularly well in Sweden. As I was based in Scotland during the recruitment stage, 
I was relatively limited in terms of how to find participants. At the same time, I had a 
larger network of contacts in Sweden, which in the end made the process rather 
straightforward. 
I initially thought that contacts within respective churches would be useful in 
finding participants. In retrospect, this showed to be a less successful strategy. I 
contacted twelve churches in Sweden either by e-mail or by phone. I informed them 
that my research involved a study of the role of the national church in relation to 
family, culture, and community in today’s society and highlighted how these 
findings may be of interest to them as a church. Only one church responded, which 
may be an interesting observation in itself. A minister from this church was very 
helpful, but in the end was not able to find me a couple to interview. In Scotland, I 
contacted four churches. Three of them responded, but only one of them was able to 
refer me to potential participants. Interestingly, the minister in one of the parishes I 
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contacted was fascinated by my research but informed me that he had only married 
one couple in the church since he transferred there years ago. This may in fact serve 
as an example of the declining role of the Kirk in the provision of life cycle 
ceremonies (see Chapter 8).  
In the same manner, I decided to contact humanist societies in each 
respective nation. The Humanist Society of Scotland was incredibly helpful in my 
attempt to find participants who had a non-religious ceremony. They posted a 
recruitment ad in their newsletter and on their website, which proved to be very 
successful, as four couples contacted me personally. While the Humanist Society in 
Sweden was supportive of my research and made attempts to help me find 
participants and refer me to a celebrant, in the end, they were not able to help me 
recruit any couples.  
The remainder of my couples were recruited through snowball sampling by 
asking couples that I interviewed for other potential couples. Overall, they were very 
helpful in giving me contact details to friends and family who had married in the last 
five years. I decided that e-mail was the most appropriate way to initiate contact with 
most of the couples. I felt that this approach, as opposed to telephoning them, was a 
less intrusive means to contact them as it would allow them the chance to discuss it 
with their spouse and contemplate over their decision before getting back to me. 
Although I contacted them via e-mail, the response rate was very high.  
Particularly in the Swedish context, but to some extent also in Scotland, my 
experience was largely similar to Zuckerman’s (2008:77) in that although a majority 
were not interested in the topic of religion, they agreed to take part “to be nice.” In 
the end, very few actually declined, but often stated that they “usually don’t think 
about religion at all.” Interestingly, before I even conducted any interviews I came 
across a profound indifference in matters related to religion in Sweden, which was 
fundamentally different in Scotland. This was further highlighted in the interviews, 
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4.5.4 Conducting the Interviews 
	  
 The interview stage took place between May and September of 2012. Three 
separate trips were made to Sweden for this purpose. All 32 interviews were 
conducted face-to-face, with approximately three quarters of them carried out in the 
couples’ homes. The remainder took place in public spaces, such as cafés. As I 
introduced myself to the couples, I gave them a box of chocolates as a token of 
appreciation and told them a brief description of my research. I asked them if they 
agreed to be recorded, and all 32 couples said yes without hesitation. The length of 
the interviews ranged from around 45 minutes to 1 hour and 45 minutes, with an 
average length of approximately one hour. Out of the 32 interviews, 17 were 
conducted in English and 15 in Swedish.113 The interviews were relaxed, and most of 
the participants spoke very freely on the topics despite the fact that, as mentioned 
above, many of them openly admitted they never contemplate such issues nor are 
they very interested in religion. Others were very passionate about the topic and 
spoke without a great deal of additional probing or encouragement. The interviews 
occasionally went off topic, but I never interrupted an interviewee. Instead, I 
carefully led them back to the question of interest or asked follow-up questions when 
appropriate.  
After each interview, I asked the participants to fill out a short demographics 
sheet, which is included in Appendix II. A description of the interview participants 
and the date and place of interview is, likewise, presented in Appendix III. The mean 
age for the Scottish sample was 33 years with a range of 25 to 47 and a median of 32. 
The Scottish participants were, overall, highly educated as 6 percent of the 
individuals had completed secondary school, 16 percent had some higher education 
or a vocational degree, 53 percent had a university degree, and 25 percent had 
completed a postgraduate degree. The age of the individuals in the Swedish sample 
ranged from 24 to 77 years, with a mean of 37 and a median of 32. Of the Swedish 
participants, 6 percent had left school after 9th grade, 22 percent had completed 
secondary school, 19 percent had some higher education or a vocational degree, 44 
percent had a university degree, and 9 percent had a postgraduate degree.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 One of the individuals in the Swedish sample was originally from England and preferred an 
interview in English. 	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In addition to the criterion of having married within the last five years in the 
National Church or a non-religious ceremony, I also ensured that at least one of the 
individuals in each couple identified as Scottish (for the Scottish interviews) or 
Swedish (for the Swedish interviews). In most cases, both individuals were Swedish 
or Scottish, but I interviewed a few individuals who were born and raised 
elsewhere.114 I did not perceive this as a limitation as in all those cases they had lived 
in Scotland or Sweden for a considerable amount of time and were married to a Scot 
or a Swede. They often revealed vivid descriptions of their thoughts and opinions of 
religion in Scottish and Swedish societies as partial outsiders to the context of study. 
Additionally, it was fascinating to see how their thoughts and interpretations differed 
from those of their Scottish or Swedish partner. Nevertheless, the fact that some of 
the individuals were foreign nationals was carefully considered when interpreting the 
findings.  
 I conducted 16 interviews for my Swedish sample and 16 for the Scottish 
sample. Originally, my aim was that half of these couples had married in the national 
church and half in a non-religious ceremony. When all the interviews were 
completed, I had spoken to nine Swedish couples who had married in the Church of 
Sweden, six who had a civil ceremony, and one who had a humanist ceremony. 
Interestingly, the Swedish couple that had a humanist ceremony married in Scotland, 
as humanist marriage ceremonies are not legally recognised in Sweden.115  In 
Scotland, eight of the couples married in the Church of Scotland, seven had a 
humanist ceremony, and one couple married in a civil ceremony. In Sweden, all of 
the interviews were conducted in the regions of Östergötland and Småland, as well as 
in the Stockholm area in the South East of the country. In Scotland, the interviews 
were conducted in Lothians and Glasgow, with a majority of interviews taking place 
in Edinburgh.   
Initially, I decided to ask the participants for the size of the community in 
which they live, but in retrospect, I realised that a distinction between an urban and a 
rural location made a very limited difference in terms of the choices made. Rather, if 
anything, the first impression was that it seemed to be more strongly linked to what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 In addition to Swedes and Scots, I interviewed individuals from Ireland, Northern Ireland, 
England, United States, Poland, Germany, and New Zealand. 	  
115 This is discussed further in Chapter 8 (pp. 233-262). 	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type of community they grew up in. It is possible that this would have been largely 
different had I interviewed couples from different socioeconomic or regional 
backgrounds. The urban-rural distinction was nonetheless explored further with a 
discussion of family background as well as analysis of quantitative data. 
 
4.5.5 Ethical Considerations 
	  
As the quantitative element consists of analysis of secondary data, the ethical 
aspects of the collection of this data are in the hands of the primary researchers. 
There are no known ethical issues associated with this data. The identities of the 
participants have been protected, as no such information is included in the data sets. I 
have gained access to this data from different data archives116 and I acknowledge and 
adhere to the user guidelines set by the primary researchers.   
As the qualitative component relates to primary data collection, this is where 
potential issues could arise. In line with the School of Social and Political Science’s 
Research Ethics Policy and Procedures. I stressed the importance of the protection of 
research participants through confidentiality. The perceived risks to the participants 
in this study are minimal, however, it is possible that discussing religious beliefs or 
marital issues may be difficult. On the rare occasions when I felt like the participant 
seemed uncomfortable, I moved on to a different question, but generally, the 
interviews progressed without any problems. The interviews are confidential, and the 
participants were informed that they were free to leave the study at any time and to 
refuse to answer any question that they were asked. The participants have my contact 
information for any questions or concerns, but none have been raised to this date. 
The fundamental aspect of research is to protect its participants, and any material 
used throughout the process of completing this research has been carefully handled 
and stored. Prior to conducting the interviews, I carried out the School Ethics self-
audit in relation to my doctoral research project in which I confirmed that no 
reasonably foreseeable ethical risks were identified. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 UK Data Archive and ZACAT Data Portal. 
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4.5.6 Data Analysis 
	  
 The data collected in the interview stage was transcribed during the autumn 
of 2012. A large majority of the interviews were transcribed word for word, while 
shorter segments of conversations that did not relate directly to my topics of interests 
were briefly summarised or left out of the transcripts (Gibbs, 2007). Audio files were 
carefully maintained and stored and during the process of analysing the data, I 
frequently went back to the audio recordings in order to more accurately interpret the 
manner in which a statement was delivered in the spoken context (Kvale, 2007). Any 
quotes used from the Swedish interviews have been carefully translated to English 
for the purpose of writing this thesis.  
 Gibbs (2007:44-45) discusses the two different analytical approaches to data 
coding, namely a concept-driven and a data-driven view. The former involves 
constructing codes by using theory and previous research, thematic topics in the 
interview schedule, or prior empirical findings (e.g. Ritchie et al, 2003). The latter 
approach is concerned with developing codes almost exclusively drawn from the 
data (Barbour, 2008;196-197). Scholars within grounded theory propose such 
analytical method (e.g. Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1997) and 
maintain that one should begin the coding process with few preconceived ideas or 
theoretical assumption. As I coded the transcripts, I used a combination of a theory 
driven and a data driven approach as I found this method to be the most suitable for 
my research. Given that I aim to contribute to the sociological understanding of 
secularisation, as well as the fact that my interview schedule is largely constructed as 
a means to explore theoretical issues and initial empirical findings, an exclusively 
data-driven approach would be both unfavourable and unrealistic. Nevertheless, the 
interviews served as a crucial opportunity to explore new angles and meanings to 
previously conceptualised ideas, and without analysing the data with an open mind, 
the qualitative findings would be largely limited to previous understandings of 
secularisation and contemporary functions of churches.  
 In the process of coding the data, I read through each transcript in order to 
roughly highlight initial thoughts and themes from the interviews. As I re-read the 
transcripts, the focus and detail of these themes were continuously developed and 
refined (Barbour, 2008:225). Information relating to each theme was sorted and 
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organised into separate collections of data. The data was analysed by mapping out 
relationships between themes as well as patterns between the qualitative themes, 
quantitative findings, and prior research and theoretical approaches. Attention was 
given to unexpected findings and how they may potentially fit in to previous 
theoretical understandings of the topic. The qualitative data, along with the 




This chapter has highlighted key methodological issues in relation to 
conducting a social scientific study of religion. With the first part of the chapter, the 
aim was consequently to show that considerable care needs to be adopted in 
conducting research on religion, in particular in regards to the fluidity of 
interpretations of meanings within and across social contexts. Here, I reported 
potential issues both in relation to participant interpretation as well as the role of the 
researcher in the research process. I similarly discussed the dilemma of researching 
the secular and similar “hidden” phenomena.  
As this thesis focuses on meanings and interpretations of religiosity, a 
methodology was required that allowed for a thorough explanation and 
understanding of such individualised conceptions while simultaneously maintaining 
the ability to describe general patterns of religion and secularisation at a national 
level. In the second part of the chapter, I consequently presented the mixed methods 
research design implemented for this research. A thorough understanding of 
secularisation at the broader societal level in Scotland and Sweden require a 
quantitative approach to grasp general patterns of religious decline. Additionally, in 
order to explore the overlap between religion and the secular in particular in terms of 
remaining functions of religion in secularising societies, a qualitative element was 
adopted to come to a better understanding of religious and cultural identities, 
meanings and feelings in relation to life-cycle ceremonies, and religious beliefs and 
affiliation. The two aspects are evidently strongly related and with a mixed methods 
approach I was able to offer a more comprehensive picture of patterns and 
experiences of religious decline in Scotland and Sweden.  
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The remainder of the chapter provided an account of how various data were 
collected and analysed. Three broader dimensions of enquiry that came out of the 
literature review and initial perceptions from the field include (1) active religious 
practice and participation, specifically as related to subjective religiosity, (2) 
religious beliefs and secularisation, and (3) religious belonging as serving different 
functions, particularly in relation to culture and community. Detailed results of data 
analysis is thus the focus of the following four chapters, beginning with a discussion 
of religious beliefs in Chapter 5, followed by church attendance in Chapter 6, 
religious identification and membership in Chapter 7, and participation in rituals in 
Chapter 8.  
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 Most scholars agree that church attendance levels are relatively low and 
broadly declining throughout Protestant Europe. Instead, fundamental disagreements 
stem from different understandings of subjective religiosity. Several scholars (e.g. 
Berger et al, 2008; Davie, 1990, 1994, 2002a, 2004, 2007; Stark, 1999; Stark and 
Finke, 2000) argue that low levels of active attendance merely reflect a change in the 
nature of personal beliefs where privatised religion is becoming increasingly 
prevalent. This is exemplified by Davie’s (1990, 1994, 2002a, 2004, 2007) assertion 
that Europe is believing without belonging, where she assumes that “traditional” 
religious beliefs, such as belief in a personal god and in hell, are often abandoned in 
favour of individualised approaches to understandings of the supernatural, such as an 
increasing pervasiveness of spirituality. As mentioned in Chapter 3, other scholars 
(e.g. Bruce, 1996, 1999, 2002a; Wallis and Bruce, 1992; Wilson 1982) instead argue 
that personal beliefs derive from religious socialisation as opposed to any inherent 
human need for religion117 and that a decrease in subjective belief thus reflects 
declining levels of active attendance.  
 As a contribution to this debate, the first part of the chapter consequently 
examines various measures of subjective religiosity in the two nations in order to 
provide a better understanding of personal religious beliefs of Scots and Swedes. In 
relation to this, levels and meanings of spirituality are presented. By examining the 
relationship between national church identification and religious beliefs in Scotland 
and Sweden, the second part of the chapter provides a contextualised assessment of 
meanings of subjective religiosity. Here, key differences emerge that contribute to 
the understanding of the role of the national churches in contemporary Sweden and 
Scotland. Quantitative findings are explored further with an account of interview 
participants’ perceptions of religious expectations of the national churches in relation 
to other religious denominations. The third part of the chapter discusses how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 As argued by e.g. Stark and Finke (2000).  
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different understandings of personal and public interest in religion may serve as an 
important dimension of secularisation. In relation to this, views on and meanings of 
atheism are explored suggesting different interpretations in the two nations. In line 
with this, Davie’s (1994) argument that low levels of atheism indicate that Northern 
Europeans believe is critically examined.  
Ultimately, this chapter attempts to situate Scotland and Sweden in the debate 
on secularisation by investigating the extent to which Scots and Swedes in fact 
believe as argued by Davie (1990, 1994, 2002a, 2004, 2007). Together with levels of 
church attendance (Chapter 6), religious identification and membership (Chapter 7), 
and ceremonial participation (Chapter 8), this provides a more nuanced and 
contextualised examination of believing and belonging in contemporary Scotland 
and Sweden.  
 
5.2 Current Levels and Patterns  
	  
 As presented in Chapter 4, subjective religiosity is a notoriously difficult 
concept to measure, with largely different figures reported by various scholars. Davie 
(2002a:7) states that 53.4 percent of Swedes believe in God, 46 percent in life after 
death, 31.2 percent in heaven, and 9.4 percent in hell. Hamberg and Pettersson 
(1994:206) present figures that suggest that only 15 percent of Swedes believe in the 
existence of a personal god and that 31 percent identify themselves as religious 
(1994:206). Zuckerman (2008:25) states that 26 percent of Swedes believe in God, of 
which 16 percent believe in a personal god, 33 percent believe in life after death, 31 
percent in heaven, and 10 percent in hell. 
Bäckström et al (2004:64) present more detailed data with which they 
examine what these specific indices mean to individuals. It is, however, 
questionable, whether they make a convincing interpretation of the results. They 
show figures suggesting that 18 percent of Swedes believe in a personal God, 20 
percent believe in an “impersonal power or force,” 36 percent believe God is 
“something within each person,” 15 percent are unsure what to believe in, and 12 
percent do not believe in a god, a supernatural power, or force. The authors do not 
believe that the secularisation thesis can be applied to Sweden, and that current 
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figures merely reflect a “religious change” (Bäckström et al, 2004:12) With these 
findings in mind, they argue that “75 percent of the adult population believe in 
transcendent forces,” and that it reflects faith in a postmodern society (2004:65). 
However, it is questionable whether a belief that “God is within each person,” is, in 
fact, a supernatural belief or something quite different. It might mean, for example, 
merely that the respondent views religious beliefs as deeply personal to each 
individual. This is explored further below with figures of spirituality as well as 
interview participants’ interpretations of this form of belief.  
Field (2001:164) presents figures that suggest that Scots are considerably 
more religious than Swedes,118 but that religious beliefs are steadily declining. He 
further shows that in 1976, 85 percent of Scots believed in God, a figure that 
decreased to 80 percent in 1983, 78 percent in 1987, and 73 percent in 1997. In the 
1980s, around 7 in 10 adults believed Jesus was the Son of God, and 9 in 10 
Catholics and 3 out of 4 of those identifying with the Church of Scotland believed 
Jesus died for our sins and was resurrected. Between 1976 and 1997, the proportion 
of Scots who believed in an afterlife decreased from around half to 42 percent, and in 
1997, 44 percent believed in heaven and hell. Brown (2007:417) states that in 2000, 
26 percent of Britons believed in a personal god, and that in 2001, 61 percent 
believed in God. Davie (2002a:7) shows that 71.6 percent of respondents in Great 
Britain believe in God, 58.3 percent in life after death, 55.8 percent in heaven, and 
35.3 percent in hell. Bruce (1996:33) argues that, in Britain, there has been a decline 
in various measures of religious beliefs in the second half of the 20th century. 
Furthermore, he states that in 1991, 10 percent of Britons identified as atheist119 and 
13 percent as agnostic. Moreover, in 1991, 72 percent believed in a supernatural 
power.  
  Figures presented above suggest that traditional Christian beliefs, such as in 
God, heaven and hell, are more common in the British context than in Sweden. 
Nevertheless, they further indicate that Scotland and Sweden are secularising with 
beliefs becoming less and less common. In the next section, research findings 
presented by prior literature above are compared to data from the ISSP (2008) and 
the SSAS (2001). As statistics on religiosity are subject to survey construction and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Although the data Field refers to is from 1997.  
119 Up from 4 percent ten years earlier.  
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various interpretations of respondents and researchers, the results are further 
explained using interview data, highlighting what these beliefs may mean to Scots 
and Swedes. 
 
5.2.1 Measures of Subjective Religiosity 
	  
 Figure 5.1 presents percentages of Scots and Swedes who explicitly believe 
in God, life after death, heaven, hell, religious miracles, reincarnation, and 
supernatural powers of ancestors. Scots are more likely than Swedes to say that they 
believe in any one of the seven measures. Interestingly, the difference between the 
two nations is particularly large on “traditional” Christian beliefs such as heaven and 
hell, in line with Zuckerman’s (2008:11) assertion that Swedes have the lowest belief 
in hell in the world. Davie (1990, 1994, 2002a, 2004, 2007) speaks of a great 
majority of Europeans as holding religious beliefs. However, it is debatable whether 
they really are. Less than half of Scots and even fewer Swedes explicitly believe in 
any one of these seven indicators, suggesting that a minority of Scots and Swedes are 
religious, at least in the more traditional, Christian sense.120 This suggests that while 
religious beliefs may be more common in Scotland than in Sweden, it is not clear 
that most Swedes or Scots believe, suggesting that the issue of believing and 
belonging is more complex and polarised than as applied by Davie.  
Figure 5.2 (Scotland) and Figure 5.3 (Sweden) present various measures of 
subjective religiosity by age cohort. In Scotland, older age groups are considerably 
more religious than younger on all three measures of religiosity. This is in line with 
Voas and Crockett (2005:15) and Field (2001) who argue that older individuals are 
more religious than those who are younger. In the youngest cohort, only 28 percent 
of Scots are spiritual or religious, a figure that is close to 75 percent in the oldest age 
group. This is arguably due to a decline in religious socialisation, as we will see with 
church attendance levels in Chapter 6.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 However, in SSAS (2001), belief in God for Scotland is 72 percent, clearly highlighting the 
difficulties in measuring religious beliefs. This is also complicated by the fact that many Scots and 
Swedes do not explicitly state that they e.g. believe in God or that they are spiritual as they are simply 
unsure. It is difficult to judge whether most of those who are unsure in fact believe. This is discussed 
further in section 5.2.2 (pp. 131-135).  
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Figure 5.1: Religious beliefs of Scots and Swedes 
 
Data source: International Social Survey Programme, 2008 
 
Similarly, the Swedish findings suggest that there is a weaker relationship 
between age and religious beliefs in Sweden. It is more common to be religious than 
spiritual in older age groups while younger individuals are more likely to be spiritual 
than religious, indicating that Davie might be correct that contemporary society has 
seen a decrease in traditional religious beliefs in favour for spirituality. Nevertheless, 
both these forms of belief are relatively low suggesting that while beliefs might be 
changing, most Swedes are still neither religious nor spiritual.   
Sociologists of religion disagree on whether age differences are due to age 
effects, meaning that people’s levels of religiosity change as they age, or cohort 
effects, suggesting generational shifts in levels of belief. While it is possible that 
there is a bit of truth to both sides, Bruce’s (2002a) assertion that religious beliefs 
and participation are formed through a process of socialisation is more convincing 
than e.g. Stark and Finke’s (2000) argument that people become more religious as 
they age in order to ensure themselves of an afterlife as their life approaches the end. 
In fact, Hamberg’s (1991) longitudinal study on Sweden shows that while older 
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between 1955 and 1970, suggesting that, Stark and Finke’s position cannot readily be 
applied to the Swedish case.  
 
Figure 5.2: Scottish religious beliefs (by birth cohort) 
 
*N for individual cohorts ranges from 205 to 334. Data source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2001 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Swedish religious beliefs (by birth cohort) 
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In the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2001), a more detailed question was 
asked about respondents’ beliefs about the supernatural. The results are presented in 
Table 5.1, which shows that 27.3 percent of Scots believe in a personal god, 28.6 
percent believe that there is some sort of power or life force, and 25.8 percent that 
there is “something there.” About 1 in 10 are unsure, and only around 7 percent state 
that they do not believe in a god, spirit, or life force. While these figures are 
interesting, they do not show what these statements really mean to the respondents. 
The option of “there is something there,” is particularly unclear, especially given that 
this is a different category to “some sort of spirit or life force.” It is questionable 
whether the individuals who believe “that there is something there” but who do not 
believe in a “spirit or a life force” really believe in any religious sense.  
 
Table 5.1: Beliefs of Scots 
There is a personal god 27.3% 
There is some sort of spirit or life force 28.6% 
There is something there 25.8% 
I don’t really know what to think 11.3% 
I don’t really think there is any sort of god, spirit or life force 6.9% 
N 1517 
Data source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2001 
 
 Similar questions arise from an examination of religiosity and spirituality in 
the two nations. As seen in Figure 5.4 below, only 37.5 percent of Scots and 18.8 
percent of Swedes would call themselves at least somewhat religious. The difference 
between the two nations is considerably smaller on the question of spirituality. In 
Scotland, 28.9 percent claim to be spiritual, while the same figure in Sweden is 25.0 
percent.121 Again, Swedes are less likely to be “traditionally religious” but 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 15.6% of Swedish sample and 14.0% of Scots “can’t choose” on the question on spirituality.   
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Figure 5.4: Percentage of Scots and Swedes who identify as spiritual 
and “at least somewhat religious” 
 
Data source: International Social Survey Programme, 2008 
 





Data source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2001 
 
There are a number of problems with Davie’s (1990, 1994, 2002a, 2004, 
2007) assertion that a vast majority of Northern Europeans believe. First of all, as 
seen above, many measures of religiosity, particularly in Sweden, are relatively low. 
In other words, if most individuals hold some kind of supernatural beliefs, it does not 
come across in surveys. Second, claiming that a majority of Europeans hold on to 
religious beliefs by looking at such vague concepts as “there is something there,” 
ignores the fact that half of Scots, and even more Swedes, are neither religious nor 
spiritual when asked. Third of all, as Davie argues that even those who do not claim 
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that 14.2 percent of Scots and 14.6 percent of Swedes are spiritual while they do not 
believe (or are unsure whether they believe) in God. This suggests that few Scots and 
Swedes who do not believe in God (or who are unsure) are explicitly spiritual. 
Furthermore, a crucial question that is not considered by Davie is what spirituality 
actually means to the respondents, and whether or not this is in fact a form of 
religious beliefs. This is consequently explored further in the next section.  
 
Figure 5.5: Percentage of Scots and Swedes who believe in God or who 
are spiritual but do not believe in God 
 
Data source: International Social Survey Programme, 2008 
 
5.2.2 The Meaning of Spirituality 
 
When discussing spirituality, interview participants in both nations expressed 
very similar sentiments. Only 5 out of 32 participants in Sweden and 11 of the 32 in 
Scotland believe in God. However, some participants would say that they are 
spiritual. Given the low figures of attendance in Chapter 6, and the fact that none of 
the Swedish and only a handful of the Scottish interviewees attend church regularly, 
this finding is in line with Davie’s claim of privatised religion. However, when 
asked to describe this belief, it becomes clear that the meaning of spirituality is more 
complex than simply a belief in a supernatural power or force other than a god. In 
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Intriguingly, many of the participants did not make a connection between 
spirituality and a belief in the supernatural. Instead, they mentioned that it meant an 
awareness of one’s inner strengths or emotions, an appreciation of music, culture, or 
art, or a connection to nature. Helen, 31 is an archivist in Edinburgh and married to 
Chris, a 33-year-old postdoctoral researcher. She came across as the most outspoken 
atheist among all the Scottish participants and conveyed a very secular take on 
spirituality. 
 
Helen: I like our connection to the earth. That’s my only spiritual thing... About us being 
connected because we evolved from it... I love being out in the country and feel a connection 
to the world. To me that is a very nice spiritual feeling if you want to call it that.122 
 
 
Jonas is a 33-year-old opera singer, married to Gabriella, 32, a violin teacher. 
They are both Swedes, but reside in Glasgow. They married in a Scottish humanist 
ceremony and are both atheists and active humanists. They were nevertheless of the 
opinion that most people are spiritual simply for the reason that if you say that you 
are not spiritual, you sound a bit cold or shallow. 
 
Isabella: What does it mean when people say that they are spiritual?  
 
Jonas: I think it is difficult to find someone who says that they are not spiritual, because they 
think it sounds so negative: “I don’t believe in anything at all.”  
 
Gabriella: Yes as if you are so flat. So cold. I think being spiritual can mean being touched 
by things. That you have deeper feelings.  
 




Alice is a 28-year-old librarian who married Ludvig, 31, an office manager, in a 
Church of Sweden ceremony. She is a non-believer who, in line with Jonas and 
Gabriella, expressed that spirituality is about finding meaning in your life, and that 
some people find that meaning in religion, while others have other outlets.  
 
Alice: I think spirituality is… I believe in people’s need to create meaning. We are so 
complicated with all the feelings. I think we create the feeling that something is bigger than 
ourselves. For some people that’s God. It’s more within us humans, but what it is, it doesn’t 
really matter, as long as it works for each person.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Full information about interview participants and date and place of interview are found in 
Appendix III (pp. 279-283).  
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Just like Alice indicates, a common impression from the interviews was that 
this sense of “something bigger” oftentimes refers entirely to a power or strength that 
can be found within each person. Natalie, 48, a science teacher, and Per, 40, an 
engineer, were married in their garden by a minister from the Church of Sweden. 
Natalie expressed a similar mindset to Alice, while her husband was more sceptical. 
 
Isabella: Could you describe your faith? Do you believe in God?  
 
Natalie: I have one of those “spiritual feelings.” That I do. But I can’t say I believe because 
that would be a lie because I don’t know... There has to be something within me that can 
keep me calm. I would love to go to India. Maybe I’m a Buddhist.  
 
Per: They are Hindus there…  
 
Natalie: Oh, okay. Maybe I can go to Nepal? Where are they Buddhist? I feel like there is 
something there, something that is a little beautiful.  
 
Isabella: But you don’t know what this is?  
 
Natalie: Around Easter I saw this TV programme about the Gospel of Thomas, that God is 
us. Maybe that’s what it is? It is the belief in ourselves.  
 
 
Lucy, 34, is a physiotherapist from Glasgow. She married Simon, 36, a police 
officer, in a humanist ceremony. She does not believe in God but is open to the idea 
that there are human powers that we might not be aware of.  
 
Lucy: Well I don’t think that there is a god but I think there is a lot that we don’t know. I 
mean there might be other things out there, and a universe that we don’t know about. For 
example, how some people say they’re telepathic and things like that, I wouldn’t say 
something like that doesn’t exist. I do think that there’s more things that we don’t realize 
about ourselves, so I’m not sure, I wouldn’t bet all my money that there is nothing out there.  
 
Isabella: Okay, so would you call yourself spiritual? 
 
Lucy: Yeah I think I’m spiritual but I wouldn’t say I’m religious.  
 
 
Nonetheless, some participants describe spirituality as a sense that there is 
more to the world than what we can see. Malin, 32, and Lucas, 35 married in a civil 
ceremony in Norrköping. Malin is an English teacher and Lucas, who is from 
England, works for a recruitment firm. Malin mentioned that there is “something out 
there that we can’t explain,” that “things just fall into place,” and “that there has to 
be a little spark of something else.” Yet, she does not believe in God or an afterlife. 
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She does not attend church and would not call herself religious. Several other 
participants expressed similar ideas. Unlike his wife Alice, Ludvig came across as 
open to the idea that there may be some kind of external powers. 
 
Ludvig: I believe in fate or something that makes things happen, but I don’t think it has a 
name. And 2000 years ago you didn’t know why things happened and maybe they needed a 
God to explain things. But now there are more complex explanations. Still, there is 
something to it. Why would the phone ring right when you’re about to step out into the street 
and get run over by a car? I don’t think there’s just two dice thrown again and again.  
 
 
The Swedish musician Magnus, 42, had a similar idea, while his wife Caroline, 42, 
who works in clothing sales, disagreed. 
 




Magnus: Well, yes I do. Somehow.  
 
Caroline: But what would that be? I can’t wrap my head around it.  
 
Magnus: Yes, but you’re not supposed to. As we said, it can’t be explained.  
 
Caroline: No I don’t believe in anything supernatural that has power over me.  
 
Magnus: But sometimes it feels like things just fall into place. In a way.  
 
Caroline: And very often they don’t fall into place.  
 
Magnus: No but I believe, like you said, in… something.  
 
 
It is clear that spirituality means largely different things to the interview 
participants, but what is interesting is that for most of them, spirituality is not 
necessarily a religious matter. Individuals who see spirituality as a connection to 
nature, music, art, or deeper emotions clearly do not believe just because they 
identify as spiritual. Most importantly, it is also questionable whether the other 
interpretation, namely spirituality as fate, is in fact a convincing indicator of belief. 
Not a single interview participant who said they were spiritual simultaneously 
expressed that this vague “belief” in any way influenced their life, as one would 
imagine would be a criteria even for privatised religion. These individuals do not 
worship, they do not pray, they do not regularly think about this possible external 
power or why things play out the way they do. This sentiment was expressed by 
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Martin, 37, a draughtsman, who is married to Sharon, 35, an accountant. He states 
that, “I’m open to the idea that there is something out there. I just don’t ever think 
about it. I don’t worry about it. If it’s there, it’s there, but I just get on with my life.”  
The question is whether the fact that these individuals do not entirely want to 
dismiss the idea that there might be something out there means that they believe? If 
so, then Davie (e.g. 1994, 2002a, 2007) may be right that spirituality is an indicator 
of belief, but to present this as belief without a proper conceptualisation is, 
nevertheless, misleading.  Furthermore, it is questionable whether a typology based 
on this dimension of belief is actually a useful refutation of secularisation. Her notion 
of believing includes virtually everyone but the most outspoken atheists. Instead, 
spirituality may in fact be a sign of decreasing social significance of religion given 
that it is highly individualised and removed from daily life (e.g. Bruce, 2002a; Wallis 
and Bruce, 1992).  
 
5.3 National Church and Religiosity 
	  
Relative to other denominations, the Church of Scotland and the Church of 
Sweden are experiencing great difficulties attracting participants to their services.123 
Additionally, the struggle, to some extent, also involves convincing those who 
identify with the church to adhere to fundamental Christian beliefs. In line with this, 
several scholars make the connection between the introduction of national churches 
in favour of a collective consciousness and the unintended consequence of 
disenchantment (Taylor, 2007), and demystification (Anderson, 2006). In other 
words, they suggest that there is a link between the functions of national churches 
and secularisation.  
As considered further below, interview participants in both Scotland and 
Sweden were of the opinion that the National Church is less strict about doctrine than 
other denominations. Yet, the Church of Scotland came across as more concerned 
about faith of their adherents than its Swedish counterpart, where the interviewees 
perceived the church not to have an interest in personal beliefs of its members. This 
connection between religious beliefs, the national churches, and their adherents is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 See section 6.4.4 (pp. 181-184).  
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discussed in depth in the following four sections. This begins with an overview of 
the religious beliefs of those who identify with the national churches, other 
denominations, or no religion, followed by a further examination of the relationship 
between national church identification and religiosity through logistic regression 
modelling, and finally, a discussion of individual perceptions of beliefs in relation to 
national churches and other denominations. 
 
5.3.1 Religious Identification and Beliefs 
	  
An examination of the relationship between religiosity and religious 
identification suggests that those who identify with the national churches are 
generally less religious than those who identify with other religious 
denominations.124 As presented in Figure 5.6, 83.4 percent of Swedes who identify 
with the Church of Sweden were at the same time extremely non-religious, very non-
religious, somewhat non-religious, or neither religious nor non-religious. In other 
words, only 16.6 percent of those who identify with the Church of Sweden would 
call themselves at least somewhat religious. The highest levels of religiosity can be 
seen among the very small number of Swedes who belong to other religion, of which 
76.9 percent are at least somewhat religious. Looking at belief in God (Figure 5.7), 
less than half (42.8 percent) of those who identify with the Church of Sweden 
believe in God, compared to 24.3 percent for no religion and 96.1 percent for other 
religion. This again illustrates that people may not necessarily belong to the Church 
of Sweden for religious reasons, while this seems to be the case for other religions.  
As presented in Figure 5.6, 44.5 percent of Scots who identify with the 
Church of Scotland are extremely non-religious, very non-religious, somewhat non-
religious, or neither religious nor non-religious. This suggests that a small majority 
of those who identify with the Church of Scotland are at least somewhat religious. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 “Other religions” in the ISSP (2008) for Sweden include Christian Free Church (2.8 percent of 
sample) Roman Catholics (1.1 percent), Islam (1.1 percent), Other Christian (0.2 percent), Buddhism 
(0.2 percent), Hinduism (0.1 percent), Judaism (0.1 percent), and other religions (0.2 percent) with a 
total of 44 individuals in the sample belonging to these religions.  
 
“Other religions” in the ISSP (2008) for Scotland include Roman Catholic (11 percent of sample), 
Anglican/Church of England (6 percent), Other Protestant (1.8 percent), Other and Unspecified 
Christian (4.6 percent), and Other Religions (0.6 percent). 
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When comparing religious identification and belief in God (Figure 5.7), 90.2 percent 
of those who belong to the Church of Scotland believe in God, compared to 48.7 
percent for no religion and 92.6 percent for other religions.125 In other words, the 
results are relatively similar between the two nations in regards to the groups with no 
religion and other religion, but there is a considerable difference in beliefs between 
those who identify with the Church of Scotland and the Church of Sweden.  
The Scottish findings are confirmed with additional analysis of the Scottish 
Social Attitudes Survey (2001). As seen in Figure 5.8, individuals who identify with 
the Church of Scotland are only slightly less likely to be religious or spiritual than 
those who identify with other religious denominations,126 and much more likely to 
be religious or spiritual than those with no religion. In other words, those who belong 
to the Church of Scotland are relatively similar to those of other religious 
denominations, while individuals who identify with the Church of Sweden more 
closely compare to those with no religion. This suggests that those who identify with 
the Church of Scotland may still do so primarily for religious beliefs, while a 
majority of Swedes who identify with the Church of Sweden do so for other, non-
religious, reasons. Identification with the Church may instead be a form of cultural 
religion, where individuals belong in the name of culture and tradition (e.g. 
Demerath, 2000; Zuckerman, 2008).127 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Same analysis with the more limited Scottish sample from the ISSP (2008) suggest 80.6 percent of 
those who identify with the National Church, as opposed to 85.3 percent for other religion and 27.9 
percent for no religion. 
126 “Other religions” in the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2001) include Roman Catholic (14 
percent of sample), Anglican/Church of England (2.7 percent), Other Protestant (3 percent), Other and 
Unspecified Christian (4.6 percent), and Other Religions (0.7 percent).	  
127 For more on cultural religion, see section 3.7.3 (pp. 77-79).   
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Figure 5.6: Percentage of respondents at least “somewhat religious”  
 
Data source: International Social Survey Programme, 2008 
 
Figure 5.7: Percentage of respondents who believe in God128 
  
Data source: International Social Survey Programme, 2008 (Sweden) and Scottish Social Attitudes 
Survey, 2001 (Scotland) 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 28.4 percent of Swedish respondents “can’t choose” and 4.7 percent of Scottish respondents “don’t 
know.” These respondents have been excluded from the analysis. In the ISSP for Scotland, 23.7 
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Figure 5.8: Religious beliefs by religious identification in Scotland 
 
Data source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2001 
 
Given that Swedes were automatically members of the Church of Sweden 
until fairly recently (see Chapter 2), it is possible that a majority of those who 
identify with the Church have not made an active choice to belong, while those who 
identify with other religious denominations are likely to be more committed as they 
either have actively exited the Church of Sweden or are immigrants with religious 
backgrounds. While there seems to be some levels of non-religious identification 
with the Church of Scotland, this is much more limited. The more religious emphasis 
on the Church of Scotland is likely a result of the Kirk’s very limited role as a 
national church compared to the Church of Sweden. Furthermore, the fact that Scots, 
to a further extent than Swedes, make an active choice to belong to the former 
national church, a church that is simply one choice among several, may suggest that 
Scots are more likely to identify with a denomination for religious purposes. This 
complex relationship is further explored with binary logistic regression modelling 
below.129  
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5.3.2 Modelling Subjective Religiosity 
	  
 Using data from the International Social Survey Programme (2008) for 
Sweden and the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2001) for Scotland, two binary 
logistic regression models were created with the aim to further explore the 
relationship between subjective religiosity, religious identification, and church 
attendance, while controlling for various other variables. In the two models, different 
measures were used for the dependent variable of subjective religiosity. In the 
Swedish data, respondents were asked to rate their level of religiosity as either 
extremely non-religious, very non-religious, somewhat non-religious, neither 
religious nor non-religious, somewhat religious, very religious, or extremely 
religious. The dependent variable is coded as 1 for at least somewhat religious and 0 
for less religious. Scots were asked to state whether or not they were religious, 
spiritual, or neither. The dependent variable for the Scottish model is thus coded as 1 
for religious or spiritual and 0 for neither. While current church attendance and 
attendance at age 11 or 12 are at the ordinal level of measurement, with seven 
categories for the Swedish model and eight for the Scottish, they were treated as 
continuous. 
 
The following independent variables were included in the Swedish Model:  
• National Church Identification: 1 for yes, 0 for no  
• Other Religion: 1 for yes, 0 for no 
• Church Attendance: Scale from 0 (never) to 6 (once a week or more) 
• Attendance at age 11 or 12: Scale from 0 (never) to 6 (once a week or more) 
• Age 
• Female: 1 for female, 0 for male 
• Urban: 1 for town, small city, suburb, or larger city, 0 for small village or 
countryside 
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Table 5.3: Determinants of subjective religiosity in Sweden 
DV: Subj. Religiosity+ B Significance Exp (B) Effect 
Constant (a) -4.223 0.000*** 0.015 Negative 
National Church -0.125 0.602 0.883 - 
Other Religion 1.766 0.001*** 5.848 Positive 
Church Attendance 0.724 0.000*** 2.063 Positive 
Attendance as Child 0.724 0.000*** 1.229 Positive 
Female 0.197 0.337 1.217 - 
Age 0.011 0.092* 1.011 Positive 
Household Income 0.001 0.411 1.001 - 
Urban 0.334 0.124 1.397 - 
N 985 
Cox and Snell 0.207 
+: At least “somewhat religious”. * p<0.1 (marginally significant), ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Data source: International Social Survey Programme, 2008 
 
The following variables were included in the Scottish model:  
• National Church Identification: 1 for yes, 0 for no  
• Other Religion: 1 for yes, 0 for no 
• Church Attendance: Scale from 0 (never or practically never) to 7 (once a 
week or more) 
• Ever Attend Regularly: 1 for yes, 0 for no 
• Age 
• Female: 1 for female, 0 for male 
• Population Density: Persons per hectare 
• Household Income (20-point scale)	  
Marital Status, Education, and Ethnicity were considered as control variables in both 
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Table 5.4: Determinants of subjective religiosity in Scotland 
DV: Subj. Religiosity+ B Significance Exp (B) Effect 
Constant (a) -3.004 0.000*** 0.050 Negative 
National Church 0.319 0.049** 1.376 Positive 
Other Religion 0.749 0.000*** 2.115 Positive 
Church Attendance 0.242 0.000*** 1.274 Positive 
Ever Attend Regularly 0.784 0.000*** 2.190 Positive 
Female 0.166 0.376 1.123 - 
Age 0.030 0.000*** 1.030 Positive 
Household Income -0.007 0.577 0.993 - 
Population Density 0.006 0.020** 1.006 Positive 
N 1354 
Cox and Snell 0.257 
+: Religious or spiritual (as opposed to neither). *p<0.1 (marginally significant), **p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. Data source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2001 
 
The findings in Table 5.3 and 5.4 are intriguing. In Sweden, national church 
is insignificant and other religion is positive, with the reference category of no 
religion. This suggests that those who identify with the Church of Sweden are just as 
likely or unlikely to be religious as those with no religion. I re-tested the findings 
with dependent variables of belief in heaven, belief in God, and belief in an afterlife, 
and for all three variables, identification with the Church of Sweden was 
insignificant clearly illustrating that identification with the Church of Sweden is, for 
most people, not a religious form of belonging, but instead a form of cultural 
religion,130 to which Swedes feel a sense of belonging as well as take part in life 
cycle ceremonies, regardless of personal beliefs. In Scotland, on the other hand, 
identification with the national church has a significant, positive, relationship with 
subjective religiosity. While cultural religion is not non-existent in Scotland (as seen 
in figures 5.6-5.8) it is clearly much more limited, possibly as those who identify 
with the Kirk to a lesser extent see this as a default option, and are more likely to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 See section 3.7.3 (pp. 83-85). 
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have made an active decision in relation to religious identification.131 Furthermore, 
odds ratios of 5.848 for Sweden and 2.115 for Scotland mean that, compared to no 
religion, other religion is a positive predictor of religiosity in both nations.132  
In line with Bruce’s (2002a:148) notion that sustained belief requires 
religious socialisation through church attendance or family background, two 
variables on church attendance were included in each model: current attendance and 
attendance at age 11 or 12 in the Swedish model and current attendance and 
whether or not the respondent had ever attended regularly for Scotland. The findings 
show that both current church attendance and attendance at age 11 or 12 in Sweden 
or whether respondent had ever attended regularly in Scotland are, as expected, 
positively associated with subjective religiosity.  
No relationship exists between sex and subjective religiosity in either of the 
two nations. This is likely due to the fact that the model controls for church 
attendance.133 This is in contrast to Berger et al’s assertion that “women are 
consistently more religious than men on whatever measure is used” (2008:99). 
Consistent with a vast range of literature and theory on the topic (e.g. Davie, 1994; 
Iannaccone, 1998; Stark and Finke, 2000) age is a significant and positive predictor 
of self-assessed religiosity in both nations. However, the relationship is only 
marginally significant in Sweden, in line with the notion that there are relatively 
small age differences on measures of religious beliefs and belonging. Moreover, as 
mentioned previously, it is unlikely that religiosity is a result of a causal relationship 
with ageing and it is much more likely that the effect of age is due to generational 
differences.134 Given that church attendance is accounted for in the model, an 
insignificant relationship is predicted between living in an urban area (for Sweden) 
or population density (for Scotland) and subjective religiosity. This was the case for 
Sweden, while there appears to be a positive association in Scotland. Nonetheless, 
this may be due to higher degree of ethnic diversity in urban areas. However, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 This is discussed further in Chapter 7 (pp. 193-232).  
132 An Exp (B) (odds-ratio) of 1 means no effect, below 1 suggests a negative effect, and above 1 a 
positive effect.  
133 A crosstabulation between sex and subjective religiosity suggests that more women than men are 
religious, a relationship that changes when control variables are introduced.  
134 See section 5.2 (pp. 124-135). 
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ethnicity was included as a control variable at the initial stage, but was found to be 
insignificant, and the results hold in a national church only model.   
As mentioned in Chapter 3, previous research (e.g. Glock et al, 1967; Rice, 
2003) use deprivation theories135 to explain higher religiosity for lower social classes 
at the individual level in the United States. Further research on the macro level (e.g. 
Gill and Lundsgaarde, 2004) argues that nations that have a high level of welfare 
spending are less religious. Given the high level of social security in both Sweden136 
and Scotland one would therefore not expect a significant relationship between 
household income and religiosity, which the findings in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 
confirm. However, it is important to note that household income is a somewhat 
problematic indicator of financial stability. As is often the case with variables on 
income, it has a substantial amount of missing data.137 Additionally, personal income 
is a less than ideal measure of social security given that it does not account for large 
differences in living costs (due to e.g. household composition). Nonetheless, while 
these findings indeed have limitations, similar ideas were expressed in the 
interviews. Several participants speculated that one of the most important reasons for 
why Sweden is so non-religious is the fact that Swedes can fall back on the state for 
material needs. Magnus and Caroline share this sentiment.  
	  
Magnus: In Sweden it’s like, when folkhemmet was built up, I think it’s about that.  
 
Caroline: Yes, it’s political.  
 
Magnus: Yes, it is. Maybe it turned out that people don’t need so much faith. Everyone was 
doing well anyway. I grew up in the 70s and 80s when everything was great. You were so 
taken care of. When I was little, there were only two different kinds of cheese to choose 
from. They had it sorted for you.  
 
Caroline: You didn’t need the faith because you were taken care of.  
 
Magnus: It’s so incredibly safe.  
 
 
Keith, 37, who works with community development and as an elder in the Church of 
Scotland is married to Amy, 32, an environmental consultant. When I asked him why 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 See section 3.6 (pp. 75-78).	  	  
136 With folkhemmet. See section 2.3 (pp. 27-40).  
137 However, there were no noticeable patterns among the 187 missing cases in Sweden and 234 
missing cases in Scotland.  
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Scotland seems to be secularising, he, along with Magnus and Caroline, mentioned 
that there is little to fear in today’s society. 
 
Keith: I think because Britain is quite a wealthy country people are able to kind of fend for 
themselves, you know, even with advancements in medicines and things like that…It’s a bit 
safer maybe and there is not so much of a reliance on God.  
 
 
Despite the fact that the regression findings on income and religiosity have to be very 
cautiously interpreted, it does bring to light the potential relationship between 
financial and social security and secularisation, an aspect that, nonetheless, needs 
further attention.  
	  
5.3.3 Sweden: “In the Church of Sweden you’re not expected to 
believe” 
	  
All of the interview participants who married in the Church of Sweden, 
despite a lack of religious beliefs, felt entirely comfortable with their decision. When 
I asked how they felt being part of a religious organisation when they do not believe 
in God, they looked at me as if I was asking a question with an obvious answer. They 
expressed that the norm is to not believe and to marry in the church. Most 
importantly, they were under the impression that the Church does not expect them to 
believe unless they attend on Sundays. Several interviewees, such as Alva, 30, were 
of the opinion that this is true only for the Church of Sweden, while other 
denominations require a religious commitment from its adherents. Alva is a teacher 
and married her husband Viktor in the Church of Sweden although she has a 
Pentecostal background. She highlighted key differences between the National 
Church and other denominations in terms of their role in today’s society.   
 
Alva: It depends on what position you are in. The Church of Sweden will always be that 
safety net to turn to when you are in need. I think that if you go to a free church you are 
expected to give something in return. It is more of a focus on personal faith. But in the 
Church of Sweden you’re not expected to … not expected to believe. 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the fact that the Church of Sweden is viewed as a 
government institution to turn to for needs, but which nevertheless does not require 
personal beliefs nor an active commitment in return, clearly demonstrates the special 
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role of the former state church as a crucial component of the Swedish welfare state. 
After a century of being governed under secular leaders, the Church of Sweden has 
developed into something quite different from other religious denominations in 
Sweden.  
Several participants, most of whom had a non-religious wedding ceremony, 
were of the opinion that the Church of Sweden is “weak” for gladly marrying more 
or less anyone, regardless of whether or not they even believe in God. Filippa, 27 is a 
nursery worker who married her husband Nils, 31, a student, in a civil ceremony. 
While they made the active decision to not marry in the church, they still understand 
why others would.  
 
Isabella: Do you know of anyone who married in the Church of Sweden even though they 
don’t believe? 
 
Nils: Yes, most people we know who are married.  
 
Filippa: I understand their choice. It’s so beautiful. And it’s a tradition.  
 
Nils: A lot of people say afterwards “It was great because the minister didn’t talk a lot about 
God.” But why use their building then? 
 
Filippa: It is always like that. But they still want to have the ceremony there.  
 
Isabella: But you always go to the Church of Sweden for weddings, not to a free church? 
 
Nils: If you go to a free church I think you have to be religious.  
 
Isabella: So people know that in the Church of Sweden it is okay to not be religious? 
 
Nils: Yes, exactly. Everyone knows the deal. 
 
 
While there was a widespread consensus among the interview participants that the 
Church of Sweden is not an institution primarily associated with religious beliefs, 
some of the participants, above all those who married in a non-religious ceremony, 
were less pleased with this arrangement. They expressed the opinion that the Church 
should stand up for its fundamental religious principles instead of providing 
effectively secular ceremonies. As an active humanist, Jonas holds strong opinions 
about the former Swedish state church.  
 
Jonas: To be honest, morally, I think the Church of Sweden are cowards. If you are a church 
shouldn’t you act like one? Should you really stretch that far just to have better statistics and 
to be able to say that “we’re still marrying people?” Above all, I think it is wrong of people 
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to marry there and not want God involved in the ceremony… and still go to a minister. But 
most people think it’s “whatever, it doesn’t matter.” 
 
 
Jonas’ idea of the church removing the fundamental aspects of their religion to 
sustain themselves illustrates what may be the ultimate crisis of the church. At a time 
of rapid decline in attendance and affiliation,138 it is possible that the national 
churches are aware that they cannot afford to refuse someone who claims to identify 
with their faith and certainly wishes to acknowledge this through taking part in 
certain rituals or ceremonies, regardless of what their actual beliefs are.139 They may 
also feel bound by their official role (despite disestablishment) to serve the entire 
nation and to be open for all.140 To some extent, Scots expressed similar views about 
the Kirk. While it came across as far less secular than the Church of Sweden, several 
interview participants spoke about the strictness of the Catholic Church in relation to 
the Church of Scotland, an impression that is further discussed in the following 
section.  
 
5.3.4 Scotland: “Most people can marry in the Church of Scotland. In 
the Catholic Church you would have to say you believe in God”   
 
 In terms of the emphasis on religious beliefs, the Church of Scotland came 
across as much stricter than the Church of Sweden. While some Swedish ministers 
required readings from the bible and hymns at the wedding, they never asked about 
personal faith or church attendance. In Scotland, on the other hand, churches 
commonly asked the bride and groom to attend church for a period of time before the 
wedding. Olivia, 31, a photographer, and Connor, 31, an architect, married in a 
humanist ceremony. They perceived some ministers within the Church of Scotland as 
rather strict regarding religious principles. While Olivia’s family would have 
preferred that she married in a religious ceremony, she could not bring herself to 
attend when she does not believe. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 See chapters 6 (pp. 159-192) and 7 (pp. 193-232).  
139 Ironically, Stark and Finke (2000) argue that it is precisely the church’s acceptance of secular 
practices and less committed individuals that leads to its downfall.	  
140 See section 2.3.7 (pp. 38-40). 
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Olivia: They can be quite strict here, I have a friend whose sister was asked to be a god 
parent to her friend’s daughter, and the minister wouldn’t do it cause she wasn’t active in 
church, so they are really strict. So we would have had to start going to church, and because I 
don’t believe in it…. It was just a family thing, and some things I just don’t really…  
 
 
Nevertheless, several participants mentioned that the Church of Scotland has 
in fact become less strict, and some ministers were more than happy to marry non-
religious couples as long as they had some form of family connection to the church. 
Two such individuals were Ben, 47, who works with property rentals, and his wife 
Pamela, 36, an optometrist. They are both non-believers but married in the Church of 
Scotland to honour the wishes of Pamela’s mother. I asked them what the Church 
thought about marrying them given their level of religious commitment, and Pamela 
answered:  
 
Pamela: Yeah, they were okay with it, as long as the minister got the message across. She 
would have liked for us to attend the church but as long as we married for the right reasons, 
that we love each other, and that we bring children up the right way, then it was fine. 
 
 
 Similar to what has happened in Sweden, the Church of Scotland has had to adjust 
its principles to keep up with changing norms and customs in a secularising society, 
even if it means serving both religious and non-religious individuals. In line with 
this, Susan and John, both 38 years old and both lawyers, were of the opinion that the 
Church is indeed showing signs of desperation.  
 
Isabella: Why do you think it is that the Church of Scotland is not seen as very strictly 
religious in some cases? 
 
John: It might be because they just take anyone.  
 
Susan: You would say it as a form of weakness. 
 
John: It’s just that they are happy to have people and hope that it might turn into something 
later. And that saying no to people doesn’t help, which is true. The ministers are very 
practical I think. They know that as long as you get people in it doesn’t matter.  
 
 
Furthermore, in relation to the Catholic Church, the interviewees perceived 
the Kirk as more relaxed about religious commitment of its adherents. Joanne, 25, a 
lawyer and non-believer, married Eric, 31, an assistant bank manager and Catholic in 
a humanist ceremony. Joanne states that “Most people can marry in the Church of 
Scotland if they wish to do so. In the Catholic Church, you would have to attend 
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counselling sessions and say you believe in God.” The fact that the Church of 
Scotland is less strict was further discussed in my interview with Susan and John. 
Susan spoke about her brother and his wife, both non-believers, who christened their 
children in the Church of Scotland to “fend off Catholic relatives.”  
 
Susan: My brother and his wife had a dilemma when it came to christening their children. 
There is an expectation on her side of the family, who are Catholic…And they didn’t 
particularly want a Catholic christening because they aren’t particularly religious… and that 
leads on to the first communion, so there is a whole separate list of things done from there. 
So as a compromise they asked if my parents’ Church of Scotland minister would christen 
their children instead.  
 
 
Sharon and Martin had a similar experience. As Sharon is a devout Catholic and 
Martin an atheist, her Catholic Church would not give them a full service. So instead 
they had a Church of Scotland ceremony as she still wanted a religious ceremony and 
he was not “too bothered either way.”  
 
Sharon: The Catholic Church wouldn’t give us a full service because Martin isn’t baptised. 
But the Church of Scotland… It felt the right thing to do. I wanted it to be recognized in the 
church in some way.  
 
Isabella: So was it a problem for the Church of Scotland minister? That you were Catholic, 
Sharon? And that you are not religious, Martin? 
 
Sharon: No, it wasn’t a problem because I believed in God and that I wanted our marriage to 
symbolise God. 
 
Isabella: So would you say that the Catholic Church is a bit stricter when it comes to…  
 
Martin: They’re a bit snoopy and you got to be a saint. The Church of Scotland isn’t bothered 
by that stuff.  
 
 
 The findings in this section suggest that the Church of Scotland is still an 
organisation that individuals mostly turn to for religious beliefs. In Sweden, on the 
other hand, the National Church has had to adjust to a decreasing public interest in 
religion and instead embrace their role as a carrier of cultural traditions and practices. 
While the social significance of religion is arguably declining in Scotland, religion 
still has a more prominent role in Scottish than in Swedish society. This is 
consequently the focus of the final section of this chapter.  
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5.4 Atheism and Social Significance of Religion 
	  
 The perceived importance of religion in people’s lives can reveal a lot about 
contemporary secularisation. One of the reasons that Davie (1994:2) uses to support 
her claim against secularisation is the fact that few people are atheists or have “opted 
out of religion altogether.” On the contrary, I would argue that the lack of the need to 
define as atheist is instead an indicator of advanced secularisation, in line with 
Bruce’s (2002a:235) claim that “Most people didn’t give up being committed 
Christians because they claimed religion was false. It simply ceased to be of any 
great importance to them. They became indifferent.” This relationship between 
secularisation, indifference, and atheism indicates key differences in the state of 
religion in Scotland and Sweden.  
 
5.4.1 Sweden: “I don’t care enough about religion to call myself an 
atheist”  
	  
 Prior to conducting my research, I had a conversation with two relatives of 
mine, a couple who had been married for 60 years. I discussed my interest in 
researching religion and as the conversation carried on, the wife, who believed in 
God, for the first time realised that her husband did not. After all these years 
together, they had not once discussed religious beliefs. Interestingly, this complete 
unawareness of fundamental religious beliefs of their spouse came across in several 
of my interviews.  
Bertil, 77, a retired chief of finance, and Birgitta, 75, a retired chef, married a 
in a civil ceremony, but are both members of the Church of Sweden. Neither Bertil 
nor Birgitta believe in God, but this lack of belief is not something they think or talk 
about. Bertil explained that prior to the interview, they had never discussed religious 
beliefs with each other. I was eager to find out why and asked them if they saw it as a 
deeply private matter. Bertil answered that, “Religion never comes up. It is not 
because it is private. You just don’t think about it. It is not interesting.” 
In line with this, Zuckerman (2008:102) speaks of religion in Sweden as a 
non-issue, as unimportant and uninteresting. This sentiment characterised every one 
of my interviews in Sweden, but rarely came up in Scotland. Nevertheless, my 
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impression was that it is not necessarily that religion itself is an uninteresting topic. 
This was illustrated by Noah, a 24 year-old university student who married his wife, 
29-year-old speech therapist, Lydia, in a civil ceremony at the registrar’s office. He 
states that, “I don’t ever talk about religion with friends and family. It doesn’t come 
up. There is nothing to discuss because everyone believes in exactly the same thing, 
or I should say don’t believe. What is there to talk about?”  In other words, religion 
comes across as an uninteresting topic because almost everyone has the same 
attitudes about it and you typically do not debate a topic on which most people are in 
consensus. Zuckerman (2008:7) quotes Riis who describes this attitude as “lukewarm 
and sceptical.” Most Swedes come across as rather indifferent about religion and it 
typically does not bring up any strong feelings one way or the other. Even those who 
do not believe generally have good things to say about the church and religion.  
Nevertheless, most interview participants are under the impression that the 
norm is to not believe. Openly religious Swedes are described as “odd” (Noah) or 
“unique” (Lydia). Elisabeth, 29, is a religious studies teacher who is married to 
Markus, 28, a bank advisor. She is one of five interview participants in Sweden who 
believe in God. She describes the general attitudes she is faced with when talking 
about religious faith.  
 
Elisabeth: People think you’re daft if you talk about religion. Since I teach religion and since 
I’m interested in it, I can talk a bit more about it, at least the factual stuff. But my personal 
beliefs I can’t talk about with many people, maybe not even with Markus. No one 
understands, because few people believe.  
 
 
Interestingly, it is not only the openly religious individuals who are seen as 
different. While religious people are seen as somewhat deviant in Swedish society, 
so are those who express their atheism. Jonas and Gabriella explain this as they talk 
about their Swedish families and about their thoughts on the differences between 
Scotland and Sweden.  
 
Gabriella: It’s interesting that even though both sides of our families are all atheists, no one is 
comfortable speaking about it or calling themselves humanist. And when we had our 
wedding celebration in Sweden, we arranged for some humanist pamphlets to be handed out 
to anyone who might be interested but of course our families who were supposed to bring 
them “forgot them at home.” 
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Jonas: Yes, they think we are aggressive in a way. It is so Swedish. The idea that you’re not 
supposed to be anything at all.   
 
Isabella: So it feels like it’s more okay to be humanist in Scotland?   
 
Jonas: Yes. Here people expect you to take a side. And humanist sounds better. Atheist has a 
bad pitch to it.  
 
 
As expressed by Jonas and Gabriella, just because many Swedes lack religious 
beliefs, it does not mean that self-identified atheism is any more common in Sweden 
than elsewhere. Few participants would call themselves atheist even though many of 
them recognise that, technically speaking, they are atheists. Alice was one of these 
individuals who hold no supernatural beliefs whatsoever but who would not call 
herself atheist.  
 
Isabella: Would you call yourself atheist?  
 
Alice: No it sounds so…  
 
Ludvig: But you are! 
 
Alice: Yes…  
 
Isabella: So what does that mean to you then? When someone says they are atheist?  
 
Alice: I think of someone who is against religion. I know it isn’t like that but… It’s not like I 
don’t think religion should exist. And that’s what I think when I hear atheist.  
 
 
Similar to Alice, Lydia has no religious beliefs. She agrees with Alice that the word 
atheism holds a different meaning than simply a belief that there is no god.  
 
Isabella: Since you don’t believe, would you call yourself atheist? 
 
After a long pause: 
 
Lydia: It sounds so harsh. I know you can select it on Facebook, but I have chosen to not do 
that.  
 
Isabella: Why is that? 
 
Lydia: I feel that when you meet people who say that they are atheists, they’re typically not 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Lydia’s wish to “one day believe” is possibly a result of her strong connection to the Church as a 
childhood memory, further explored in section 7.4.1 (pp. 225-226).  
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Atheism is a poor measure of non-belief since, as explained above, it 
drastically underestimates levels of non-belief. Furthermore, rather than being a 
requisite for secularisation as argued by Davie (1994), a need to identify as atheist 
indicates that religion still has a prominent role in social life. Sweden is thus a 
leading example of Bruce’s (2002:41) argument that secularisation does not lead to 
atheism but to the declining social importance of religion. This is also why non-
religious Swedes at the same time have relatively positive feelings about religion, in 
line with Zuckerman’s (2008:106) idea that “in a society where most non-religious 
people are simultaneously anti-religious…that indicates that religion is still a social 
or cultural force to be reckoned with.”  
 
5.4.2 Scotland: “Atheism is a proactive statement” 
	  
 The interviews gave the impression that there is a relatively more prominent 
social significance of religion in Scotland, suggesting a later stage of secularisation 
in Sweden.142 As Swedes who live in Scotland, Jonas and Gabriella had an insightful 
perception about the differences between the two nations. 
 
Jonas: Here in Scotland people are aware of religion in a whole different way. Our social life 
involves a liberal circle of friends but it is clear that it is still very important if you are 
Catholic or Protestant. Religion has a much bigger influence here with same sex marriage 
and other things. Religious figures are heard in media and things like that. They say, “this is 
awful.” That would never happen in Sweden.   
 
Gabriella: Exactly. If you are a religious figure here you are somewhat of an official 
spokesperson. Your voice counts just because you come from the church.  
 
 
That religion has, compared to Sweden, a more important place in Scottish society 
was illustrated by the fact that many of the Scottish interview participants discuss 
religion relatively often with friends and family and thereby come across as much 
less indifferent about the topic. Lucy and Simon from Glasgow describe this.  
 
Isabella: When you meet friends and family, are you open about your belief? Or is it 
something that never comes up? 
 
Lucy: Yes, we talk about it quite a bit. I think I’m probably more open about it now, more 
than I used to be, because at work people often talk about things to do with religion. I’ll be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 This is examined further with church attendance trends in Chapter 6 (pp. 159-192).	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open about the fact that I’m not religious if they ask, or if they assume that I am, I’ll just say 
that I’m not. 
 
Simon: I think you need to debate about it every now and again with friends but at the same 
time you don’t want to offend people.  
 
 
Perhaps as a result of the relatively high religious diversity, Scots are more likely to 
take a stand and make more or less of an active choice among several options. This 
means that in terms of religion, Scots are less homogeneous than Swedes, and 
religion becomes a topic of discussion among those of different views and beliefs. 
David, 26, a P.E teacher, and Gill, 26, a career advisor, discuss this. They married in 
a Church of Scotland ceremony and are active participants in their local church.  
 
Isabella: Do you discuss religion with friends and family? 
 
Gill: It would come up a lot actually. 
 
David: Yes it would come up quite a lot. 
 
Isabella: Both with people who are and aren’t Christian, or is it…? 
 
Gill: Yeah, I think especially with people that know we are Christians and who are not 
Christian themselves. I think they like to bring things up at times. 
 
David: They will ask things about what we think of this issue or that… 
 
Isabella: Does it ever become sort of a heated discussion, or is it usually...? 
 
Gill: I think it has once with your friend Angus.  
 
David: Umm, yeah it has occasionally. I mean we obviously would be disagreeing. 
 
Gill: But there is never a big argument. 
 
 
Religious diversity may likewise be a reason for why there is not a similar norm in 
Scotland to be non-religious, and for why being openly religious is not perceived as 
“odd” or “embarrassing” as was the impression from the Swedish interviews.  
Similar to the Swedish interviews, there was a sense that Scots perceived the 
word atheist as rather confrontational. Many Scots are theoretically speaking atheists 
in that they believe that there is no god, but at the same time do not define 
themselves as such. As mentioned above, this suggests that levels of atheism are less 
useful measures of non-religiosity in line with Bruce’ (2002a) assertion that atheism 
often has a negative connotation. Olivia expressed this as she states that, “I think 
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atheist is a bit hard lined. They seem a bit anti-God rather than… I would prefer to 
accept other people with their own god or faith. On the other hand, I’m not confused 
about it. I don’t think there is any form of god.” Ellie, 29, a research assistant, and 
Henry, 29, a househusband, were of the same opinion.  
 
Henry: People used to think that atheist is someone who strongly believes there is no god, as 
opposed to agnostic where you don’t know. But I think now because of Dawkins, and 
Hitchens, and people like that, I think people now think that atheists have got a problem with 
religion. And they are intolerant, and… 
 
Ellie: I think that’s why I’m so reluctant to say I am an atheist, and even when I hear the 
word I picture Christopher Hitchens, and just aggressive… I just prefer to say that I don’t 
believe in God rather than the word atheist.  
 
 
Similarly, even though he is a non-believer, Ben dislikes atheism and he perceives it 
to be an active form of disbelief.  
 
Ben: To me, atheism is no different than religion. It’s just a belief in something else. As soon 
as you put a name on it, it’s going to become something. I don’t have a name for what I am. 
To me, atheism is more a proactive thing… about stating your case. Rather than not saying 
anything, you’re instead saying “yeah I am an atheist” and in that case you are just religious 
but in a different way. Atheism is attention seeking. It’s just like naming religion – like you 
want to have a conversation about it.  
 
 
Nevertheless, the interviews gave the impression that while most participants 
relate atheism to an active standpoint, Scots felt more comfortable defining 
themselves as atheists, and displayed a much stronger awareness of their non-
religiosity than Swedes. It most often came across as something they had 
contemplated at length. This was clearly portrayed by Helen.  
 
Helen: Atheism is not a lack of belief. It is a strong belief that there is no god. That’s why I 
don’t say, “I’m not religious.” I am an atheist because I actively believe in not believing in 
God. It is an active statement. I initially called myself agnostic because same as Chris said, I 
thought it was quite arrogant to say you’re atheist, that you don’t believe in God, because 
humans don’t know everything. There is a chance there is a god that we’re not aware of. I 
don’t think it’s very likely but it might be. And if there was, then of course, fine. Grand! 
More recently I started calling myself atheist because that’s what I am.  
 
 
Nevertheless, some of the interviewees were of the opinion that especially the 
younger generation has no interest in religion and that it no longer stirs up quite as 
strong emotion. This was described by Pamela as she states that “I don’t think there 
is anyone with strong enough views really.” In other words, despite the fact that 
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religion generally seems to have a more prominent role in Scottish society, it is likely 
that as Scotland secularises, Scots will display a weaker and weaker interest in 




This chapter discussed the complex relation between subjective religiosity, 
national churches, and secularisation. Attempts made by Davie (1990, 1994, 2002a, 
2004, 2007) to categorise Europeans as believing and belonging have limited value 
in part due to the fact that broad measures of belief alone do not offer a 
comprehensive understanding of meanings and interpretations of diverse forms of 
religious beliefs in Scotland and Sweden. 
The first part of the chapter presented measures of subjective religiosity that 
suggest that religious beliefs are more common in Scotland than in Sweden and that 
there is a particularly large difference in traditional Christian beliefs. Here, I argued 
that while far from most Scots and Swedes believe, even if spirituality is on the rise 
as argued by Davie, this development is not incompatible with secularisation. In fact, 
a decline in traditionally religious beliefs in favour for individual interpretations of 
spirituality, many of which are not religious in nature, convincingly illustrates a 
declining significance of religion in contemporary society.     
The second part of the chapter examined the relationship between church 
affiliation and subjective religiosity. Despite the fact that both the Church of 
Scotland and the Church of Sweden are former national churches in Protestant 
Europe, descriptive analysis and binary logistic regression findings revealed crucial 
differences. Those who belong to the Church of Sweden are not significantly more 
likely than those with no religious identification to call themselves religious. As a 
former integral part of the Swedish welfare state, the Church of Sweden serves as a 
main provider of life cycle ceremonies while it is perceived to have only limited 
association to the supernatural. As a contrast, the Church of Scotland communicates 
religious doctrine alongside other religious denominations, arguably as a result of a 
weaker role as a national church in a religious landscape with higher levels of 
diversity. 
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The final part of the chapter offered an examination of social significance of 
religion as presented with meanings of atheism and individual perceptions on 
religion as a topic of conversation. Here, I argued the inaccuracy of Davie’s assertion 
that secularisation may be refuted due to low levels of atheism. Instead, the need to 
define oneself in terms of religion diminishes as a society gradually secularises. In 
relation to this, Sweden may serve as a key example of a highly secularised society 
where religion simply does not evoke strong feelings one way or another. Arguably, 
Scotland may be going down a similar path considering lower levels of belief as well 
as perceived declining interest in religion among younger generations.   
This chapter showed that believing is a complex issue as various measures 
and interpretations of subjective religiosity generate diverse conclusions. In line with 
this, I argued that certain measures of religious beliefs, in particular as related to 
spirituality, often hold secular interpretations making it difficult to judge whether 
Scots and Swedes believe without clearly defining the concept. However, it is not 
just the concept of believing that is problematic. With the aim to offer a new 
interpretation of religious belonging, the next three chapters explore church 
attendance, church membership and identification, and participation in rituals as 
distinct concepts that do not necessarily correlate with one another. This begins with 
church attendance in Chapter 6.  
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There is a widespread consensus in the field of sociology of religion that 
contemporary levels of church attendance in Europe are at a historically low level 
(e.g. Berger et al, 2008; Bruce, 1996, 2002; Davie, 2000, 2002a, 2007; Stark and 
Finke, 2000; Warner, 2010) and the phenomenon has been described as considerably 
more severe in Protestant European countries (Berger et al, 2008:11; Davie, 2002:6; 
2000:9; Martin, 1978). As discussed in Chapter 3, Davie (1990, 1994, 2002a, 2004, 
2007) uses this perceived crisis in organised religion as evidence for her claim that 
Europe can be categorised as believing without belonging.  
This chapter examines church attendance as a key dimension of religious 
belonging. It appears to be distinctly different from identification or membership 
(Chapter 7) and participation in rituals (Chapter 8). A focus on church attendance 
illuminates patterns and individual experiences of what is a public, and active, 
expression of religious beliefs and community. Identification or membership may be, 
to a further extent a passive sense of being part of a social group, and ritual 
participation can be described as the act of celebrating this sense of belonging to this 
group. The latter two forms of belonging carry non-religious sentiments to a further 
extent than church attendance. As is seen in the next three chapters, to subsume all 
three of these dimensions under belonging highly limits the possibility of 
understanding religious decline and the changing functions of national churches in 
Scotland and Sweden.  
The first part of the chapter focuses on how church attendance habits have 
changed over the course of respondents’ lives. This sheds light on crucial and diverse 
patterns of secularisation. Here, key differences in rates of decline in religious 
activity are presented in the two nations, findings that are further highlighted and 
contextualised with interview data on generational differences.  
Building on this, the second part discusses patterns and levels of 
contemporary religious participation, including an examination of attendance by age, 
religious denomination, and belief in god. Non-attendance is studied with regression 
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analysis and descriptive statistics. Interview data further explore non-religious 
reasons for attending church. This part examines how Swedes and Scots compare in 
terms of levels of, reasons for, and experiences of attending church.  
Overall, the chapter describes contextual similarities and differences in 
church attendance. Examining changes in objective religious participation uniquely 
contributes to the understanding of the changing role of the church in everyday life 
of Scots and Swedes. Together with religious beliefs in Chapter 5, identification and 
membership in Chapter 7, and participation in rituals in Chapter 8, the aim of this 
chapter is to offer a better understanding of the complex phenomenon of 
secularisation and the role of religion in secularising societies.  
 
6.2 Changes in Church Attendance 
	  
6.2.1 Decline in Church Attendance 
	  
The International Social Survey Programme’s 2008 survey includes a number 
of questions on church attendance. One asks how often the respondent attended 
religious services at age 11 or 12 and another asks about current attendance. 
Combining these two survey items created a variable called “change in church 
attendance” used to grasp the decline in religious participation over the past century. 
The two variables were coded from 0 to 6 where 0 means never attending church and 
6 represents once a week or more.143 The new variable is made up of current 
attendance minus attendance at age 11 or 12. This means that a negative value 
represents individuals who attend less now than when they were 11 or 12, a positive 
number means they attend more often now, and a zero corresponds to no change in 
church attendance frequency. A value of -6, for example, means that the respondent 
attended church once a week or more when they were 11 or 12 and that they never 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 0=Never, 1= Less than once a year, 2=Once or twice a year, 3=Several times a year, 4= Once a 
month, 5= Several times a month, 6= Once a week or more.	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Figure 6.1: Change in Swedish church attendance
 
Data source: International Social Survey Programme, 2008 
 
Figure 6.2: Change in Scottish church attendance 
 
Data source: International Social Survey Programme, 2008 
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As is presented in Figure 6.1, the pattern of change in Sweden’s church 
attendance resembles a normal curve, suggesting that, overall, there has not been a 
sudden change in attendance over the course of the respondents’ lives (i.e. the past 
10-70 years) The lack of major change is also illustrated by the fact that close to half 
of the sample attend as much or little now as they did when they were 11 or 12. 
However, it is important to highlight that this figure only displays changes in church 
attendance and that a zero merely represents no change, including everything from 
“never attending in the past and never attending now” to “attending weekly in the 
past to attending weekly now.”  
The Scottish data present a different case. As seen in Figure 6.2, only four 
percent attend church more often now than they did when they were 11 or 12, about 
26 percent claim no change, and close to 70 percent attend less often now than when 
they were 11 or 12. Interestingly, a full 20 percent of those who attended church 
weekly or more as children now claim to never attend church. Even more intriguing 
is the fact that the corresponding statistic for Sweden is 1 percent. In other words, 
there has been a drastic decline in the Scottish case, where as in the same time period 
in Sweden, the negative change in church attendance has not been as dramatic. This 
suggests that a major decline in Swedish church attendance took place at a 
historically earlier time period in Sweden.	  However, it is important to note that with 
a small Scottish sample size of 165, these findings need to be cautiously interpreted. 
Nonetheless, it follows similar patterns to interview findings and literature discussed 
below as well as to further survey data from the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 
discussed in section 6.2.2.  
It is crucial to highlight that specific contexts influence responses that are 
given to a certain question. The discussion in section 4.2.3 mentioned that figures of 
church attendance differ according to social norms. For example, Americans tend to 
exaggerate how often they attend church (e.g. Berger et al, 2008:12; Bruce, 
2002:206; Hadaway et al, 1993:742), suggesting that church attendance data need to 
be cautiously interpreted between and within contexts of study. As seen in Chapter 5, 
relative to Sweden, religion appears to have a more prominent role in Scottish 
society, suggesting that it is possible that Scots, to some extent, inflate their 
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attendance while Swedes do not. However, along with Chapter 5, it is important to 
note that Scotland also seems to experience a continuously declining social 
significance of religion, meaning that possible differences will likely shrink, and 
Field (2001:162) suggests that the disparity between estimated and claimed 
attendance is relatively low in Scotland. Additionally, given the relatively low level 
of interest and passion that religion and the Church evoke in Sweden, it is highly 
unlikely that Swedes under-report how often they attend. Nevertheless, it is 
important to cautiously interpret the results above and to distinguish figures of 
claimed and counted church attendance, also in relation to the fact that it is likely that 
many will fail to accurately recall how often they went to church at age 11 or 12. 
Along with the findings above, prior literature has noted a steady decline in 
church attendance in both Scotland and Sweden. Martin (1978:65) states that 
Swedish attendance decreased steadily between 1927 and 1952, going from 2.4 to 1 
percent in the Stockholm region, and from 13.1 to 4.9 percent in Gothenburg. In 
Hamberg’s (1991) longitudinal study, all measures of religiosity except claimed 
church attendance saw a decrease between 1955 and 1970. The lack of change in 
attendance, similar to what is seen in Figure 6.1 was partially explained by a floor 
effect, since the respondents could not possibly attend less often than “never.” 
Bäckström et al (2004:43) present a steady decline in the average count of weekly 
church attendance, going from an average of 2.6 percent of the population in 1970 to 
1.3 percent in 2002. Data from the ISSP suggest that claimed regular church 
attendance (i.e. attending monthly or more) has decreased from 7.9 percent in 1998 
to 5.5 percent in 2008.  
Furthermore, Field (2001:163) shows that Scottish claimed church activity 
decreased from 24 percent weekly attendance in 1972 to 17 percent in 1997. Rosie 
(2002:25) presents levels of current regular and past regular attendance indicating 
that for all birth cohorts, between 3 and 4 out of 10 people used to attend regularly 
but no longer do so.  He further shows that among those that used to attend regularly 
in the past but no longer do so, only a very small percentage has considered returning 
(Rosie, 2002:26) Brown (2012:78) presents figures from the Scottish Church 
Attendance Census showing that a headcount of church visitors on an average 
Sunday in 1984 corresponded to 17 percent of the population, a figure that had 
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declined to 14 percent in 1994, and 11.2 percent in 2002. Additionally, more recent 
data from the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey suggest that claimed regular 
attendance (i.e. monthly or more often) has gone down from 27.2 percent in 1999 to 
20.2 percent in 2011.  
 
6.2.2 Scotland: Generational Shifts 
	  
Because of the wide age range in the sample, the time range between current 
and age 11 or 12 attendance varies considerably in Figure 6.1 and 6.2. This data 
therefore represent individuals who were aged 11 or 12 over 70 years ago as well as 
those who were aged 11 or 12 ten years ago. Examining cohort effects may generate 
a clearer picture of changes taken place over time. Here, the Scottish Social Attitudes 
Survey, 2001 is a more suitable data source given the limitations to using a small 
sample in studying differences in various age groups.  
As seen in Figure 6.1 and 6.2, there has been a drastic decline in claimed 
church attendance in Scotland. Figures presented in Table 6.1 show that older 
cohorts are much more likely than younger to attend regularly.144 It is difficult to 
pinpoint precisely when the most significant decline took place. Nevertheless, more 
than half of Scots born in the 1960s and later have never attended regularly, a figure 
that is just below a third in the previous cohort. Using the same data set, Bruce and 
Glendinning (2010:117-118) show that 44 percent of those born in the 1920s who 
were previously regular attendees have since stopped going. For those born in the 
1960s, the corresponding figure is 68 percent. Bruce and Glendinning (2010) assert 
that a decline in attendance among Scots born in the 1960s can be explained by 
changing attitudes in their parents’ generation, pointing towards the 1930s and 
1940s. They attribute this decline to changing family structure and its effect on 
religious socialisation as a result of World War II (Bruce and Glendinning, 
2010:115-117). This is in contrast to Brown (1997, 2001), who emphasises socio-
cultural and political changes of the 1950s and 1960s145 as more direct causes of 
religious decline. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 This is explored further in section 6.3 (pp. 172-175). 
145 See sections 2.4.7 and 2.4.8 (pp. 48-52).  
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Table 6.1: Percentage of Scots who attend regularly, who attended 













Regular Attendee 46.0% 36.6% 23.7% 23.1% 14.2% 9.3% 
Former   36.1% 34.4% 43.7% 44.7% 35.5% 32.3% 
Never  17.9% 29.1% 32.6% 32.2% 50.3% 58.4% 
N 263 227 215 273 332 279 
This table is adapted from Rosie (2002:25) (using different age cut-offs). Data source: Scottish Social 
Attitudes Survey, 2001 
 
 
Table 6.2: Age at which past regular attendees ceased to attend 













25th Percentile 17 18 14 14 12 11 
50th Percentile 35 30 20 17 16 13 
75th Percentile 70 50 32 33 23 16 
N 95 78 94 112 118 90 
Data source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2001 
 
 
  Figures presented in Table 6.1 are in line with Bruce and Glendinning’s 
(2010) idea of generational religious decline given that the percentage of Scots who 
have never attended regularly increases by cohort. Furthermore, Table 6.2 shows 
that, for each cohort, previous regular attendees stopped going to church regularly at 
a younger and younger age. For both cohorts born before 1941, 75 percent of past 
attendees ceased to attend regularly in adulthood (over age 17). A clear difference is 
observed in subsequent cohorts where more than half of past attendees left before the 
age of 20, in line with Bruce and Glendinning’s (2010) notion of unsuccessful 
religious socialisation of children born after the wars. This is further examined in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 It is important to note that the different age ranges between cohorts could affect the median. For 
example, all individuals in the youngest cohort who have stopped attending regularly have done this at 
or before age 30. If current attendees cease to go to church regularly later in life, the median will thus 
increase. However, given that only 9 percent in the youngest cohort currently attend regularly, the 
median age of stopping cannot go above 15 even if all current attendees cease to attend regularly.  
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Table 6.3, which shows that a large number of previous regular churchgoers in fact 
ceased to attend regularly in the 1950s and 1960s as argued by Brown (1997, 2001). 
However, Brown’s (1997:162) notion of a relatively stable level of attendance in the 
first half of the 20th century can be challenged with the fact that over 4 in 10 Scots in 
the oldest cohort who previously attended regularly stopped doing so before 1950.  
 
Table 6.3: Year in which past regular attendees ceased to attend 
regularly (by birth cohort) 
 1901-1930 1931-1940 1941-1950 1951-1960 
Stopped before 1950 41.1% 11.5% 1.1% 0.0% 
1950-1969 14.7% 44.9% 61.7% 29.5% 
After 1969 44.2% 43.6% 37.2% 70.5% 
N 95 78 94 122 
Data source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2001 
 
As is presented in Table 6.1, approximately a third of respondents born in 
1971 and later claim to have attended church regularly in the past while they no 
longer do so. All but three of the 32 Scottish interview participants were part of this 
age group. Many of these individuals expressed that they went to church fairly 
regularly as children and took part in activities such as Sunday school.147 In several 
cases, their parents have remained active within their local church, while others 
mention that their parents have also stopped attending.  
A common theme throughout the Scottish interviews was a noticeable 
generational decline in levels of participation, where grandparents are seen as more 
religious and more active in the church than parents, who are, in turn, more active 
than the interviewees themselves. Olivia describes the strong role her grandparents 
played in encouraging her family to attend church:  
 
Olivia: I went to church every Sunday. We would go to church and then granny and grandpa 
would come to lunch. My mum would put the chicken on and then we would all leave for 
church. And then granny and grandpa would come to lunch after. 
 
Isabella: For how many years did you go to church? Throughout your childhood? 
 
Olivia: Yes, until I was 12 or 13. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Brown (1997:1, 64) states that Presbyterian Sunday school enrolment has plummeted from 52 
percent of Scots aged 5-15 in 1890s to 13 percent in 1981, and less than 10 percent in 1990.  
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Isabella: What happened then? 
 
Olivia: My grandparents moved away. 
 
  
Regardless of their own levels of participation, parents of the interviewees were 
seemingly indifferent to their children’s choice to no longer attend. Pamela explains 
that she had a religious upbringing. Nevertheless, her parents never pushed her to 
attend once she was old enough to make her own decision, suggesting a change in 
attitudes has taken place where the church is no longer seen as an obligation. Scots 
are not expected to go to church, and even active participants see it as acceptable to 
choose otherwise.   
 
Pamela: I was christened in that church. The primary school that I went to, we used to have 
services in that church for the end of term. I went to Sunday school there as well. I had that 
upbringing, but we were never dragged there. Once the Sunday school was finished that’s 
when I left. 
 
Isabella: So your parents went to church every Sunday or ...?  
 
Pamela: They still go. Not religiously every Sunday, but maybe a couple of times a month. 
 
Isabella: When you were a child you came along sometimes, or ...?  
 
Pamela: We were never made to go… I probably didn’t go very often, so when Sunday 
school finished when I was like 10 or 11, then I could just come along if I wanted to. 
 
Isabella: And you didn’t feel like it? 
 
Pamela: No… I suppose I thought it was quite boring. I just thought there were better things 
to do.  
 
 
In addition to Pamela, several other interview participants mentioned that there are 
plenty of more exciting activities to engage in. Owen, 26, a nursery teacher expresses 
this sentiment despite the fact that he married his wife Jessica, 25, a dance teacher, in 
a Church of Scotland ceremony. He states that “I went to church once before the 
wedding, but nah, I golf every Sunday morning.” A similar sentiment was expressed 
by Nicole and Samuel, both 46, who work in banking and trucking respectively. 
Nicole states that:  
 
Nicole: There is so much now on a Sunday, you know it used to be that going to church 
would be the social event of the week, but now… Sunday mornings were never good for us 
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anyways because my son would play football and some games are on a Sunday. And now 
there are so many other things to do on a Sunday. 
 
 
This is in line with Brown’s (1997:168) assertion that the Church of Scotland lost 
participants as a result of its inability to compete as a provider of leisure activities,148 
which may indeed serve as an explanation for the decline in church attendance as 
presented above.  
Moreover, Eric, 31, relates this decline in church attendance and increasing 
interest in other activities to social structural changes: “It used to be a lot stricter 
where you would have to go to church every Sunday. But now people don’t really 
see it as a holy day anymore. There is football on Sunday mornings, and life is 
different now.” This suggests that it is equally possible that both secularisation in 
terms of modernisation149 (e.g. Bruce, 2002a; Wallis and Bruce, 1992; Wilson, 1982) 
as well as the diminishing need for social involvement150 (e.g. Putnam, 2000) have 
contributed to the large drop in church attendance among all generations in the 
sample (see Table 6.1). While these theories may likewise serve as plausible 
explanations for church attendance decline in Sweden, as is presented in the next 
section, the two nations are unmistakably experiencing two different paths of 
religious decline.   
 
6.2.3 Sweden: A Century of Non-Attendance 
	  
While Swedes are generally very supportive of the church, its cultural 
heritage, and its provision of life cycle ceremonies,151 it has failed to attract 
participants to its services for several generations. Few of the Swedish interview 
participants have parents or even grandparents who attended church regularly. 
Birgitta, born in 1937, illustrates this:  
 
Birgitta: My parents and grandparents weren’t religious and did not attend church, but they 
were members of the Church of Sweden. We went on Christmas once or twice. It was the 
atmosphere. We walked with torches through the forest and the snow to get to the church. It 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 See section 2.4.8 (pp. 51-52).	  
149 See section 3.3 (pp. 62-68).	  
150	  Described in full in section 3.8 (pp. 85-89).	  
151 See chapters 7 (pp. 193-232) and 8 (pp. 233-262).	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was an experience. But it only happened once every year, if that. 
 
 
 The entire 20th century seems to have been characterised by a widespread 
Swedish apathy towards church attendance. The highest percentage of regular 
attendees at age 11 or 12 can be observed for those born between 1929 and 1943 (see 
Table 6.4). Since then, there has been a steady decline from the already low level. 
This suggests that in the Swedish case, secularisation, at least in terms of church 
attendance, happened before the early 20th century. This is in line with the very low 
levels of participation in the Holy Communion at the end of the 19th century (e.g. 
Martling, 2008:260). If a majority of those who were born between 1929 and 1943 
only attended church a few times per year or less when they were 11 or 12, this also 
suggests that parents of this generation did not attend regularly as it is unlikely that 
they would attend without bringing their children. This is confirmed by a three-way 
crosstabulation between mother’s and father’s attendance when respondent was a 
child, respondent’s attendance at age 11 or 12, and age group. The results show that 
only a handful of parents whose children never or occasionally went to church 
attended regularly themselves. Along with this, 79.3 percent of mothers and 81.7 
percent of fathers of the oldest cohort attended church a few times per year or less 
when the respondent was 11 or 12. This is in line with the notion that even Swedes 
born around the turn of the 20th century were, over all, not active church participants 
as adults.  
 













Regularly 21.2% 17.9% 20.4% 11.7% 9.6% 14.4% 
Occasionally 63.5% 61.3% 52.8% 59.9% 64.5% 47.2% 
Never 16.3% 20.8% 26.9% 28.4% 25.9% 38.4% 
N 208 240 216 222 166 125 
Data source: International Social Survey Programme, 2008 
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As is presented in Table 6.4, for all cohorts except those aged 65 and older, it 
is more common to never have attended church at age 11 or 12 than to have done do 
so regularly. At age 11 or 12, between 9.6 and 21.2 percent of the respondents 
attended regularly, where the highest percentage can, not surprisingly, be found in 
the oldest age group. Among the 21.2 percent, 5.8 percent attended monthly, 5.3 
percent attended 2-3 times a month, and 10.1 percent weekly. In line with a decline 
in church attendance, these figures are considerably higher than current 
attendance.152   
Table 6.5 presents changes in church attendance from when the respondent 
was aged 11 or 12 to now. Just as is observed in Figure 6.1, respondents rarely attend 
more often today, with the highest percentages of 16.7 and 16.1 for the two oldest 
age groups. Nevertheless, a considerable number of respondents in these age groups 
(43-44 percent) have become less frequent church participants since childhood. For 
all six cohorts, around 4 out of 10 people say they attend less frequently, between 4 
and 5 out of 10 report no change, and only between 1 and 2 attend more often. Just as 
is argued previously, the small differences between the cohorts suggest that Sweden 
has had a slow but gradual, and presumably earlier, decline rather than a sudden 
generational shift in church attendance over the 20th century. This was confirmed 
when conducting Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on change in church attendance 
for different age groups.153 While a negative change can be observed for all age 
groups, the differences between the birth cohorts are, in fact, not statistically 
significant.154  
 













Increase 16.1% 16.7% 10.3% 15.1% 10.9% 6.6% 
No Change 39.9% 41.2% 46.3% 44.7% 52.1% 54.5% 
Decrease 44.0% 43.2% 43.5% 40.2% 37.0% 38.8% 
N 193 233 214 219 165 121 
Data source: International Social Survey Programme, 2008 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 See section 6.3 (pp. 172-175). 
153 Using the 2008 ISSP data.	  
154 p=0.44	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To add an additional decade to the analyses, the above findings were 
compared with similar analyses of the ISSP data on religion from 1998. As is 
presented in Table 6.6, the percentages of Swedes who attend regularly by cohort are 
very similar in the two data sets. Here, figures show that the last 80 years have seen a 
decline in claimed regular (at least monthly) church attendance at age 11 or 12 from 
an already relatively low level of 27 percent among those born between 1921 and 
1933. While the Scottish data proposes a critical drop in church attendance in the 
1960s, these findings suggest a longer-term decline predating the current data.  
 
Table 6.6: Swedish regular attendance (at least monthly) at age 11 or 12 
(by birth cohort) 
Year of Birth Attend. Age 11-12  (1998) Attend. Age 11-12  (2008) 
1921- 1933 27.0%  
1934-1943/1929-1943 28.0% 21.2% 
1944-1953 19.3% 17.9% 
1954-1963 20.3% 20.4% 
1964-1973 14.3% 11.7% 
1974-1980/1974-1983 14.8% 9.6% 
1984 -1991  14.4% 
N 1119 1177 
 Data source: International Social Survey Programme, 1998 and 2008 
 
There are contextual differences that can explain why this seems to have 
happened considerably earlier in the Swedish case. Chapter 2 discusses potential 
reasons for early secularisation in Sweden, where Zuckerman (2008:122) suggests 
that Swedes never truly became Christian in the supernatural sense. It is therefore 
possible that once they no longer were required to attend, they stopped going 
regularly, again suggested by the fact that in 1890, only 5 percent of Swedes 
participated at least once a year in what used to be a mandatory holy communion 
(Martling, 2008:260).  
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Bäckström et al (2004) and Tomasson (2002) pinpoint the 19th century as the 
time of rapid secularisation in Sweden primarily due to industrialisation and the 
Church’s newfound role as a welfare provider. The Church of Sweden’s connection 
to the welfare state is arguably the single most important factor in explaining the 
differences between Scottish and Swedish church attendance patterns. This does not 
deny the effects of a state monopoly of religion on religious vitality as argued by 
Stark and Finke (2000), but rather complements it. To a Swede, regular attendance is 
not seen as a vital component of a successful church. In line with Bäckström et al 
(2004:121), the role of the Church as a welfare provider is to carry out key 
ceremonies and to be open to any one individual at time of need rather than to serve 
as a social activity or a place to connect with others.155 Because of this and the 
continuous funding from the state, the church has little incentive to attempt to attract 
more active participants.  
While both Scotland and Sweden have experienced declining church 
attendance, data suggest very different trajectories of secularisation. This has 
unquestionably influenced contemporary variations in levels and experiences of 
church attendance in Scotland and Sweden. This is consequently the focus of the 
remainder of the chapter, beginning with an overview of key differences between 
Scotland and Sweden in terms of frequency of current church attendance.  
 
6.3 Current Trends in Scotland and Sweden 
	  
While churches throughout Europe are experiencing low levels of frequent 
attendance, patterns differ largely between and within various Protestant European 
regions. Davie (2002a:6) shows that European church activity is least frequent in the 
Lutheran North and that levels of church attendance in Great Britain fall right in 
between the Nordic countries and the Catholic South. Sweden is described as the 
Nordic country with the lowest levels of belief and only 3.8 percent weekly 
attendance (Davie, 2002a:6). Tomasson (2002:68) presents a similar figure of 2 
percent, and Martin (1978:65) calls Sweden the “least practicing of all western 
societies.” In line with this, data from the ISSP (2008) show that only 5.5 percent of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 See section 3.8.2 (pp. 87-89) on religion and social capital.	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Swedes claim to attend church at least monthly (see Figure 6.3). Yet, Davie (2002:6) 
states that only 0.2 percent of the population claim to never attend church for any 
reason.156  
Berger et al (2008:68-69) explain that Scotland has low levels of religious 
participation, close to the Northern European levels. However, Field (2001:163) 
shows figures of claimed weekly church attendance for Scotland that are, in 1997, 
considerably higher at 17 percent, while 57 percent claim to never attend. With data 
from Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2011), Figure 6.3 shows that 20.2 percent of 
Scots claim to attend church at least monthly,157 of which 13.3 percent claim to 
attend weekly. Moreover, 65.3 percent of the respondents never attend.158 Similar 
analysis of data from the ISSP (2008) suggests that 11 percent claim to attend at least 
once a month.  
 In other words, while both Scotland and Sweden are relatively secularised on 
measures of active attendance, there are key differences between the two nations. 
Both attending regularly and never are more common in the Scottish case. A typical 
Swede attends church occasionally, while a majority of Scots never attend.159 It also 
suggests that while it is more common for Scots to attend regularly, organised 
religion is experiencing considerable problems attracting participants in both nations, 
with about 1 in 5 Scots and 1 in 20 Swedes claiming to attend at least monthly. 
Nevertheless, the differences imply that attending church means very different things 
to Scots and Swedes. That a majority of Swedes attend occasionally can be explained 
by the overwhelming dominance of the Church of Sweden in the provision of life 
cycle rituals and other ceremonies such as school graduations,160 and it is likely that 
most Swedes who attend occasionally do so for such special occasions rather than for 
routine religious services. With a higher level of religious diversity in Scotland (as 
seen in Chapter 2), Scots to a greater extent make active decisions in relation to 
religious belonging, explaining why they are more likely to attend regularly or not at 
all. Perhaps as a result of this, Scots have a wider range of choices regarding life 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 However, the figure for never in the ISSP is 33.9%. 
157 This figure was 24.7 percent in 2001, and 27.2 percent in 1999 (Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 
1999, 2001).	  
158 Never attending includes those who stated that do not identify with a religion.  
159 Regularly refers to monthly or more often, and occasionally to a few times per year or less. 	  
160 See Chapter 8 (pp. 233-262).	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cycle ceremonies,161 which consequently means that Scots are less likely than 
Swedes to have any form of contact with the church.  
 
Figure 6.3: Frequency of church attendance in Scotland and Sweden162 
 
 
Data source: International Social Survey Programme, 2008 (Sweden) and Scottish Social Attitudes 
Survey, 2011 (Scotland) 
 
 
 From the data presented in Figure 6.3, two key aspects are emphasised. With 
low levels of regular attendance characterising both nations and a majority of Scots 
never attending, the following section discusses non-attendance, beginning with a 
presentation of levels of attendance for different denominations as well as for 
different age groups in both Scotland and Sweden. Low levels of participation are 
further explained with interview data. Occasional participation is the most common 
category for Swedes, and as argued above, such attendance is likely to be for non-
religious reasons. This is explored further in the final section of this chapter, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Availability of choices of ceremonies in the two nations is discussed in full in section 8.2.4 (pp. 
244-248).	  
162 Never for Scotland includes those who have no religion but who were not asked the question on 
attendance (34.4 percent of individuals with no religious identification). It is also important to note 
that Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2011) asks for attendance apart from special occasions, while 
the ISSP (2008) asks for overall attendance. Nonetheless, a comparison with Scottish data from ISSP 
suggests that there are only minor differences with 11 percent regularly, 19.9 percent occasionally, 













Regularly Occasionally Never 
Sweden (N=1196) Scotland (N=1197) 
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focuses on non-religious church attendance. Here, data is presented on the 
relationship between occasional participation and belief in God. Key findings are 
illustrated and explained with interview data on non-religious reasons for going to 




6.4.1 Modelling Non-Attendance 
	  
 Similar to the analyses of subjective religiosity in section 5.3.2, two binary 
logistic regression models were created to examine the determinants of non-
attendance. While, as mentioned, regular attendance appears to be strongly linked to 
religious beliefs, less attention has been given to those who claim to never attend or 
only attend for special occasions. The two models have the dependent variable of 
non-attendance, with 1 for never attending apart from special occasions (for 
Scotland) or between never and once a year (for Sweden),163 and 0 for attending 
more often.  
 
The following independent variables were included in the Swedish Model:  
• No Religion: 1 for yes, 0 for no  
• Other Religion: 1 for yes, 0 for no 
• Subjective Religiosity: 1 for at least somewhat religious, 0 for less religious 
• Age 
• Female: 1 for female, 0 for male 
• Urban: 1 for town, small city, suburb, or larger city, 0 for small village or 
countryside 
• Household Income (in thousand kronor) 
• Married: 1 for married, 0 for not married 
 
The following variables were included in the Scottish model:  
• No religion: 1 for yes, 0 for no  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Making the assumption that once a year or less corresponds to attendance for special occasions 
only. 
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• Other Religion: 1 for yes, 0 for no 
• Subjective religiosity: 1 for religious or spiritual, 0 for neither religious nor 
spiritual 
• Age 
• Female: 1 for female, 0 for male 
• Population Density: Persons per hectare 
• Household Income (20-point scale)	  
• Married: 1 for married, 0 for not married 
Education, and Ethnicity were considered as control variables in both models but not 
included in the final models due to not being statistically significant.  
Findings show that, in both nations, those who identify with the National 
Church are more likely to attend church only for special occasions or never than 
those with other religions, but less likely to do so than those with no religion. Those 
who are at least somewhat religious (Sweden) or religious or spiritual (Scotland) are 
more likely to attend more frequently than for special occasions only. In line with 
Iannaccone’s (1998) findings, being married has a negative relationship with non-
attendance, meaning that those who are married tend to go to church more often than 
for special occasions only. However, this relationship is only marginally significant 
in Sweden. In contrast to the regressions on subjective religiosity, where sex was 
insignificant, men are more likely than women to only attend for special occasions or 
to never attend (along with e.g. Davie, 2007:232; Berger et al, 2008:99). Household 
income and population density (Scotland) or living in a town or city (Sweden), do not 
have a significant relationship with church attendance. This suggests that, holding all 
other variables constant, there are no significant differences in attendance between 
urban and rural areas.164 In both nations, younger individuals are more likely to 
attend occasionally or never, suggesting generational effects of religious decline, and 
arguably a more prominent role of the church as a community for the older 
generations. Beginning with age differences, these findings are explored further in 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Similar to findings in 5.3.2 (pp. 140-145), this holds even on a sample with National Church only.  
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Table 6.7: Determinants of non-attendance in Sweden 
DV: Non-Attendance+ B Significance Exp (B) Effect 
Constant (a) 3.695 0.000*** 40.247 Positive 
No Religion 1.320 0.000*** 3.745 Positive 
Other Religion -1.047 0.030** 0.351 Negative 
Subjective Religiosity -2.111 0.000*** 0.121 Negative 
Married -0.412 0.087* 0.662 Negative 
Female -0.612 0.005*** 0.542 Negative 
Age -0.027 0.001*** 0.973 Negative 
Household Income 0.009 0.121 1.009 - 
Urban 0.043 0.846 1.044 - 
N 977 
Cox and Snell 0.194 
+:Never attending and attending once a year. * p<0.1 (marginally significant), ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Data source: International Social Survey Programme, 2008 
 
Table 6.8: Determinants of non-attendance in Scotland 
DV: Non-Attendance+ B Significance Exp (B) Effect 
Constant (a) 1.831 0.000*** 6.242 Positive 
No Religion 2.008 0.000** 7.448 Positive 
Other Religion -0.303 0.060* 0.739 Negative 
Subjective Religiosity -1.183 0.000*** 0.306 Negative 
Married -0.522 0.001*** 0.593 Negative 
Female -0.392 0.006*** 0.676 Negative 
Age -0.015 0.001*** 0.986 Negative 
Household Income -0.017 0.259 0.984 - 
Population Density 0.001 0.725 1.001 - 
N 1208 
Cox and Snell 0.278 
+: Never attending church (apart from special occasions). *p<0.1 (marginally significant), **p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. Data source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2001  
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6.4.2 Scotland: “The church is for the elderly” 
	  
A majority of the Scottish interview participants do not attend church 
frequently. Most of them, both non-believers as well as those who are explicitly 
religious, mentioned that the last time they went to church, it had been for a funeral, 
a wedding, or a Christening. When I asked them when they last attended for a 
Sunday service, I received answers such as “I don’t think I have ever been to a 
regular service” (Connor), “20 years ago maybe” (Olivia), “the only time I ever went 
to the church was with school” (Henry), and “I went once or twice in the early 
1990s” (Susan).  
Eric calls himself religious, but he does not see the need to go to church. He 
believes most people in his generation have a similar mindset: “People our age just 
don’t go. It’s fairly boring. It’s on a Sunday morning, so you don’t go unless you 
find it to be important. You know, people just don’t see it as being important.” In 
line with this, a common theme from the interviews was the perception that the 
church mainly serves older people. Gill, who is, as mentioned, a regular church 
participant, recognises this problem. She explains that, “If you visit a lot of Church 
of Scotland churches it will mainly be old people, which kind of shows that it is 
dying ‘cause younger people aren’t going anymore, and eventually… you know… 
the old people won’t be going.”   
Examining church attendance frequency by age reveals interesting 
differences between cohorts as well as between Scotland and Sweden. In Scotland 
there is a much larger cohort effect in terms of regular attendance than in Sweden, in 
line with different historical stages of secularisation as suggested in the first part of 
this chapter. As mentioned in the interviews, younger Scots indeed attend much less 
frequently than those who are older (see Table 6.9). Around a third (36.5 percent) of 
respondents who were born in 1940 or earlier claim to attend church regularly. This 
is in contrast to the youngest age group, where only 12 percent claim to attend as 
frequently. An interesting difference can be observed between those born before and 
after the 1960s. The proportion of Scots who attend regularly decreases steadily 
among those born between 1912 and 1960, when it consequently stabilises at around 
12-13 percent. Nevertheless, while a large percentage of the oldest cohort attends 
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regularly, it is important to highlight that never attending is the most frequent 
category for all cohorts.  
There are two possible explanations for the observed relationship between 
age and attendance. It could mean that individuals become more frequent church 
attendees as they age in line with Stark and Finke’s (2000) rational choice theory, or 
the far more plausible explanation that there has been a generational shift as argued 
by among others Steve Bruce (2002a:66). As presented in the first part of this 
chapter, in Scotland, the older but not the younger generations have had a frequent 
contact with the church throughout their lives, suggesting that church attendance in 
Scotland will tail off with each generational shift.  
 













Regularly 36.5% 27.5% 17.1% 12.2% 13.1% 12.0% 
Occasionally 15.5% 15.0% 16.1% 15.5% 13.6% 9.5% 
Never* 47.9% 57.5% 66.8% 72.3% 73.3% 78.5% 
N 219 200 205 213 191 158 
*Includes No Religion. Data source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2011 
	  
6.4.3 Sweden: “I Went to a Religious Service in 1964” 
	  
Unlike in Scotland, regular attendance in Sweden is roughly even and very 
low across the different cohorts. Apart from the oldest age group at 9.2 percent, only 
between about 3 and 5 percent of the respondents report attending at least monthly 
(see Table 6.10). Just as mentioned above, attending occasionally is the most 
common category for all age groups, explained by participation on “special 
occasions” such as for life cycle ceremonies. Intriguingly, churches in Sweden not 
only fail to attract the young, they are also unable to find participants among the 
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Regularly 9.2% 4.5% 5.4% 4.8% 5.2% 3.2% 
Occasionally 68.4% 65.7% 58.6% 58.1% 57.1% 50.8% 
Never 22.3% 29.8% 36.0% 37.1% 37.6% 46.0% 
N 306 230 226 214 156 64 
Data source: International Social Survey Programme, 2008 
 
This is clearly illustrated by my conversation with Birgitta, 75, and Bertil 77, 
the oldest couple in my interview sample. Both Birgitta and Bertil fall into the oldest 
cohort in Table 6.10. They call themselves Protestants, are committed members of 
the Church of Sweden, and have never considered leaving the church. Interestingly, 
neither one of them nor their friends ever attend church other than for weddings, 
funerals, and baptisms.  
 
Isabella: When did you last go to church and why? 
 
Birgitta: Let me think… Yes it was when my grandson got married. 
 
Bertil: It must have been many years ago. 2003? 
 
Birgitta: 2002 or 2003.  
 
Isabella: Have you been to a religious service? Midnight mass? Or Easter?  
 
Birgitta: No… but my mum always went on Christmas morning to eat the porridge.  
 
Isabella: How long has it been since you went to a regular service? 
 
Birgitta: Well it must have been… I don’t remember… Yes, I did go to a religious service 
with my mother and it was in 1964… 
 
Bertil: I don’t know if I have ever been.  
 
Birgitta: We did go in the United States. Where they stomp their feet and clap their hands.  
 
Isabella: But the Church of Sweden was in 1964? 
 
Birgitta: Yes.  
 
 
	   181	  
Bertil and Birgitta, but also most of the other Swedish participants came 
across as outright oblivious to the fact that it could in any way be perceived as odd 
that they literally never attend for a religious service even if they are loyal church 
members. This attitude was expressed by Amanda. She is a 34-year old dietician who 
married her husband Isak, 32, a radio operator, in a Church of Sweden ceremony. 
Out of all 32 Swedish participants, she was by far the strongest supporter of the 
Church of Sweden. She became very defensive when speaking of declining 
membership rates and the idea that school graduations would be held elsewhere. 
Nonetheless, she has not attended a religious service since she “sang in the choir as a 
small child,” and explains that “considering the ‘faith level’ that we are at, there is no 
reason to sit in church.” This suggests that the Church of Sweden brings different 
meanings to people’s lives. For most people, it is not a strictly religious meaning, but 
a sense of cultural belonging. On the other hand, to a small minority who are 
dedicated to the Christian faith, the church gives a different meaning, namely a sense 
of spiritual wellbeing. It is the latter, but very seldom the former group, who attend 
church on a Sunday. Although you are more than welcome to attend, if you are only 
“a little religious” you are not expected to be there.  
 
6.4.4 National Churches and Non-Attendance 
	  
As mentioned earlier, Protestant Europe is considered to have lower levels of 
participation than elsewhere in Europe. Chapter 2 discussed the theory that 
Protestantism is in itself secularising (e.g. Taylor, 2007; Weber, 1904/2009), and in 
Chapter 3 it is explained that the theory of the religious economy sees a relationship 
between the religious monopoly created by Protestant state churches and low 
religious vitality (e.g. Stark and Finke, 2000).  
As presented in Table 6.11, the Protestant national churches of Scotland and 
Sweden indeed have lower levels of active participation than other denominations. In 
terms of claimed active participation, the national churches in Scotland and Sweden 
hold a weak position. Regular attendance for those identifying with the Church of 
Sweden is virtually the same as for those with no religious identification, in line with 
the proposition that belonging to the Church of Sweden is largely a cultural rather 
than a religious identification. In Scotland, on the other hand, church activity for 
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those that identify with the Church of Scotland fall in between no religion and other 
religion on all three levels of participation. Nevertheless, patterns of church 
attendance for those who identify with the Church of Scotland are a lot closer to 
those with other religion than in the Swedish context. 
 
Table 6.11: Attendance by denomination165 
Sweden (2008) Scotland (2011)  
Church of 
Sweden 
Other None Church of 
Scotland 
Other None 
Regularly 3.2% 43.3% 1.2% 34.0% 47.1% 1.8% 
Occasionally 59.7% 44.0% 40.4% 25.0% 23.0% 8.0% 
Never 26.5% 9.6% 58.5% 41.0% 29.5% 90.2% 
N 778 83 354 300 278 608 
Data source: International Social Survey Programme, 2008 (Sweden) and Scottish Social Attitudes 
Survey, 2011 (Scotland) 
 
When asking the interview participants why other denominations are, 
relatively speaking, doing much better at retaining participants than the Church of 
Sweden and the Church of Scotland, participants across both nations expressed 
similar thoughts. A majority stated that they do not attend regularly because the 
services are boring. Axel, 49, is a non-religious project manager who is married to 
Elin, 43, an entrepreneur. They are both members of the Church of Sweden, but 
married in a civil ceremony. He believes and that the Church needs to renew itself in 
order to keep up with other denominations:  
 
Axel: I never attended church as a child. Baptisms and funerals, weddings, confirmations, but 
never mass. But I did go to a Christmas morning service sometime when mum forced me to 
come along. It only confirmed my picture that it is so incredibly boring. The Church of 
Sweden only has itself to blame that they fall behind. I mean they do arrange those rock n’ 
roll services, but not the ones I have been to. If you get dragged out of bed at 5 am at 
Christmas when you’re 7 years old and have to go listen to someone speaking of the devil, 
it’s not very exciting.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Again, it is important to note that the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2011) asks for attendance 
apart from special occasions, while the ISSP (2008) asks for overall attendance. Similar analysis on 
the ISSP 2008 for Scotland suggest that for the Church of Scotland, 14.9 percent attend regularly, 19.1 
percent occasionally, and 55.3 percent never attend. The corresponding figures for other religion is 
29.0 percent regularly, 26.3% occasionally, and 44.7% never. Finally, among those with no religion, 
1.2 percent attend regularly, 11.7 percent occasionally, and 87.2 percent never.  
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Petra, 27, a teacher, married her husband Elias, 26, an engineer, in the Church of 
Sweden. They never attend church other than for special occasions. However, since 
Elias’ family is Baptist, they have attended a small number of free church services 
together. They share Axel’s opinion that the Church of Sweden needs to renew itself 
in order to keep up with a changing society and mentions that free churches, but not 
the Church of Sweden, have managed to do this. Petra states that, “The Church of 
Sweden has an older focus. The free churches have a new perspective. I understand 
why people would want to go there. But someone just standing there preaching, 
that’s a different story.”  
Lars is 53 years old and works in human resources. He is married to Maria, 
36, a chef. Also hinting that the church services are not very exciting, Lars generally 
has good things to say about the church that he married in, but is nevertheless not 
interested in attending: 
 
Isabella: When was the last time you attended a regular Sunday service? 
 
Lars: Oh… That was a really long time ago. I can’t even remember. 
  
Isabella: Why don’t you go? 
 
Lars: Well, Sunday at 11. It’s the wrong time.   
 




(after a moment of silence) 
 
Lars: The church is beautiful. I like the songs and the music is nice, but all that talking… 
 
 
Just like the Swedes, several Scottish interview participants perceived the services as 
“gloomy” and “depressing.” Along these lines, Henry mentions that, “If you go into 
the churches and look at them, they are so austere, so boring, and the services are so 
dull.”  
In line with the theory of the religious economy discussed in Chapter 3, state 
sponsored churches and religious markets with little competition become 
complacent. The Church of Sweden has not had the incentive to make an effort to 
attract participants. While it no longer relies on state funding to operate, a majority of 
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Swedes still pay a considerable part of their income to the Church (Svenska Kyrkan, 
2013) and it financially makes no difference to them if these members attend on 
Sundays or not. Although the Church of Scotland is the largest denomination in 
Scotland, it has far from the comfortable position that the Church of Sweden holds 
and therefore has to work hard to convince people to join their church above others. 
A handful of interview participants, such as Keith, mentioned that his church stands 
out as more vibrant and original than others, offering activities practically unheard of 
in Sweden. 
 
Keith: I say, society has become more individualised where smaller groups will meet up for 
coffee and that kind of thing, where as the church is still kind of, you sit, you sing songs, you 
listen to the sermon, you stand up, you sing more, you pray, and that kind of order of the 
service is quite rigid, but for some churches like my church, we have Bible studies, where 
there are smaller groups, where you can kind of explain what the service was about on 
Sunday, so then you can explore your relationship with god and I think that’s where the other 
churches need to catch up a bit.  
 
 
While prior restrictions to “free market” competition may serve as a plausible 
explanation as to why the national churches are doing worse than their competitors, 
particularly in Sweden, the effort of the churches is not the only factor to consider. It 
is crucial to emphasise that the long history of national churches has caused the 
Church of Sweden, and to a smaller extent the Church of Scotland, to be regarded the 
“default religion” of all, suggesting why more non-religious individuals identify with 
the national churches compared to other denominations.166 This explains why their 
supposed adherents are less keen on attending religious services. Furthermore, the 
theory of the religious economy is only able to account for momentary differences in 
church attendance and is less effective in understanding long-term changes. Despite 
some efforts from the Church of Scotland relative to the Church of Sweden, no 
amount of diversification seems to reverse the decline in church attendance presented 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 As seen in section 5.3.1 (pp. 135-139). 	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6.5 Non-Religious Church Attendance 
	  
Some of the non-religious interviewees in both Scotland and Sweden mention 
that, aside from life cycle ceremonies, they occasionally attend other services and 
activities that the church organises. In line with this, Figure 6.4 below suggests that 
occasional attendance for non-religious reasons is fairly common in both Scotland 
and Sweden. Figure 6.4 shows the percentage of respondents of each level of church 
attendance who believe in God. Close to everyone who goes to church regularly in 
both nations believe in God, suggesting that those who attend actively do so for 
religious reasons.  
While none of the Swedish interviewees attend church regularly, a handful of 
the Scottish couples are active participants. In line with the findings presented in 
Figure 6.4, these couples all express religious reasons for going to church regularly. 
In fact, for most of them, religion influences their everyday life in many ways not 
witnessed among the interview participants who attend less frequently. Most of the 
regular participants mentioned having family members who are active in the 
organisation of the church, for example through serving as elders, ministers, or 
church administrators. David and Gill illustrate this: 
 
David: I grew up in the Church of Scotland. Both of us had Christian parents. Well 
obviously, your dad was a minister and your mum played the organ. My dad was an elder in 
the church, and my mum ran the Sunday school. And both are still heavily involved in the 
church. 
 
Isabella: So for most of your life you have been going to church almost every Sunday? 
 
Gill: Yeah, I have never really known any different.  
 
Isabella: So does it ever happen that you don’t go on a Sunday? 
 
Gill: The only time ever that we haven’t been on a Sunday is if we are ill. 
 
 
Approximately half of Swedes and 3 in 4 Scots who attend occasionally 
believe in God, again confirming the notion that Swedes are more likely than Scots 
to attend church for non-religious reasons. Nonetheless, it is important to note that 
just because a number of the individuals who attend church occasionally believe in 
God, it does not necessarily mean that they attend church to worship. Furthermore, 
Figure 6.4 shows that a majority of both Swedes and Scots who never attend church 
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also do not believe in God. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Davie (1990, 1994, 2002a, 
2004, 2007) primarily uses church attendance as belonging and as is observed in 
Figure 6.4, most individuals who, by this definition do not belong also do not 
believe, challenging her notion that Swedes and Scots believe without belonging.167  
 
Figure 6.4: Percentage who believe in God by attendance 
 
Data source: International Social Survey Programme, 2008168 
  
When speaking to Swedes and Scots about their non-religious reasons for 
attending church, differences between the two countries become apparent. In 
Sweden, interviewees attend for activities, such as concerts or plays, for traditions, 
such as midnight mass, and for emotional wellbeing because of the atmosphere in the 
church building. In Scotland, on the other hand, only one reason to attend for non-
religious reasons emerged, namely to attend for the sake of family members. These 
differences are consequently explored below. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 This is discussed in detail in chapters 5 (pp. 123-157 and 7 (pp. 193-232).	  
168 Given that the question on attendance in the Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys asks for attendance 
apart from special occasions, using this data set would have offered a very limited ability to compare 
non-religious, occasional attendance between the two nations. Many non-religious Swedes not only 
attend for life cycle ceremonies, special occasions also involve Christmas services and similar. The 
corresponding figures from the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2001 are, nevertheless 61.7 percent 
for never (including those with no religion who were not asked question on attendance), 93.2 percent 
for occasional attendance (apart from special occasions), and 98.2 percent for regular attendance. This 
analysis excludes the missing cases of people who “can’t choose” on the question of belief in God. 
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6.5.1 Sweden: “It’s not surprising if you go to church, but it’s odd if you 
believe in what is said there” 
	  
 None of the 32 Swedish participants attend church regularly, and among 
those who occasionally visit for other reasons than ceremonies, not a single one 
mentioned doing so for religious reasons. On the contrary, some of the participants, 
such as Natalie, expressed that they wished the church would tone down the religious 
components of the services. 
 
Natalie: I would consider going to church more often, absolutely. Because I think that 
sometimes when I’m there and hear the words about God I can’t think it’s all that wrong 
really, but what makes it a no is that it just becomes too much, not just amen and hallelujah, 
but they have to have hallelujah 10 times and amen 20. Why? Are you more… are you a 
better person or more religious if you repeat these words? I don’t understand it and this 
makes me “anti.” Then I don’t want to go there. I don’t want to hear amen and hallelujah 28 
times in an hour. I can go there and listen – amen! And that would make it a rather nice 
message. It irritates me when they say it so many times and therefore I don’t feel the nice 
message. So I don’t go. 
 
 
Olof, a principal, and Rebecka, a guidance counsellor, are both 32 years of age and 
married in a civil ceremony in their garden by the sea. They hold similar attitudes as 
Natalie. Even though she has left the church, Rebecka occasionally attends non-
religious activities that the church arranges, such as concerts and toddler groups. 
Olof believes that in this day and age, the churches should remove the most religious 
components of their services, seemingly unaware of, or perhaps disagreeing with the 
fact that this is indeed the main purpose of a church.  
 
Isabella: So it feels okay to go to the church? When you don’t believe?  
 
Rebecka: Yes it feels okay. I have a bit of anxiety over the fact that we have exited the 
Church and I still go to things that they organise for free. They give you coffee and cake and 
then I think, oh right, I don’t even pay to the Church. I go to church occasionally, but not for 
a regular Sunday service. I went to a concert over Easter, and it was really nice with the 
atmosphere… and I guess the Easter concert is hallelujah so then of course it has to be 
hallelujah, no way around it… 
 
Olof: That they still have the hallelujah annoys me more than you I think. I’m more like “but 
come on, it’s 2012!”  
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Even though several interview participants dislike the most religious aspects of a 
service, they still feel compelled to attend on certain occasions. This may be 
explained by the fact that to the typical Swede, the Church of Sweden represents 
important historical and cultural traditions. In line with the concept of cultural 
religion (e.g. Demerath, 2000; Zuckerman, 2008) as described in Chapter 3, some of 
the participants attend church at Christmas for the purpose of recognising these 
traditions. Alice and Ludvig describe this sentiment. 
 
Alice: We went to midnight mass sometimes. Maybe because we lived next to the church. It 
wasn’t important. But it was nice and relaxed.  
 
Ludvig: We did that too at some point.   
 
Isabella: But not for religious reasons? 
 
Ludvig: No, the atmosphere. It’s nice. 
 
Alice: And we always read the Gospel of Luke. Every Christmas.  
 
Ludvig: We do that too. We can’t open the presents until it’s done.   
 
Alice: Midnight mass, reading from the Bible. It’s just a tradition.  
 
Ludvig: It’s to remember why we celebrate Christmas.  
 
Isabella: But does anyone in your family believe in the religious part? 
 
Ludvig: No, no… 
 
 
This form of belonging is nonetheless not to a religion per se, but to a social group in 
a Durkheimian sense and a recognition of a cultural heritage in line with what 
Hervieu-Léger (2006:48) calls a collective, shared memory. This was clearly 
illustrated by Malin. She does not believe in God, but states that “I think what moves 
me when I go to church is that you feel part of something bigger… I almost start to 
cry because I think everyone in the room is there because we believe in something 
more… but I can’t say it’s religious.” 
 Even if they do not believe in God and they may consider the services to be 
boring, most Swedes do not avoid entering churches. As a matter of fact, the church 
building was often described as a place to find emotional well-being, without finding 
God. Caroline explains that the church is a good place to reflect upon oneself as she 
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states that, “The feeling you get in church might be that you find yourself. You 
believe in yourself. It is something deeper than what you get elsewhere.”  
Just like Caroline, several other interviewees, among those, Per and Natalie, 
consider the atmosphere and the sense of peace in the church to be a good reason for 
paying membership fees to the Church of Sweden.  
 
Isabella: So do you think that the money you pay to the Church of Sweden... that it is used 
for something good?  
 
Natalie:  Yes. Absolutely. I think everything they do is really important. To enter a church, 
for me always gives a sense of peace. It doesn’t matter if it is the Notre Dame with 700 
people. Why do you always feel calm in a church?  
 
Per: That would be the reason I don’t leave the church. That my church money goes to the 
building. I get the same feeling when I enter some other buildings too, so it’s not the Church 
in itself. It’s the church as a physical phenomenon, not emotionally… 
 
Natalie: No for me there is a spiritual feeling in the building but I can’t say what it is.  
 
Per: Yes, in a way there is a spiritual atmosphere. 
 
Natalie: But it doesn’t make me religious. I don’t go there and pray to god – “oh dear god, 
make sure it doesn’t rain tomorrow.” No. 
 
 
6.5.2 Scotland: “It’s important to be there for family, but as for the 
service, ah, you clap once it’s over” 
	  
 Just as is seen in Figure 6.4, it is much less common for Scottish occasional 
participants to not believe in God. This is in line with the interview data, where 
Scottish non-believers more commonly said that they never attend church for any 
reason apart for weddings, funerals, and baptisms. Similarly, the reasons why 
Swedes attend church for non-religious reasons never came up in the Scottish 
context. However, some non-religious interview participants mentioned that they 
occasionally go to church, but for a different reason. While many Swedes expressed 
that they quite enjoyed occasional church attendance, some Scots saw it as an 
obligation rather than a choice.  
 Julie, 32, and Brian, 35, are both police officers from Edinburgh. They 
married in a humanist ceremony and are both openly atheist. They express that they 
dislike going to church but that they nonetheless attend at Christmas.    
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Julie: We went to a Christmas Eve service.  
 
Brian: Wait that’s not a normal service. I can’t think when I went on a Sunday to be honest 
with you. Christmas Eve over that past couple of years. 
 
Julie: That’s because we visit my family. My mum and dad like to do a Christmas Eve 
service. 
 




Isabella: And did you enjoy it? 
 
Julie: Hmm, it was okay. 
 
Brian: It was fine. I mean it was slightly different. It’s a family thing. 
 
Julie: I couldn’t think the last time I went to a Sunday service though. Definitely over 10 
years ago.  
 
 
Simon and Lucy convey a similar attitude. Just like Julie and Brian, they married in a 
humanist ceremony and are both atheists. Nevertheless, a friend asked them to come 
to a service and they agreed.  
 
Isabella: So can you tell me about the last time you went to church? Where did you go and 
why? 
 
Lucy: It was at my friend’s church. She invited us along cause it was an Easter service.  
 
Isabella: Ah okay. How was it? How do you feel about it?  
 
Simon: It’s important to be there for your friends and family, but as for the service, ah you 
clap once it’s over. You’re happy when you get to social aspect of it. 
 
Lucy: That was the last time I went before I thought about it and realised that I wasn’t 
actually a Christian. 
 
 
While the Swedish participants expressed that they attend church at Christmas and 
other special occasions for traditions and for the atmosphere, Scots like Julie, Brian, 
Simon, and Lucy have almost exclusively mentioned doing so out of respect for 
family and friends. Some participants mentioned that they feel forced to go by more 
active family members, and they do not enjoy the experience. 
The differences between Scotland and Sweden here undoubtedly correspond 
to the generational differences described in the first part of this chapter. Many 
Scottish participants had a religious upbringing where they attended church with 
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their family. As some of their parents are still active in the church, it is only natural 
that they wish for their children to come along at special family holidays such as 
Christmas. However, since Scotland is experiencing a decline in religious 
participation, attending church for family reasons is likely to tail off with this 
generation. It is possible then that even though they are doing relatively better in 
terms of regular participation, the crisis that the Church of Scotland experiences may, 
at this point, be even more severe than its Swedish counterpart, which despite low 
regular attendance for many generations, nonetheless has an overwhelming support 




This chapter illustrates that apart from the small minority who participate 
regularly for religious reasons, Scots and Swedes have different attitudes towards 
church attendance, arguably as a result of contextual differences of secularisation as 
well as the perceived role of the church. Here, historical differences as well as the 
theoretical frameworks of secularisation, cultural religion, religious economy, and 
religion and social capital are suggested as plausible explanations.  
The first part of the chapter argued that while church attendance levels are 
indeed decreasing in both Scotland and Sweden, there has been a more recent and 
drastic decline in the Scottish case, while in Sweden, the crucial decline appears to 
have taken place much earlier. In Scotland there seems to have been a generational 
shift where those who were born in the 1960s and later were much less likely than 
earlier cohorts to ever have attended church regularly, suggesting a change of 
attitudes in their parents’ generation. In Sweden, on the other hand, church 
attendance levels have been exceptionally low throughout the past century, 
suggesting that dramatic change took place prior to the 20th century.  
In the second part of the chapter, contextual differences and similarities in 
contemporary patterns of church attendance emerged. In Scotland, older generations 
are considerably more likely to be active in the church, while the churches in Sweden 
have difficulties attracting participants across the board. Both national churches are 
doing considerably worse than other denominations, while it is particularly severe in 
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the Swedish case, likely as a result of individuals identifying with the church for 
non-religious reasons as is further discussed in the next chapter. Nevertheless, both 
Swedes and Scots expressed a need for the National Church to become more 
innovative.  
Church attendance levels are more polarised in Scotland as Scots are more 
likely than Swedes to attend regularly or never, while most Swedes attend 
occasionally. It is argued that occasional church attendance can be accounted for by 
attendance for non-religious reasons, a phenomenon much more prominent in the 
Swedish case, where individuals visit the church for traditions, for non-religious 
activities, and for emotional well-being. Non-religious Scots, on the other hand, 
seem to only attend church out of obligation to family or friends, and Scots generally 
held more negative attitudes about church attendance, while Swedes described 
occasional participation as a fairly pleasant, but yet not religious experience. 
If belonging is measured as church attendance, then Davie (e.g. 1990, 1994, 
2002a, 2004, 2007) is correct in her assertion that Scots and Swedes are not 
belonging, where a majority of Scots do not belong and most Swedes belong 
occasionally. What is clear is that particularly in Sweden, this form of belonging 
does not serve a religious purpose. Furthermore, while it is not contested that Swedes 
and Scots generally do not attend church, it is clear that Davie’s typology does not 
thoroughly account for different forms of religious belonging. This is consequently 
the focus of the next chapters.  
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Chapter 7: Belonging as Membership and 
Identification 
	  
7.1 Introduction  
	  
In relation to the debate on secularisation, sociologists of religion primarily 
emphasise declines in religious beliefs and church attendance. As presented in the 
previous two chapters, these dimensions of religion are indeed of crucial importance 
in providing an account of contemporary patterns of secularisation. Nevertheless, 
literature has given less attention to other key dimensions of religious belonging. As 
a result, religious identification and membership are discussed in this chapter, and 
participation in life cycle ceremonies in Chapter 8. Identification here refers to a 
subjective sense belonging to a religious denomination.169 Membership, on the other 
hand, is an objective, formal acknowledgement of religious adherence.  
There are three key reasons for why these aspects of belonging are of key 
importance. First, they provide an additional and alternative measure of religious 
change and secularisation. Second, by stressing the complexity of religious 
belonging, it highlights the superficiality of conceptualising and dichotomising 
religious beliefs, feelings, attitudes, and practices in terms of believing and belonging 
(Davie, 1990, 1994, 2002a, 2004, 2007). Third, it provides an understanding of 
remaining functions of religion in contemporary Scotland and Sweden, covered in 
detail in Chapter 8 with a discussion of religious rituals.  
The first part of this chapter continues the examination of believing and 
belonging in Scotland and Sweden by presenting figures and meanings of religious 
identification and membership. The second part describes how diverse interpretations 
and meanings of Christianity in the two nations reveal key differences in the role of 
religion in Scotland and Sweden. The last part of the chapter examines figures of 
believing and belonging and discusses the limitations of referring to belonging as 
active participation alone rather than the more intuitive connection to identification 
or membership. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 For the sake of clarity, the term identification has been used instead of belonging, which may 
collectively represent identification, attendance, and participation in rituals. 
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Overall this chapter aims to highlight the connection between religion and 
belonging to a social group associated with a cultural heritage or a community (e.g. 
Durkheim, 1912/1995; Bellah, 1991; Hervieu-Legér, 2006). This is a topic that has 
not been studied to the same extent as secularisation. However, I believe this aspect 
is essential to the understanding of religion as a social phenomenon and not the least 
to changing roles of religion in secularising societies.  
 
7.2 Current Levels and Patterns  
	  
Exploring changes in religious identification between childhood and 
adulthood in the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2011) and the International Social 
Survey Programme (2008) reveals interesting contextual differences that call for 
further attention. As presented in Figure 7.1 and 7.2, 53.6 percent170 of those Scots 
raised in the Church of Scotland still identify as such. In Sweden, the corresponding 
figure for the Church of Sweden is 78.1 percent. In other words, a majority of 
respondents with a family background in the Church of Sweden still identify with the 
National Church, while it is more common for Scots to shift from identifying with 
the Church of Scotland to no religion. This is further shown by the fact that 41.4 
percent171 of Scots raised in the Church of Scotland now do not identify with any 
religion. Furthermore, 25.7 percent of Swedes raised in no religion now identify with 
the National Church, compared to just 0.9 percent for Scots.  
This raises a number of questions. If Scots are more religious than Swedes 
(Chapter 6), how come they are more likely to cease to identify with the National 
Church? If Swedes virtually never attend church apart from special occasions 
(Chapter 5), why do they still identify with it? Moreover, why do 1 in 4 Swedes with 
no religious background now identify with the National Church while in Scotland 
this figure is less than 1 in 100? In the next two sections, I attempt to shed light on 
these questions, beginning with the case of Sweden. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 This figure was 53.2 percent in 2008 (International Social Survey Programme, 2008).  
171 This figure was 40.5 percent in 2008 (International Social Survey Programme, 2008).	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Figure 7.1: Percentage identifying with same religion as the one they 
were raised in 
 
Data source: International Social Survey Programme, 2008 (Sweden), and Scottish Social Attitudes 
Survey, 2011 (Scotland)  
 
 
Figure 7.2: Current religious identification of those raised in the 
National Church 
 
Data source: International Social Survey Programme, 2008 (Sweden), and Scottish Social Attitudes 
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7.2.1 Sweden: Church Membership 
	  
 Data from the Church of Sweden (Figure 7.3) show a steady decline in formal 
membership from 95.2 percent of the population in 1972 to 67.5 percent in 2011. As 
seen in Figure 7.4, for every single year since 1970, the number of individuals who 
actively leave172 the church exceeds the number of new members. However, the 
difference between the two remained relatively small until after the disestablishment 
in 2000. The biggest gap can be seen in 2004, when 79 000 members left the church, 
while only a little over 5000 joined.  
 
Figure 7.3: Members in the Church of Sweden (percent of population) 
 











	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Data only represent an active choice to leave or become member of the church, meaning that it 
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Figure 7.4: New members and members leaving the Church of Sweden 
 




The financial aspect explains the steep decline in membership following the 
deregulation of the Swedish state church. For the first time, a decision on church 
membership had a considerable effect on personal income. The membership fees that 
were previously shared by all Swedish taxpayers could now be avoided by making 
an active choice to leave the Church. In line with this, according to the website of the 
Church of Sweden, “from 2001 onward, many individuals leave as they receive their 
annual tax declaration” (Svenska Kyrkan, 2013). Furthermore, these findings suggest 
a gradual process of secularisation in Sweden. Bäckström et al (2004:51) show that 
the decline in membership in the Church of Sweden has not simultaneously meant an 
increase in membership for other Christian denominations. In fact, almost all free 
churches have seen decreasing membership rates in the same time period.  
Most interview participants who had left the Church gave financial reasons 
for doing so. However, in relation to their decision to terminate their membership, 
some participants, among those, Olof and Rebecka, also mentioned values and 
feelings about the church.  
 
Olof: I looked at the tax declaration one too many times and said, “We need to leave this.” 
Then you forget. And then the next year, it is there again and you think, “Why the hell are we 
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not a supporter. It’s not just the money, but it’s also some kind of a statement to say that we 
don’t belong to this. Since I’m a bit more “anti hallelujah” I think it is important for me to 
not be a member.  
 
Rebecka: You place more values in your decision. I’m more like “but come on, let’s spend 
the 3000 kronor173 we give to the church each year on something else.”  
 
 
Nevertheless, most interview participants are, like the majority of Swedes 
(see Figure 7.3), still members of the church. Intriguingly, many interviewees came 
across as rather indifferent about their membership. They do not believe in God and 
have talked about leaving the church many times but “do not see a pressing need” 
(Gabriella), “do not have energy to prioritise it” (Axel), or “practical circumstances 
get in the way” (Elin). In line with this, a perception from the interviews was that 
many participants feel rather conflicted. While they do not believe in God, they feel a 
connection to the Church of Sweden and would like to use its services at key points 
in their lives.174 Given the fairly recent disestablishment, they are for the first time 
urged to actively reconsider what their official membership means to them both 
financially as well as in relation to their values and beliefs, a decision that is often 
avoided or suspended, such as highlighted by Alice and Ludvig. As is presented in 
Chapter 5, Alice does not believe in God or any supernatural powers, but she has 
positive feelings about the Church. Ludvig, on the other hand, believes in 
“something else,” but he is less interested in the Church.  
 
Isabella: So you are both members of the Church of Sweden? Have you ever considered 
leaving the Church?  
 
Ludvig: Yes we have. Every time we see how much we pay in taxes. But we don’t have the 
energy to do it. Maybe I should, but we are hoping to baptise our child.  
 
Alice: Yes, and I feel that I would like to go there for Christmas at some point, and I got 
married there, so there is no reason to leave.  
 
Isabella: So do you feel as though your money is well spent?  
 
Alice: Of course we could be there more, but yes, I’m sure they use the money for good 
things. The buildings are beautiful.  
 
Ludvig: But on the other hand, our visits to the church are very expensive since we only go 
there once a year. But yes, that’s how it is. It’s supposed to be like that.   
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Approximately £300. 
174 See section 8.2 (pp. 234-248) for a full discussion.  
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Similarly, Elias and Petra are happy to pay the tax to the church. They do not know 
what their money is allocated to, and neither are they particularly curious to find out. 
They have no interest in becoming active participants, but have nonetheless never 
considered leaving the church.  
 
Elias: We are not active members, but we haven’t left the church either.  
 
Isabella: Is the church membership important to you?  
 
Petra: No, I don’t reflect over it.  
 
Elias: Well, the Church of Sweden does… It feels okay to pay the taxes because they do 
good things that aren’t just Christian. I mean charity and cultural heritage.  
 
Isabella: So with this tax, do you feel as though you get your money’s worth or that it is well 
spent? 
 
Petra: Yes, but I don’t know.  
 
Elias: Yes and we have used its services through our wedding and baptism.  
 
Isabella: So you have no plans to exit the church? 
 
Petra: No. It’s so much tradition… And I assume we will baptise our next child.  
 
 
It is possible that this reluctance to leave the church instead signifies that this 
passive membership still means something even if it is not religious in nature. One 
such meaning is the collective responsibility for other people’s religious needs 
expressed by several interview participants. Per and Natalie do not want to leave the 
Church despite their lack of beliefs and regular attendance. Per mentioned that he is 
“closer to exiting the church than Natalie.” She mentioned on multiple occasions that 
she felt like the Church “does good things,” so I asked her more specifically what 
this meant.  
 
Natalie: I’m thinking like this: I’m almost political now but in today’s society there is not 
much solidarity anymore. You are supposed to earn money, have the cheapest phone contract 
and you should... everything is about making money and if I go back to how it was when I 
grew up, back then you had Telia175 because Telia took care of everyone and it didn’t matter 
if you lived at the top of the mountain you should of course have a telephone and you 
shouldn’t pay more than anyone else… and the only part in today’s Sweden where I feel like 
we still have that is in a way the Church of Sweden. Everyone has… there is this sense of 
solidarity. It doesn’t matter who enters the church. Everyone is welcome. The church still 
nurtures this sense of solidarity and I feel like that’s important. All children get to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Sweden’s previous state telecommunication monopoly. 	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baptised, all couples can marry, and all humans get to be buried. It’s a humane feeling I don’t 
see anywhere else. 
 
 
Similarly, Caroline and Magnus would never consider leaving the church despite a 
lack of belief and attendance. One of the reasons for this is a collective solidarity, in 
line with Natalie’s thoughts.   
 
Magnus: I do believe the church serves a purpose. Even if things are okay for us it can be of 
an enormous help. It is a safety net in a way.  
 
Isabella: So now that you pay part of your salary to the Church, do you think you get your 
money’s worth?  
 
Magnus: Yes, I think so. Yes.  
 
Caroline: I don’t question it… I don’t know what my money goes to. But I like the Church. 
The building in itself is a cultural heritage... and then I think that there are many people that 
need to go there and we can all help pay for that. We all have different needs. 
 
 
This exemplifies the strong relationship between the Church of Sweden and 
folkhemmet, the Swedish welfare model,176 where non-religious individuals pay to 
the church to ensure it can continue to serve those in need. While this is an important 
reason for membership and religious identification in Sweden, these two forms of 
belonging do not necessarily go hand in hand.  
 
7.2.2 Sweden: Religious Identification 
	  
As is seen in Table 6.1, the disestablishment seems to have had a very minor 
effect on religious identification. In 1998, 65.5 percent of the Swedish respondents 
identified with the Church of Sweden. In 2008, the same figure was 65.4. 
Overlapping, and almost identical confidence intervals177 suggest that the proportion 
of Swedes who identify with the Church of Sweden is not significantly different 
between 1998 and 2008. In other words, levels of identification with the Church of 
Sweden has remained unchanged between 1998 and 2008 in spite of the 
disestablishment in 2000 and the fact that official membership rates have fallen from 
84.3 to 72.9 percent in the same time period. This finding suggests that membership 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 See section 2.3.5 (pp. 33-36). 
177 Confidence interval at 95 percent in 1998: 62.8-68.2 percent. Confidence interval at 95 percent, in 
2008: CI, 95%: 62.9-68.3 percent. 
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is rather different from personal identification and that Swedes can belong to the 
church in other ways than formal membership.  
While a majority of Swedes are still members, there is, at this moment, no 
indication that the trend of a steep decline in membership is turning or even slowing 
down. On the other hand, many Swedes arguably feel like they belong to the Church 
of Sweden regardless of their lack of beliefs and active participation. Sweden is 
therefore a clear example of Bruce’s (1994:35) assertion of people losing faith while 
retaining a nostalgic, positive attitude about the church. This is in line with the theory 
of cultural religion178 (e.g. Demerath, 2000; Zuckerman, 2008) that suggests a 
relationship between a historical heritage and a collective religious identity 
regardless of beliefs.179 This theory is, as seen in the following section, less 
applicable to the case of Scotland.  
 
Table 7.1: Religious identification in Sweden 
 1998 2008 
Church of Sweden 65.5% 65.4% 
Other 6.0%a 6.7%b 
None 28.5% 27.9% 
N 1175 1208 
a) Free churches: 3.9%, Catholic: 1.0%, Other: 1.1%. b) Free church: 2.8%, Catholic: 1.2%, Islam: 
1.2%, Other: 1.5%. Data source: International Social Survey Programme, 1998, and 2008 
 
 
 Chapter 6 presents church attendance data suggesting an earlier beginning of 
religious decline in Sweden than in Scotland. Chapter 5 also showed that in terms of 
religious beliefs, there is a much larger cohort effect in Scotland than in Sweden, and 
several Scottish interview participants were of the opinion that the Church of 
Scotland is “for the elderly.” In Sweden, on the other hand, church attendance and 
particularly religious beliefs are low and fairly consistent across the different age 
groups. Figures of religious identification suggest a similar trend. As is seen in 
Figure 7.5, at least half of the respondents in all age groups identify with the Church 
of Sweden, with the highest percentage at 74.6 among those born in 1943 or earlier. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 See section 3.7.3 (pp. 77-81). 
179 The connection between religious belonging and cultural religion is explored further with religious 
rituals in Chapter 8.2 (pp. 234-248). 
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Younger respondents are less likely to identify with the National Church in favour of 
no religion, While this indeed shows that Swedish religious belonging is more 
common among older generations, the effect is small, in particular in comparison to 
the Scottish data as seen in Figure 7.7.  
 
 
Figure 7.5: Swedish religious identification (by birth cohort) 
 




 Findings presented in this section suggest that a majority of Swedes belong to 
the former state church if defined as identification or membership. In 2012, 67.5 
percent of Swedes were formal members, and in 2008, 65.4 percent identified with 
the Church of Sweden. The reason why some Swedes are members even though they 
do not identify with the Church is likely due to the fact that, as explained earlier, 
some Swedes are only members “on paper” in that they have not yet filled out the 
formal paper work to leave the Church of Sweden. Some Swedes may wish to retain 
their membership in order to use its services or to support it financially for various 
reasons, without necessarily feeling like they belong to it.180 Another explanation 
could be that many Swedes are formal members to both the Church of Sweden and to 
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a free church as explained by Alva. Less than a third (27.9 percent) claim to not 
identify with any religion at all. Regardless of the low levels of beliefs presented in 
Chapter 5, a majority of Swedes nominally belong to a religion in even if they do not 
actively attend church (Chapter 6). Belonging to the National Church as a 
recognition of a cultural heritage is less common in the case of Scotland. Despite 
higher levels of religious beliefs, religious identification is declining more rapidly in 
Scotland than in Sweden, suggesting a different meaning of religious belonging.  
 
7.2.3 Scotland: Membership and Identification  
	  
 The Analysis of Religion in the 2001 Census Summary Report (2005) shows 
that about two-thirds of Scots identify with a religion. In the Census, 42.4 percent of 
the population identify with the Church of Scotland181 (47 percent reported having 
been brought up within this denomination), around 16 percent are Catholic, and the 
remaining 9 percent identify with other religions, of which, other Christian is the 
largest group with around 7 percent. The Catholic Church plays a large and active 
role in the religious landscape in Scotland as it is currently the second largest 
denomination in Scotland. However, the Catholic Church is experiencing a similar 
decline in adherence as the Church of Scotland. In fact, all religious organisations in 
Scotland apart from Islam and a number of small newer religions have seen a 
continuous decline in membership rates (Brown, 1997:158; Robbins, 1994:372; 
Voas, 2006:108).182  
 With data from the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (1999-2011), Figure 7.6 
shows that up until 2001, more Scottish respondents identified with the Church of 
Scotland than with no religion. Since then, the Church of Scotland has experienced 
declining levels of religious identification in favour of no religion. In 2011, more 
than half of Scots had no religion and just over a quarter identified with the Church 
of Scotland. Relatively little change is observed among Catholics and those with 
other religions. In line with prior literature (e.g. Robbins, 1994:372), this suggests 
that the Church of Scotland is facing particularly severe difficulties. Not only do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 The same figure from the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2001) is 37.3 percent. 
182 As seen below, membership in the Church of Scotland entails formally joining a specific 
congregation.  
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fewer people identify with the Kirk or attend religious services (Chapter 6), those 
who do are less likely to call themselves religious than those who identify with other 
religion (Chapter 5).   
 
 
Figure 7.6: Scottish religious identification 1999-2011 
 
Data source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 1999-2011 
 
 
In line with the notion that the Kirk is “for the elderly” (Chapter 6), Figure 
7.7 shows a very strong cohort effect in terms of affiliation with the Church of 
Scotland. More than half (50.9 percent) of the respondents who were born before 
1940 identify with the Church of Scotland. The same figure for those born in 1981 or 
later is 6.3 percent. This shows that the Kirk is unsuccessful in attracting younger 
generations. Just as is argued in Chapter 6, this suggests a generational shift rather 
than an age effect. As presented earlier, only 3.2 percent of respondents begin 
identifying with the Church of Scotland as adults if they were not raised as such 
(SSAS, 2001),183 which, at least in terms of religious identification rejects Stark and 
Finke’s (2000) idea that individuals become more religious as they age. Furthermore, 
other religions and the Catholic Church do not experience similar differences 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  

















	   205	  
between cohorts, as the proportion of Scots who identify as such is largely even 
across different age groups.  
 
Figure 7.7: Scottish religious identification (by birth cohort)
 




Compared to Sweden, it is much more common to not identify with any 
religious denomination in Scotland. Less than half (48.9 percent) of Scottish 
respondents identified with a religion in 2011. The same statistic for Sweden in 2008 
is 72.1 percent. While Scots are more frequent churchgoers than Swedes, on levels of 
religious identification, fewer Scots belong. Furthermore, there is a relatively high 
level of religious diversity in Scotland, with only 25.3 percent identifying with the 
Church of Scotland, 9.6 percent as Catholic, and 14.0 percent as other religious 
denomination. In Sweden, 65.4 percent of respondents identify with the National 
Church, and only 6.7 percent with other religious denominations.184 As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, a higher level of religious diversity suggests a weaker connection between 
a Scottish cultural identity and the National Church. As a result, Scots are more 
likely to take a stand, meaning that they identify with a religion primarily for reasons 
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related to religious beliefs.185 This suggests a form of belonging that is, in Scotland, 
more of a religious phenomenon than in Sweden.  
Just as presented for Sweden, there is a considerable difference between 
official membership and religious identification in Scotland. It is important to note 
that in the Church of Scotland membership consists of joining a particular 
congregation, again indicating the Church of Scotland’s emphasis on local 
community. Although it is encouraged, membership in the Church of Scotland does 
not strictly require a financial commitment. Instead, membership comes as a result of 
baptism, a public profession of faith,186 and a subsequent inclusion in the communion 
roll. In 2009, 9 percent of the population were official members of the national 
church (The Church of Scotland, 2012).  
Several Scottish interview participants identify with the Church of Scotland, 
attend church frequently, but have never considered becoming members. Sophia is a 
30-year-old nurse who married her husband Thomas, 30, a computer analyst, in a 
Church of Scotland ceremony. He is not religious, but Sophia attends church most 
Sundays with their two young children.  
 
Sophia: I am not a member of the church, but they do say to you once a year, “does anyone 
want to become a member?” 
 
Isabella: And why have you decided to not become a member? 
 
Sophia: Because it doesn’t really mean anything to be a member. It doesn’t make a 
difference. I mean I am still going to go to the church.  
 
Isabella: So what does a membership involve? 
 
Sophia: I don’t even know. 
 
Thomas: It’s probably just a commitment. 
 
Sophia: It’s probably just a financial commitment. 
 
Isabella: But they are happy for anyone to come whether or not you are an official member? 
 
Sophia: Oh yeah, no one has ever said to me: “Why aren’t you a member yet?” 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 However, non-religious identification exists in the form of community or cultural defence as 
described in section 7.2.4 (pp. 208-211).  
186 Also known as confirmation.  
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In other words, official membership has two very different meaning in the two 
national churches. A perception from the interviews was that only the most 
committed and most active participants are expected to be members in the Church of 
Scotland and that those who decide to be members, often do so as a form of 
belonging to a particular community. Nicole and Samuel explain this.  
 
Isabella: So are you both members of the Church of Scotland? 
 
Nicole: I am. 
 
Samuel: I’m not. 
 
Isabella: Oh okay, so have you been a member since you were a child? 
 
Nicole: Yes… you affiliate yourself to a particular church and you’re supposed to give a 
certain amount of money... Mine is a direct debit that comes out of my account every month. 
 
Isabella: So approximately how much do they... not charge, but do you give? 
 
Nicole: Well, they used to have this expectation years ago that it was 10 percent of your 
salary, but now it’s about 20 pounds a month I think. Out of my account. 
 
Isabella: How come you have chosen to affiliate with this particular church? 
 
Nicole: Because we used to live there. That’s where John was christened, and it had a great 
mother and baby group.  
 
 
Intriguingly, Nicole’s membership is associated with positive experiences of 
community in the past. She acknowledges that religious belonging has a much more 
limited role in today’s society. She no longer attends church, her children are 
atheists, and she does not expect them to be a part of the church in the same way that 
she was.  
With an increasing prevalence of identification with no religion (Figure 7.6), 
many Scots opt for a non-religious ceremony, such as a civil or a, now legally 
recognised humanist ceremony.187 However, despite the fact that such ceremonies 
are becoming increasingly popular, few of the interview participants felt that it was 
important for them to be formal members of the Humanist Society. In fact, most of 
them only became members because it was required in order to have a humanist 
wedding ceremony. Lucy mentioned, “We joined up for the wedding, but our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Humanist ceremonies have been legally binding since 2005 (General Registry of Scotland, 2013). 
See section 8.3 (pp. 248-261). 
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membership lapsed and we didn’t renew because we had to pay.” In line with this, 
Susan shared her thoughts on why many individuals do not see humanist 
membership as important.  
 
Susan: We are no longer members and I suspect a lot of people aren’t. For a lot of churches, 
collective worship is a core element in expressing your beliefs, and there is no suggestion 
that we humanists have to hang around other humanists and talk about other humanist stuff. 
 
 
This sentiment arguably relates to secularisation and the social significance of 
religion (e.g. Bruce, 2002a; Wallis and Bruce, 1992; Wilson, 1966, 1982). While 
Scots are more likely than Swedes to take a stand on issues relating to religion, many 
Scots do not feel so strongly about these matters that they see the need to gather 
around this common set of values. Most of the interviewees who married in a 
humanist ceremony simply wanted a non-religious option. Just as is suggested in 
Chapter 5, if religion had a large impact on Scottish society, it is likely that more 
Scots would encourage a more active stand on matters of faith. 
 
7.2.4 Scotland: Religion, Community, and Cultural Defence  
	  
Fewer and fewer Scots identify with the Church of Scotland and those who 
have chosen a non-religious alternative to life cycle rituals commonly do not see the 
need to formally belong to such a network. Yet, two different, but related, reasons for 
religious affiliation emerged in the Scottish data, namely as cultural defence and as 
belonging to a community. The sense of religion as a community came across much 
stronger in the Scottish than the Swedish interviews. It is possible that as a state 
sponsored component of the Swedish welfare model, the Church of Sweden has not 
made an active effort to serve that purpose. In Scotland, belonging to the Kirk means 
making an active choice to be a part of a group, similar to what is seen among 
members of the Swedish free churches. For example, Helen recognises the social 
aspect of the Church of Scotland. As described previously, she is now an outspoken 
atheist, but she mentioned that during her years at university she joined a religious 
group as a search for meaning and a community.  
 
Helen: I think I’m fine with my life in Scotland without being aware of religion particularly, 
which suits me. But having said that, with my job I give talks to particular groups and often 
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to the Women’s Guild, which is part of the Church of Scotland, and all of them are really old. 
They used to have a younger women’s guild. I don’t think they called it that but you get the 
idea. And nowadays women aren’t coming through because they’re either working or not 
into religion or whatever. All of these groups are populated with really old women so 
eventually they might die out. But again my experience with them is that it is more a 
community thing. It’s about organising the community for women. But there is a moral tone 
to it. I think this is a positive aspect of the church.     
 
 
Ben and Pamela have similar thoughts on religion as community. However, 
they also emphasise that not only are religious beliefs and active attendance in 
decline in Scotland, so is religion as belonging to a social group.  
 
Pamela: That’s another thing... It is a community thing as well, not a religious thing. That’s 
why they [Pamela’s parents] pay quite a lot to the church. They give them a lot of money. 
 
Ben: Yeah those two things often get confused: Religion and community.  
 
Pamela: Usually in the past I think the church was the centre of the community. It is not so 
much of that anymore. But some people might still have that connection.  
 
 
In line with Putnam’s (2000) assertion of the decreasing need for social involvement, 
Olivia relates this decline in community to social structural changes.  
 
Olivia: There is less reliance on community for support. People tend to have much smaller 
communities of friends. Maybe participation in a much wider community is not the way our 
society works these days. There are many in our grandparents’ generation that just would go 
because everyone else did.  
 
 
Again, this serves as an example of Davie’s (2002b) use of Putnam’s (2001) theory 
in relation to decline in belonging. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Bruce (2002b) 
disagrees with Davie’s (2002b) notion that a disinterest in public association is not 
accompanied by a similar decrease in beliefs. However, it is clear that a general 
decline in the community aspect (Putnam, 2001) and secularisation as a result of 
modernisation (e.g. Bruce, 1996, 2002a) are highly intertwined phenomena that very 
well may have led to a decline in active participation, membership, identification, 
and arguably to some extent, religious beliefs.  
Furthermore, this decline can also be observed in the diminishing role of 
religion as cultural defence. Many interview participants shared their thoughts on the 
relations between Scottish Protestants and Catholics. Most of them were aware of a 
tension between adherents of the two religious groups. Nevertheless, few of them 
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had personally experienced any conflicts. Most interview participants expressed that 
this is only really an issue in the West of Scotland, particularly in Glasgow.  
Moreover, in line with literature on the subject (e.g. Brown, 1997; Rosie, 2004), a 
common sentiment from the interviews was that Scottish sectarianism is generally 
weak, and certainly not about religion per se. Even though he grew up in the West of 
Scotland, Eric shared this idea.  
 
Isabella: Did you notice any conflicts between Catholics and Protestants when you were 
growing up? 
 
Eric: No, not at all. You only know it because of football.  
 
Isabella: So is it really a religious conflict? 
 
Eric: I think it is more of a stupidity conflict. I think they just want to identify as something, 
even if they don’t believe in it…I don’t think they actually believe strongly in the things they 
are shouting at each other.  
 
 
Similarly, Helen describes that identifying as Catholic or Protestant oftentimes does 
not have a religious meaning.  
 
Helen: I wouldn’t say it’s about religion. Again, it’s a cultural community. They very much 
identify themselves as Catholic because their grandparents are Irish. There was a big Irish 
Catholic community in Glasgow, and they were very much, “We are Catholic and we support 
Celtic and the Protestants support Rangers.” And you know, being Irish and going to 
Catholic schools, it was very much about this self-identification, but I don’t think they were 
really genuinely Catholic in the sense that they genuinely lived their lives according to the 
Catholic Church and many of them don’t actually believe. It definitely is a social and 
cultural, ehm… community association much more than religious. 
 
 
As described in Chapter 3, in line with the theory of cultural defence (e.g. Bruce, 
1996, 2002a), religion often serves as a social institution around which different 
ethnic and social groups gather. With secularisation, the religious element gradually 
fades away, but individuals continue to identify with these groups or communities. 
This is an example of how religion can remain relevant longer or appear to have a 
stronger place in society.  
Belonging to a religious organisation, and particularly to the National Church, 
is in decline in both Scotland and Sweden. However, the processes are seemingly 
different in the two nations. In Scotland, a decline in religious beliefs (Chapter 5) and 
church attendance (Chapter 6) are arguably accompanied by a similar decline in 
	   211	  
religious identification. In Sweden, on the other hand, identifying with the church is 
a largely separate phenomenon from active participation and belief. These perceived 
differences are examined further in the next two sections that explore determinants of 
religious identification in Scotland and Sweden.  
 
7.2.5 Modelling Religious Identification in Sweden 
	  
 Building on the descriptive findings and the perceptions from the interviews, 
Swedish religious belonging was explored further with a multinomial logistic 
regression model using data from the International Social Survey Programme, 2008. 
The dependent variable in the model is religious identification, which consists of 
three different categories constructed from the survey questions “Do you belong to a 
church or religious parish?” and “Which church, parish, communion, or religion is 
it?” It is coded as 1 for the Church of Sweden, 2 for other religion, and 3 for no 
religion. While the Church of Sweden is a religious organisation, to an extent, it 
arguably serves a secular role, a phenomenon that is virtually non-existent in other 
religious denominations. As this is of particular interest, identification with the 
Church of Sweden is selected as the reference since it allows for a comparison of 
how identification with the former state church differs from other religious 
denominations or no religion.   
 
The following independent variables were included in the model:  
• Subjective Religiosity: 1 for at least somewhat religious, 0 for less religious 
• Church Attendance: Scale from 0 (never) to 6 (once a week or more) 
• Urban: 1 for town, small city, suburb, or larger city, 0 for small village or 
countryside 
• Household Income (in thousand kronor) 
• Age 
• Married: 1 for married, 0 for not married 
Sex and Education were considered as control variables but were not included in 
the final models as they were not statistically significant in either the Scottish or 
the Swedish model.  
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Table 7.2: Determinants of religious identification in Sweden 
 Other Religion No Religion 
DV=Identification+ Exp (B) Sign. Effect Exp (B) Sign. Effect 
       
Subj. Religiosity 6.438 0.000** Positive 0.993 0.979 - 
       
Attendance 2.578 0.000*** Positive 0.446 0.000*** Negative 
       
Urban 5.880 0.001*** Positive 1.586 0.009** Positive 
       
Age 0.925 0.000*** Negative 1.002 0.726 - 
       
Married 8.708 0.000***  Positive 0.826 0.262 - 
       
Houshold Income 0.962 0.002*** Negative 1.003 0.054* Positive 
       
N 977 
  
Cox and Snell 0.292 
+: Church of Sweden is the base category *<0.1, **<0.05, ***<0.01. Data source: International 
Social Survey Programme, 2008 
 
 
Table 7.2 shows that three variables are statistically significant in predicting 
identification with the Church of Sweden in relation to no religion. Confirming the 
evidence presented in Chapter 6, this suggests that individuals who identify with the 
Church of Sweden hold many similar characteristics to those with no religion. In 
terms of demographics (age, sex, marital status, and education), little differentiates a 
person who identifies with the Church of Sweden from one who does not identify 
with any religion. This is in line with the idea that identification with the National 
Church relates to a sense of belonging to the Swedish culture at large. On the 
contrary, all variables except sex and education serve as significant predictors of 
belonging to other religions compared to the Church of Sweden. Arguably, there are 
more prominent differences between individuals who identify with other religions 
and the Church of Sweden than between those who belong to the Church of Sweden 
and those with no religion. This is interesting given that, the Church of Sweden is a 
religious organisation. This is another example of the Church of Sweden no longer 
having a close association with religious faith.   
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 In line with the notion that the Church of Sweden serves relatively non-
religious functions, subjective religiosity has a positive relationship with 
identification with other religious denominations over the Church of Sweden. For 
example, several interview participants made the connection between openly 
religious individuals and free churches. To many firm believers, other denominations 
are more attractive than the Church of Sweden as their main purpose is to relate their 
adherents to the supernatural. Furthermore, those who are at least somewhat 
religious are no more or less likely to identify with the Church of Sweden as opposed 
to no religion. This indeed shows the weak bond between subjective religiosity and 
the National Church and also highlights a prevalence of privatised religion.188   
There is a significant, positive relationship between attendance and other 
religious denominations (as opposed to the Church of Sweden). This is in line with 
figures and interview findings in Chapter 5 that show that other religious 
denominations have more active participants and a stronger sense of community. Not 
surprisingly, church attendance is also associated with identification with the Church 
of Sweden in comparison with no religion.  
Table 7.2 shows that there is a significant and negative relationship between 
age and identification with other religion in relation to the Church of Sweden. This 
suggests that older individuals are more likely to belong to the Church of Sweden 
than to other religions.189 It is possible that younger individuals are more likely to 
seek religious answers in the context of a more plural religious market. Most older 
Swedes have been part of the Church of Sweden for most of their lives. If they still 
wish to belong to a religious organisation, they are less likely to make an active 
choice to go to a different denomination as opposed to staying with the National 
Church. However, age is not a significant predictor of identification with the Church 
of Sweden in relation to no religion. This can be explained by the fact that older 
Swedes are largely as secular as those who are younger (Chapter 5 and 6), in line 
with the notion of a historically early secularisation in Sweden. As mentioned, many 
identify with the National Church for the sake of tradition as opposed to faith. Bertil 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 As argued by Davie (e.g. 1994, 2002a, 2007). See section 3.4 (pp. 68-71). 
189 However, immigrants with other religions tend to be younger which may influence the results to 
some extent. I ran a model where citizenship was included as a dependent variable, and no significant 
differences in the results were observed. However, citizenship does not account for background and 
does not equate ethnicity by any means.	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and Birgitta, the oldest couple in my interview sample, highlight this when they 
discussed their unwillingness to leave the National Church despite the fact that 
neither of them believes in God.  
 
Isabella: Why is it that you haven’t left the Church then? Do you feel like it is value for the 
money?  
 
Birgitta: Funerals are free.   
 
Bertil: Yes, but then… We don’t go to church very often.  
 
Birgitta: No, only for weddings and baptisms. We don’t go for other reasons. But I’m sure 
they do a lot of good things. 
 
Bertil: Yes, but we know a lot of people who have left the church. Mostly for financial 
reasons.  
 
Birgitta: But then we say, “we have been with them for so long, so it doesn’t matter...”  
 
Bertil: And the Church has good values. It represents stability. And when you were at school, 
you sang your hymns. It’s still there.  
 
 
 Being married is positively associated with other religion as opposed to the 
Church of Sweden. In line with the interviews, other religious denominations are 
perceived to uphold a sense of family and community, while the Church of Sweden 
is more strongly linked with a representation of a cultural heritage. Furthermore, as 
expressed above with the idea that those who identify with the Church of Sweden 
closely share similar characteristics with those who have no religious identification, 
being married is not significantly associated with identification with the Church of 
Sweden as opposed to no religion.  
 There is a significant, negative, relationship between urban location and 
identification with the Church of Sweden both in relation to other religious 
denominations and to no religion. Part of this association is likely due to a wider 
ethnic diversity in urban areas.190 Today, the fact that almost every small village has 
a church is a reminder of its historical role as the heart of local communities 
particularly prior to the industrialisation (Chapter 2).  Despite the disestablishment, 
the Church of Sweden is committed to remain a national church and thereby serves 
all areas throughout Sweden. Albin and Ida, both 35, live in a small village in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 As mentioned, I ran a model where citizenship was included as a dependent variable, and no 
significant differences in the results were observed. Again, citizenship is highly limited as a measure 
of ethnic background.    
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Småland. Albin works in a factory and Ida is a teacher. They married in the Church 
of Sweden in the neighbouring village and while neither of them believes in God, 
they are both members of the church, specifically because of its role in the local 
community.  
 
Ida: I think that here in the countryside the traditions around the Church will remain longer. 
In the city it has decreased a lot. Traditions are stronger in the countryside. Also, most of the 
activities that children can participate in are in the church. You are therefore a part of the 




Amanda describes a similar idea as she states that, “I believe the church has an 
important place in society, especially in the countryside. It is very important. They 
have so many activities like baby singing and arts and crafts evenings and there is 
nothing else. There is a whole different supply of activities in the city.”  
 Finally, those with lower household income are more likely to identify with 
the Church of Sweden as opposed to no religion and less likely to identify with the 
Church of Sweden as compared to other religion. The relationship between income 
and identification with the Church of Sweden or no religion, at first glance, appears 
to support the deprivation theory suggesting that those who are struggling seek 
support in religion. However, this relationship was insignificant both in relation to 
church attendance and subjective religiosity. Instead, it is more likely that those with 
lower income are generally more supportive of folkhemmet, the Swedish welfare 
model, in which the Church plays a crucial role.191  
 The findings presented in this section are in line with the idea that 
identification with the Church of Sweden often represents a secular form of 
belonging, very different to that of other religions. Those who identify with the 
Church of Sweden are seemingly similar in characteristics to those with no religious 
identification, aside from the fact that the former group has a sense of belonging to 
the Church while those in the latter do not. As presented above, this sense of 
belonging often refers to a cultural heritage or identity, which is explored further in 
Chapter 8.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 See section 2.3.5 (pp. 33-36). 
	   216	  
 
7.2.6 Modelling Religious identification in Scotland 
 
As indicated earlier, the Church of Scotland arguably has a different position 
than the Church of Sweden. Therefore, it is predicted that the independent variables 
have different relationships to Scottish religious identification. Similar to the one 
constructed for Sweden, a multinomial logistic regression was created for Scotland 
using data from the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2001. The dependent variable 
is religious belonging constructed from the survey questions “Do you regard yourself 
as belonging to any particular religion?” and if yes, “Which?” The variable consists 
of three categories coded as 1 for the Church of Scotland, 2 for other religion, and 3 
for no religion. Just as described for Sweden above, the aim of the model is to 
investigate religious belonging as identification to a former national church in a 
secularising society. Therefore, the Church of Scotland was selected as the reference 
category against which other religion and no religions are compared.  
 
The following independent variables were included in the model:  
• Subjective Religiosity: 1 for religious or spiritual, 0 for neither religious nor 
spiritual 
• Church Attendance: Scale from 0 (never or practically never) to 7 (once a 
week or more) 
• Population Density (persons per hectare) 
• Age 
• Female: 1 for female, 0 for male 
• Married: 1 for married, 0 for not married 
• Household Income (20-point scale) 
Again, Sex and Education were considered as control variables but were not included 
in the final models as they were not statistically significant. 
Findings presented in Table 7.3 suggest that on several measures, there are 
significant differences between those who identify with the Church of Scotland, 
other religious denominations and no religion. More specifically, the variables age, 
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population density, household income, subjective religiosity, and church attendance 
are significant determinants of religious identification in Scotland.  
 
 
Table 7.3: Determinants of religious identification in Scotland 
 Other Religion No Religion 
DV=Identification+ Exp (B) Sign. Effect Exp (B) Sign. Effect 
       
Subj. Religiosity 1.541 0.011** Positive 0.674 0.014** Negative 
       
Attendance 1.169 0.000*** Positive 0.478 0.000*** Negative 
       
Population Density 1.008 0.008*** Positive 1.003 0.302 - 
       
Age 0.961 0.000*** Negative 0.969 0.000*** Negative 
       
Married 1.227 0.219 - 1.086 0.621 - 
       
Household Income 0.960 0.010** Negative 0.975 0.100 - 
       
N 1354 
  
Cox and Snell 0.382 
+: Church of Scotland is the base category **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Data source: Scottish Social 
Attitudes Survey, 2001 
 
As discussed in section 7.2.3 and in Chapter 6, the Church of Scotland has 
experienced a steep decline in active participation and identification, arguably as a 
result of generational shifts. In other words, a majority of individuals in older 
generations still identify with the National Church while it has not succeeded in 
attracting younger individuals. That older generations favour the Church of Scotland 
is confirmed in the multinomial logistic regression analysis. Significant odds ratios 
below one for other religion and for no religion, suggests that in relation to the 
Church of Scotland, age is a negative predictor of identification with other religion 
and no religion. In other words, older Scots are significantly more likely than 
younger Scots to identify with the Church of Scotland as opposed to other religions 
and no religion. This again suggests a powerful secularising trend that matches the 
evidence of a generational decline in Scotland. The fact that older Scots favour the 
Church of Scotland over other religion may be explained by religious identification 
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of immigrants, who tend to be younger,192 or by the fact that older generations 
generally have long connection to the Kirk since childhood, while younger Scots are 
less likely to have been socialised into any particular religious faith. 
Individuals with a higher household income are more likely to identify with 
the Church of Scotland as opposed to other religions. This may be explained by the 
role of immigration given the relationship between ethnic minorities and 
socioeconomic status.193 However, just as seen with subjective religiosity (Chapter 5) 
and attendance (Chapter 6), household income does not have a significant 
relationship between identification with the Church of Scotland over no religion. 
 Population density is a significant determinant of identification with other 
religious denominations in relation to the Church of Scotland. As religion diversified 
in Scotland particularly during the period of industrialisation and urbanisation 
(Chapter 2), non-Presbyterian immigrants settled primarily in urban areas suggesting 
that the Church of Scotland retained a more prominent role in the countryside. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that secularisation has not left a trace on rural 
Scotland. As population density does not have a significant effect on identification 
with the Church of Scotland as opposed to no religion, this suggests that also in rural 
areas, many Scots have ceased to identify with the Church of Scotland. This is 
interesting given the perceived importance of the National Church in providing 
activities in local communities. However, this is possibly due to the fact that the 
model controls for church attendance. 
 Chapter 6 demonstrates a sharp decline in church attendance levels for the 
Church of Scotland in particular. Similarly, Table 7.3 shows that there is a positive 
relationship between church attendance and identification with other religious 
denominations in relation to the Church of Scotland. This again highlights the idea 
that the Kirk is unable to attract participants to its services. Furthermore, an 
interesting difference between Scotland and Sweden can be observed in the effect of 
subjective religiosity. In Sweden, this variable has a strong relationship with 
identification with other religious denominations, but does not significantly predict 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Although notably, this relationship holds in a model that controls for identifying as Scottish.	  
193 Again, this relationship holds in a model that controls for identifying as Scottish. 
	   219	  
identification with the National Church over no religion.194 In Scotland, those who 
are religious or spiritual are significantly more likely than those who are not to 
identify with the National Church in relation to no religion, but less likely to identify 
with the National Church in contrast to other religion, again supporting the idea of a 
national church that is further secularised than other denominations. This suggests 
that belonging as measured by religious identification has very different meanings 
and characteristics in Scotland and Sweden. Consequently, the next section will 
explore this further by examining different understandings of what it means to be a 
Christian.  
 
7.3 The Meaning of Christianity 
	  
From the interviews, interesting contextual differences emerged around the 
meanings of Christianity. In Sweden, interview participants are divided on the 
interpretation of the concept of being a Christian as an expression of a non-religious 
cultural identity or a form of religious belonging. In Scotland, on the other hand, 
Christianity is, in addition to being a statement of religious identity, also linked to 
values and actions.  
 
7.3.1 Sweden: “I’m Christian, but I don’t believe in Jesus”  
	  
 Zuckerman (2008) argues that most Danes and Swedes identify themselves as 
Christian and that “When they said they were Christian, they simply mean it in terms 
of cultural heritage and history” (2008:10). While this attitude came across strongly 
among the Swedish participants, my perception from the interviews is that the term 
Christian has a more ambiguous meaning. Some of the participants associated the 
term with culture and tradition, while others said it implies active Christian beliefs 
and practices. Noah is of the opinion that being Christian means believing. He states 
that, “I think that someone who is a Christian believes in God, Jesus, and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Again, it is important to note that the two variables of subjective religiosity are measured 
differently. In Sweden, it involves identifying as at least somewhat religious and in Scotland as either 
religious or spiritual.  
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afterlife.” Similarly, Elias declares that, “If someone says they are Christian, I think 
of active church attendance. Much more active than I am.”  
Nevertheless, several participants expressed that it is possible to be a 
Christian without believing in God. Birgitta and Bertil interpreted the term Christian 
entirely as belonging to the Church, with or without beliefs.  
 
Isabella: Would you call yourself Christian?  
 
Birgitta: Yes we do.   
 
Isabella: What does that mean to you? 
 
Bertil: It means that we can go to church if we want to. We can baptise our children. We can 
get married in the church. And we haven’t left the church. It’s security and stability.  
 
Isabella: So you don’t have to believe to be a Christian?  
 
Bertil: No, I don’t think so. A lot of it is tradition and culture.  
 
 
In line with Birgitta and Bertil, Ida and Albin also identify as Christian for non-
religious reasons.  
 
Ida: I define myself as Christian but I don’t believe.  
 
Albin: Yes, me too.  
 
Ida: We celebrate the Christian holidays.  
 
Isabella: But if someone asks if you are religious?  
 
Albin and Ida: No… 
 
Ida: We follow the traditions.  
 
 
This again illustrates the prevalence of cultural religion195 in Sweden. Christianity 
has come to represent culture, history, and traditions in a society where religious 
beliefs are diminishing. Nevertheless, given that the church serves both secular and 
religious purposes, some individuals express conflicting interpretations of the term 
Christian. Similarly, Malin describes that there are different types of Christians.  
 
Isabella: What would you say if someone asked, “Are you a Christian?”  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 See section 3.7.3 (pp. 83-85). 
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Malin: In technical terms, yes I am, but since I don’t believe in Jesus…  
 
Isabella: Do you think being a Christian implies religious beliefs? 
 
Malin: I think if people say they are Christian, I would expect them to go to church at least 
more than I do. 
 
Isabella: Some people say Sweden is a Christian nation. Do you agree with that statement? 
 
Malin: In terms of tradition, yes.  But I think it’s surprising if someone tells me her or she is 
religious. I asked my class how it’s been at Christmas and this very cool kid was like “I got a 
bible for Christmas” and I thought he was kidding because, you know, he wouldn’t get a 
bible! So I was like “Yeah right!” and he was like “Yeah, I did.” “Oh you did? Was that the 
only thing you got for Christmas?” “Yes, it wasn’t a small gift!” I was really shocked, like 
“Did you know he is a real Christian?”  
 
 
Along with this, Filippa is of the opinion that Christian could mean a religious 
identity or a cultural identity, but also that you can be religious and Christian without 
believing in the religious aspects of Christianity. She states that, “I’m a little bit 
religious, as I believe in something. I am also a Christian but not a believer in the 
Christian faith. It’s the cultural heritage and the way you are raised.” This clearly 
highlights the cultural importance of a Christian heritage and that it can be 
completely separated from religious beliefs even if the individual indeed believes. As 
is explored further below, few Scots make such a connection between Christianity 
and a non-religious cultural heritage. Nonetheless, Christianity has shaped the culture 
in Scotland in terms of values, an impression that did not come across in the Swedish 
interviews.  
 
7.3.2 Scotland: “Christianity is about goodness as opposed to God” 
	  
While Christianity in Sweden is associated with culture and tradition, the 
couples I interviewed in Scotland linked Christianity to not only Christian beliefs, 
but also to values, a connection that none of the Swedish interview participants 
made. Pamela and Ben discussed the ambiguity of the term Christian.  
 
Isabella: If people asked you if you are religious, would you say yes or no? 
 
Pamela and Ben: No. 
 
Isabella: What about if they ask you if you’re a Christian? 
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Ben: If you want to take that conversation into context then I would say I have Christian 
values but I still call them commonsense values, if you call them Christian values, then 
yeah…  
 
Pamela: I think “Christian” then it reminds you of someone who goes to church and we don’t 
go to church.  
 
Ben: It has a religious connotation.  
 
 
Pamela and Ben further explain that many Scots associate Christian with being a 
good person. Ben, who only agreed to a religious wedding for Pamela’s (or maybe 
Pamela’s mum’s) sake, mentioned that when they got married, he searched for parts 
of Christianity that he agreed with, and focused on that rather than the religious 
element. For him, this meant Christian values.  
 
Isabella: When you married in the church and they talked about God, what did this mean to 
you? 
 
Ben: I interpreted those words as goodness as opposed to God. It makes sense to me, and for 
that reason it was really interesting. I do think some churches know that as far as attendance, 
it’s a problem, but that’s not to say people don’t attend their own church so to speak, and I 
don’t mean that they are religious. 
 
Isabella: So what do you mean then? 
 
Ben: It’s more about the values.  
 
 
In line with Pamela and Ben, Nicole mentioned the importance of Christian 
values. Despite the fact that she is religious herself, she sees Christian values as more 
crucial than religious beliefs in today’s society.   
 
Nicole: To me, being a Christian is about treating others the way you want to be treated, and 
have respect for people, and all that, you know it’s more about values actually than a true 
religious belief. 
 
Isabella: Oh okay, it’s more about how you act? 
 
Nicole: Yes.  
 
 
The idea that Christianity is about being a good person over religious beliefs 
suggests that Scotland is secularising. Here, Christianity seems far removed from its 
orthodox interpretation, in line with Bruce’s claim of secularisation as “the erosion 
of the supernatural” (1996:26) and a continuous decline in orthodox beliefs 
	   223	  
(2006:36). Although religious beliefs are decreasing, a remaining function of 
Christianity in Scotland is the notion that religion teaches morality. Brown describes 
this idea.  
 
The conundrum may perhaps be best understood by seeing ‘Christian’ as a claim not so much 
to religious belonging as to ‘niceness’ – a statement of attachment to personal moral qualities 
which, while not necessarily Christian, are nonetheless best expressed, in the cultural absence 
of a better rhetoric, by that word. To proclaim oneself to be a ‘Christian’ is, in British culture, 
to make a claim to human goodness (2007:471). 
 
 
However, several of the non-religious participants did not regard this as a positive 
aspect. Helen and Chris expressed very strong opinions about the use of the concept 
of Christian values.   
 
Isabella: I had an interview the other day with a couple who said people can believe whatever 
they like as long as we maintain Christian values in society. What do you think about that? 
 
Helen: Oh…I find that really offensive. Because a lot of values that Christianity has taken to 
be Christian values, they’re not Christian values, they’re human values. Christianity and 
other religions have appropriated say “If you’re kind and you’re compassionate, then you’re 
a good Christian.” No! That’s a human feeling. That really, really drives me mad when 
people try to appropriate good feelings and good things as if that’s... uh! Christian Aid 
Week! That drives me insane! I absolutely refuse to give money to Christian Aid Week! 
Because of the idea that somehow because you’re a Christian you would give money to poor 
people, whereas other people wouldn’t or would then use that money to proselytise rather 
than giving people… Yeah that really makes me mad! 
 
Chris: It’s the inferred insinuation that if you are not a Christian or not religious, then you are 
immoral and that you can’t possibly be a good person and have principles. 
 
 
The assumption that Christianity means being a good person stirs up emotions in a 
nation where most people take a stand by either belonging to or distancing 
themselves from religion. This highlights a, relatively speaking, more significant role 
of religion in Scotland. Most importantly, while both Scotland and Sweden are 
secularising, different interpretations of what Christianity means in a non-religious 
context illustrate the different historical backgrounds in the two nations (Chapter 2), 
where Christianity as a representation of cultural inclusiveness emphasises the 
Church of Sweden’s close connection to the Swedish state. This is largely in contrast 
to Scotland where a focus on Christian values and morality may have encouraged the 
development of close-knit communities.  
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Contextual interpretations of the meaning and role of Christianity described 
in this section present different characteristics of religious belonging in two 
Protestant European, secularising, Northern European, nations. Different processes 
of religious change have undoubtedly influenced the meanings of and reasons for 
belonging to a religion in contemporary society. However, additional investigation of 
how religious belonging relates to beliefs is required. Consequently, the final section 
of this chapter presents figures of believing and belonging (as belief in god or a 
higher power and identification with a religion) in the two nations as well as in 
Europe.  
 
7.4 Believing and Belonging 
	  
 Low levels of regular church attendance in Scotland and Sweden are in line 
with Davie’s (1990, 1994, 2002a, 2004, 2007) notion that Europeans are not 
belonging. Nevertheless, church attendance is only one form of religious belonging 
and it is debatable whether this measure alone effectively describes patterns and 
characteristics of religion in Scotland and Sweden. Claiming that Europeans are not 
belonging without discussing levels of religious identification is misleading, and as 
seen in section 7.2, a majority of Swedes and roughly half of Scots belong if 
conceptualised as identifying with a religious denomination. In Chapter 3, I discuss 
Davie’s lack of conceptualisation and argue that it is unconvincing to speak of 
patterns of religiosity while refraining from operationalising such concepts. 
Moreover, in Chapter 5, I question whether most Scots and Swedes actually believe, 
since, although spirituality is a relatively common phenomenon, this does not 
necessarily constitute religious beliefs.  
The following two sections examine levels of believing and belonging  
(defined as believing in God or a higher power and identifying with a religion) in 
Sweden, Scotland, and Europe. Despite the fact that Scotland and Sweden are two 
Northern European nations with a Protestant history, findings presented throughout 
this thesis suggest that contemporary trends of religious belief and belonging are 
largely different in the two contexts. Therefore, the aim of this part of the chapter is 
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to investigate whether there is in fact, as Davie argues, a common pattern of 
believing and belonging in a religiously diverse Europe. 
 
7.4.1 Believing and Belonging in Sweden 
	  
Davie’s (1994:2) claim that Northern Europe is believing without belonging 
can be challenged by a comparison of the percentages of Swedes who believe (in 
God or a higher power) and belong (whether or not the respondent identifies with a 
religion). As Davie argues that believing does not necessarily mean traditional, 
Christian, beliefs, but a higher prevalence of spirituality, in measuring believing, I 
have included both individuals who believe in God and those who believe in a higher 
power.196 Despite the fact that it is questionable whether many of those who believe 
in a higher power actually believe (Chapter 6) in the way Davie uses this term, it is 
still clear that Swedes cannot be categorised as believing without belonging. As 
demonstrated in Table 7.4 below, this is the smallest category in Sweden with 11.2 
percent in 2008 and 13.6 percent in 1998. 
 
Table 7.4: Believing in God or a higher power and belonging to a 
religion in Sweden 
International Social Survey Programme, 2008  
N=1205 Believe Do not Believe 
Belong 42.4% 28.0% 
Do not Belong 11.2% 18.3% 
International Social Survey Programme, 1998 
N=1045 Believe Do not Believe 
Belong 44.9% 25.6% 
Do not Belong 13.6% 15.1% 
Data source: International Social Survey Programme, 1998 and 2008 
 
 
Many Swedes belong without believing. This is in line with Hervieu-Legér’s 
(2006:48) notion that religious belonging may be a representation of a culture or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Including all those who stated that they do believe in God and all who said they do not believe in 
God or who are uncertain, but who said they believe in a higher power. 
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community, explaining why many Swedes may identify with a religion without 
believing. This is also the definition of cultural religion (Demerath, 2000; 
Zuckerman, 2008), where history, culture, and tradition are closely associated with 
religion (e.g. a historical state church), and where belonging is a recognition of the 
culture to which the individual is part of rather than any religious beliefs. In 2008, 
28.0 percent state that they belong to a religion but that they do not believe in God or 
a higher power, a figure that was 25.6 percent in 1998. If belonging were defined as 
church attendance, most of these individuals would be categorised as neither 
believing nor belonging, and it would highly limit the understanding of the role of 
religion in a secularising society. Lydia is one of these individuals who would, in 
Davie’s opinion, not belong, as she almost never attends church. Nevertheless, she 
feels a very strong connection to the Church.     
 
Lydia: My dad grew up in a small village in the countryside. He went to church and helped 
his uncle in the church. Christmas morning service was very important and my dad is really 
interested in old things and horses so he bought two, three sleds and my whole childhood he 
has been talking about going with a horse and sled to the church on Christmas morning. He 
talked about that my whole childhood but we never did. I have a very romanticised image of 
the church and my dad’s childhood, but we never talked about the religious stuff. Maybe 
that’s why I like churches. It was part of his happy childhood. I’m a bit confused now. This 
stirs up a lot of emotions. It surprises me just how non-religious I am and how important I 
still think it is with the Church. 
 
 
This clearly shows that just because Lydia does not attend, it does not mean that she 
does not belong to the Church. Furthermore, as seen in Chapter 6, Lydia states that 
she wishes she would start believing one day. Her statement above suggests that she 
may feel a bit conflicted about her positive feelings about the Church and her 
disbelief. The fact that she does not call herself an atheist because she would like to 
believe in the future does not mean that she believes. In other words, Davie may 
categorise someone like Lydia as believing without belonging and doing so 
completely disregards religious beliefs and the functions of religion in a relatively 
secularised society. 
 
7.4.2 Believing and Belonging in Scotland 
 
 As presented in Tables 7.5 and 7.6, believing without belonging only applies 
to between 15 and 17 percent of Scots. Believing and belonging is the largest 
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category in both surveys, but it is considerably larger in the SSAS 2001 (Table 7.6) 
even though this measure only includes belief in God and not a higher power, as is 
the case for the data from the ISSP (Table 7.5). There could be a number of reasons 
for this difference, including the modest sample size in the International Social 
Survey Programme (2008) or variations in how the questions are worded and placed 
in the survey. Nevertheless, this may indicate a decline in believing and belonging in 
favour of neither believing nor belonging between 2001 and 2008.   
 
Table 7.5: Believing in God or a higher power and belonging* to a 
religion in Scotland 
International Social Survey Programme, 2008  
N=169 Believe Do not Believe 
Belong 37.3% 12.4% 
Do not Belong 15.4% 34.9% 
*Identifying with a religion. Data source: International Social Survey Programme, 2008 
 
Table 7.6: Believing in God and belonging* to a religion in Scotland 
Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2001 
N=1520 Believe Do not Believe 
Belong 58.3% 5.5% 
Do not Belong 17.6% 18.6% 
*Identifying with a religion. Data source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2001 
 
 
 This is further explored by investigating differences in believing and 
belonging by age. This chapter previously demonstrated a considerably lower level 
of religious identification among younger generations. Similarly, Chapter 5 revealed 
a positive relationship between age and religiosity. Along with this, Table 7.7 shows 
that believing and belonging is much more common among the older age groups. 
Younger age groups are increasingly likely to believe without belonging, which 
appears to confirm Davie’s (1990, 1994, 2002a, 2004, 2007) assertion that this is 
becoming a more common phenomenon.197 However, while believing without 
belonging indeed is more prevalent among the younger, an even larger difference can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Assuming that believing and belonging experiences generational shifts and not age effects, as 
discussed in 5.2.1 (pp. 127-128). 
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be seen in the category of neither believing nor belonging. This is similar to Bruce’s 
(2002a) argument that not all indicators of religiosity have to decline at an even pace 
for the secularisation thesis to be sustained. It is entirely reasonable that individuals 
who believe and belong first cease to belong, leading to a temporary increase in the 
category of believing without belonging. Ultimately, without religious socialisation 
through belonging, beliefs also disappear, increasing the frequency of individuals 




Table 7.7: Believing in God and belonging to a religion in Scotland 
Individuals aged 30 and Below  
N=255 Believe Do not Believe 
Belong 44.3% 6.3% 
Do not Belong 25.1% 30.6% 
Individuals aged 31-60 
N=787 Believe Do not Believe 
Belong 52.0% 6.7% 
Do not Belong 19.3% 22.1% 
Individuals aged 60 and over  
N=481 Believe Do not Believe 
Belong 79.2% 3.5% 
Do not Belong 11.0% 6.2% 
Data source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2001 
 
 
 Just as demonstrated earlier, Table 7.5 and 7.6 suggest that Scots are more 
likely to take a stand, given that most individuals either believe and belong or neither 
believe nor belong. Very few Scots belong without believing highlighting low levels 
of cultural religion in Scotland. This is likely due to the relatively weaker historical 
position of the Church of Scotland, meaning that a particular religion has not been 
associated with a unified cultural identity in Scotland. In fact, several Scottish 
interview participants mentioned that belonging to a religion or using the church for 
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various purposes without believing in God would be hypocritical,198 clearly showing 
that in Scotland, belief and belonging are more strongly connected to each other than 
in Sweden.  
 By assuming a common path of religious change in Europe, Davie (1990, 
1994, 2002a, 2004, 2007) fails to acknowledge clear differences in the meaning of 
and relationship between various dimensions of religiosity in two, on the surface, 
similar nations. The fact that most Scots take a stand for or against religion and 
belief and that Swedes are much more likely to belong without believing is not 
adequately grasped with the current implementation of her typology. Nevertheless, 
despite these differences, there are similarities between the two nations in that they 
both experience a decline on measures of believing and belonging, in line with the 
theories of secularisation (e.g. Bruce, 1996, 2002a).  
 
7.4.3 Believing and Belonging in Europe 
 
Belonging without believing is, overall, more common in the Nordic countries 
than in the rest of the European nations surveyed (see Table 7.8). This is in line with 
the idea that a long history of state churches has shaped a strong bond between the 
Church and the nation (Chapter 2). More Swedes than Danes and Norwegians 
neither believe nor belong, possibly as a result of the state church disestablishment 
that had, in 2008, neither taken place in Norway nor Denmark.199 
The two most common categories in Great Britain, as a whole are, just as 
seen in Scotland, believing and belonging and neither believing nor belonging. 
Scotland, England, and Wales have fairly similar characteristics with just over a third 
of its respondents believing and belonging and another third neither believing nor 
belonging. Here, very few people belong without believing, demonstrating a clear 
difference between the Nordic countries and Great Britain.  
Most importantly, the information presented in this table is a direct challenge 
to Davie’s (1990, 1994, 2002a, 2004, 2007) claim of Europe as believing without 
belonging as it is, based on this measurement, far from the most common category in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 This is discussed in detail in Chapter 8.3 (pp. 248-261).  
199 The Church of Denmark still serves as a state church while the Church of Norway was separated 
from the state with a constitutional amendment in May, 2012 (e.g. Kasselstrand and Kandlik Eltanani, 
2013).  
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any of the nations. Indeed, it is the category with the lowest proportion of 
respondents in most countries in the sample. Furthermore, Table 7.8 also shows that 
the religious landscape of Europe is highly diverse and it is questionable whether one 
can speak of common patterns even in very general terms. 
 
Table 7.8: Believing and belonging in Europe 
Believing= Believing in God or a higher power. Belonging= Belonging to a religious denomination. 

















Austria 22.4% 4.7% 60.4% 12.5% 1020 
Belgium 52.2% 3.4% 25.5% 18.8% 1191 
Croatia 80.5% 2.4% 13.0% 4.1% 1187 
Cyprus 84.7% 0.2% 14.7% 0.2% 998 
Czech 
Republic 
30.2% 10.7% 9.0% 50.0% 1464 
Denmark 53.5% 5.3% 32.1% 9.1% 1896 
England 42.0% 11.4% 15.5% 31.1% 1700 
Finland 54.6% 6.3% 27.5% 11.6% 1101 
France 55.1% 9.8% 14.7% 35.1% 2343 
Germany 50.9% 7.6% 15.0% 26.8% 1673 
Ireland 81.6% 2.8% 11.4% 4.1% 2038 
Latvia 53.0% 14.4% 7.6% 25.0% 1052 
Netherlands 35.5% 24.4% 22.0% 18.0% 1879 
Northern 
Ireland 
75.2% 6.4% 11.5% 6.9% 1086 
Norway 54.1% 5.0% 30.0% 11.0% 1048 
Portugal 87.3% 3.8% 4.9% 3.9% 988 
Russia 64.7% 5.4% 10.6% 19.4% 976 
Scotland 37.3% 15.4% 12.4% 34.9% 169 
Slovakia 74.4% 3.6% 8.9% 13.1% 1098 
Slovenia 65.3% 6.9% 15.3% 12.4% 1030 
Spain 70.4% 5.2% 8.0% 16.4% 2305 
Sweden 42.4% 11.2% 28.0% 18.3% 1205 
Switzerland 65.6% 14.1% 9.2% 11.1% 1189 
Turkey 96.2% 0.0% 3.5% 0.3% 1436 
Ukraine 81.6% 1.7% 10.1% 6.7% 1877 
Wales 38.1% 15.5% 9.5% 36.9% 84 
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7.5 Conclusion 
	  
 Just as described with beliefs and attendance, this chapter showed clear 
differences in religious membership and identification between the two nations. In 
Sweden, identification with the National Church is portrayed by an allegiance to a 
cultural heritage, and in Scotland as a religious commitment or a recognition of 
family or community. In addition to historical differences, the theories of cultural 
religion, religion and social capital, and secularisation are used as reasons for the 
current levels, patterns, and meanings of this form of religious belonging.  
 The first part of the chapter explored measures of religious membership and 
identification as well as described what church identification means to the interview 
participants in both nations. Membership and identification do not necessarily go 
hand in hand. There is no, statistically significant, difference in the percentage of 
Swedes between 1998 and 2008 who identify with the Church of Sweden, despite the 
fact that, in the same time period, official membership has plummeted. Yet, there are 
more Swedes who are members than who identify with the Church of Sweden, while 
many more Scots identify with rather than are members of the Church of Scotland. 
Findings suggested that church identification in Sweden is closely linked to a sense 
of belonging to a cultural heritage and traditions. In Scotland, formal membership 
implies a particularly strong commitment to the Church or to a local community. 
Nonetheless, church identification is primarily associated with religious beliefs. 
 Following from the first part of the chapter, the second part examined 
contextual differences in the meaning of Christianity. Given the two largely separate 
roles of the National Church in Sweden, distinct interpretations of Christianity are 
presented as a religious identity or a cultural identity. In Scotland, on the other hand, 
morality serves as a secular interpretation of Christianity, apparently to the 
dissatisfaction of openly non-religious interview participants.  
 The final part of the chapter presented levels of believing and belonging in 
Scotland and Sweden. Here, I argue that not only is Davie’s (1990, 1994, 2002a, 
2004, 2007) very broad notion that Europe is believing without belonging challenged 
with current data on belonging as church identification, it also fails to capture crucial 
differences in patterns of religious change in Scotland and Sweden. Most Scots either 
believe and belong or neither believe nor belong. Swedes, on the other hand, believe 
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and belong (not necessarily suggesting a connection between the two) or belong 
without believing. 
Compared to the Church of Scotland, the Church of Sweden is seemingly 
secular. Nevertheless, the Church of Scotland is experiencing a very rapid decline in 
measures of attendance and identification. In Sweden, the fact that the Church 
performs many non-religious functions means that it has remained relevant for 
longer in a society that is highly secularised on measures of belief and attendance. 
While few Scots and Swedes belong as measured by active church attendance 
(Chapter 6), and many Scots and Swedes hold a passive sense of belonging to a 
religion as seen in this chapter, there is an additional, active dimension of religious 
belonging. This is explored in the next chapter, focusing on rituals as distinct 
representations of remaining functions of religion in secularising societies.   
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The previous three chapters have explored the link between secularisation 
and national churches in Scotland and Sweden with an investigation of religious 
beliefs (Chapter 5), attendance (Chapter 6), and identification and membership 
(Chapter 7). This chapter involves a comprehensive assessment of another role of the 
national churches in Scotland and Sweden, namely the provision of life cycle rituals, 
such as weddings, funerals, baptisms, and confirmations. This dimension of religion 
shares characteristics with religious identification in that it provides an additional 
measure of secularisation that is not as thoroughly studied as church attendance and 
religious beliefs. Furthermore, while religious identification highlights a passive 
sense of belonging as being part of a religion or a social group, participation in 
rituals emphasises active and public processes of belonging. While this also applies 
to church attendance, the measures are distinctly different as church attendance, for 
the most part,200 signifies actions with a religious motivation (Chapter 6), while 
participation in rituals has a wider meaning and purpose beyond the religious realm 
(e.g. Durkheim, 1915/1995).  
My findings suggest different meanings of traditionally religious rituals to 
Scots and Swedes. The first half of this chapter focuses on the role of rituals in 
Sweden, highlighting the importance of cultural heritage and traditions. Here, I 
present current levels and patterns of religious and secular ceremonies, discuss the 
availability of alternatives to church ceremonies, and the importance of a sense of 
occasion. The second half of the chapter explores current patterns of life cycle 
ceremonies in Scotland, emphasises the role family plays in the decision making 
process, and discusses common perceptions and opinions on church rituals for non-
religious individuals.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 There are forms of non-religious church attendance as seen in section 6.5 (pp. 185-191), however, 
this applies to occasional attendance and not frequent attendance and is much more common in the 
Swedish than the Scottish case.  
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Ultimately, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate the importance and 
meanings of traditionally religious rituals in the secular realm, in line with Bruce’s 
(2002a:30) assertion that, at least in the shorter term, religion can serve specific roles 
in secular societies. In addition to affiliation, this is a largely understudied 
phenomenon that may provide a crucial understanding of remaining functions of the 
church in a secularising society, as well as the extent to which these forms of 
belonging remain religious.   
 
8.2 Sweden: Cultural Heritage and Tradition 
	  
8.2.1 A Non-Religious Tradition 
	  
As noted previously, a typical Swede has a special relationship to the Church 
that often lacks religious beliefs (Chapter 5) and frequent attendance (Chapter 6), but 
that is characterised by a strong sense of belonging to the church as a cultural 
heritage. In addition to membership and identification (Chapter 7) this form of 
belonging also involves participating in various life cycle ceremonies. That church 
rituals are of key importance to Swedes is emphasised by Bäckström et al (2004:60). 
They show that Swedish respondents find old church buildings (61 percent), 
baptisms (62 percent), church weddings (63 percent), and church funerals (70 
percent) important to them personally. The particularly prominent role of the church 
as a provider of funeral services is discussed further below.  
As I spoke to Swedish participants about their choices in relation to their 
wedding ceremony as well as their thoughts on other rituals, many expressed that 
anything but a church ceremony would feel incomplete. For example, Markus states 
that, “I think baptism is important, but I don’t know why. Without a baptism it feels 
like the child doesn’t get a name.” Ida expresses a similar sentiment.  
 
Ida: If I got married on a beach or in a civil ceremony, it would not feel like a wedding, it 
would feel like something else. I would not feel married. I guess it is tradition with the 
church, but it is not about religion. Even if I brought a minister to marry us on the beach, it 
still wouldn’t feel right. 
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Most interview participants who had a church wedding share this attitude. They find 
the rituals to be of key importance in their lives, but do not know why and neither is 
it a matter that they contemplate. 
Furthermore, none of the interviewees who find church rituals and traditions 
important attend church regularly, most of them do not believe, and most of those 
who believe in something do not connect this belief to the Church. The notion that 
religious rituals are not performed for religious reasons is again highlighted with data 
from Bäckström et al (2004:61-62). Only 29 percent of respondents relate the 
purpose of baptism predominantly to Christianity or being part of a religious 
community. Interestingly, 71 percent see it as an alternative form of belonging, 
namely as becoming part of society or the church like “everyone else.” Similarly, 
only 23 percent see a church funeral primarily as having a religious purpose, while 
77 percent view it either as an important tradition or as giving the diseased a 
dignified departure without attaching a religious meaning to it.  
The wish to have a meaningful, traditional, but non-religious church 
ceremony unsurprisingly creates a conflict among some non-believers as they ask the 
minister to avoid religious elements in the ceremony. Natalie and Per mentioned that 
until they had agreed to take part in the interview, they had never even considered 
the fact that they had a Church of Sweden wedding as conflicting with their (lack of) 
beliefs. Their wedding took place in their garden with a minister from the local area. 
They live in the countryside and did not know of anyone else who could perform the 
ceremony. To them, the location was more important than having a minister. They 
had considered the local church but since it had burned down in the 1950s and then 
renovated, it looked “too modern” and “too 1970s” to them. Natalie and Per 
emphasise the importance of traditions and cultural (and not necessarily Christian) 
celebrations in connection to their wedding. Just like several other interview 
participants, they are of the opinion that a secular church wedding would have been 
ideal and that it is unfortunate that God has to be involved in an otherwise beautiful 
ceremony.  
 
Natalie: We had an idea of what we wanted the day to look like. An image that we agreed on. 
We wanted it to be on Midsummer Eve, with a midsummer party, musicians playing, and all 
of that. We wanted it to feel like it was midsummer. That was very important! It was the only 
thing that was important. Of course with the food and drinks, herring and the alcohol. Just 
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like a normal midsummer. We wanted everyone to dance around the midsummer pole and 
barbecue. All of this was more important than if we had a minister or not. We told him [the 
minister] about it and said “this is how we see our day” and he said “that sounds perfect!” 
Oh, okay, and of course he wanted to say something religious, and we were like “we want 
music, but no hymns.”  
 
Isabella: And that was okay? 
 
Natalie: Yes, yes… but then he said “I would like to say something from ‘The Song of 
Songs.’” And we said “What? What’s that?” Confirmed people who don’t even know what 
“The Song of Songs” is!  And he took something from it that I don’t remember, but he chose 
a few words and we thought, “That sounds very beautiful, take that.”  
 
Per: That was really the only religious thing that was said apart from the forced, “churchy” 
words that are required.  
 
Natalie: Yes, but he really deemphasised religion a lot even there because he must have 
understood what we wanted, what our wishes were, and he chose his words according to that. 
He was very willing to make alterations.  
 
 
In other words, the minister was happy to accommodate to the fact that they were 
non-religious. Interestingly, some interview participants were completely unaware 
that the Church of Sweden requires religion in its ceremonies. This was discussed in 
the interview with Lydia and Noah. Although they had a civil ceremony, Lydia has, 
as presented earlier, very positive feelings about the Church. They married in the 
registrar’s office as they only had a limited period of time before moving to Dubai 
and being married facilitates living together in the United Arab Emirates.  
 
Isabella: If you hadn’t moved to Dubai, would you have considered having a church 
wedding?  
 
Lydia: Yes, I have been to countless weddings, baptisms, and funerals. There are not many 
people in Sweden who have religious faith. I don’t know if I know anyone. Well maybe I 
know a few people.  The Church is a cultural heritage and for many, many generations, 
people have done all of those things; baptisms, funerals, weddings in the church. It’s a part of 
your life.  
 
Isabella: So how do you feel about the fact that you buy the whole package including the 
religious bit with promising in front of God?  Can you disregard that or does it feel strange?  
 
Lydia: When my sister got married I thought it was a bit odd, but God is also a part of this 
tradition. But Noah, you said before you could have considered a church wedding?   
 
Noah: I think I have to change that answer now.  
 
Lydia: I can’t say we would have ended up in the church if we hadn’t moved to Dubai, but it 
is how you imagine it when you are younger.  
 
Noah: Wait, I didn’t think you had to have all the religious stuff?   
 
Isabella: I think you can choose a lot of it, but some of it is required.  
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Noah: Then I will have to change my answer. Then I’m against marrying in the church.  
 
Isabella: So the place is okay?  
 
Noah: Yes. The place is okay. The church is lovely. But to have to hear about God and all, 
that would have felt awkward.  
 
 
Furthermore, many couples who had a civil ceremony, some of which had 
made an active decision to leave the Church of Sweden, expressed that they do not 
personally feel comfortable with the idea of a secular church wedding, but 
understand why others make this choice. Rebecka and Olof married in a civil 
ceremony, but recognise that even if you do not believe, you can still marry in the 
church out of tradition. However, they mention that at the end of the day, it is still a 
Christian ceremony.  
 




Isabella: Do you understand their choice? 
 
Rebecka: Yes I understand it because you don’t reflect over it. You don’t think about it.  
 
Olof: It’s like funerals that we talked about before. “Okay we are burying someone.” You 
don’t reflect over whether to be in a church or not or what it means.  “Okay, now we’re 
having a big wedding here. How many people do we invite? Where are we having the party? 
Which church are we marrying in?” Those are the three questions you might ask yourself. 
You don’t reflect over it... 
 
Rebecka: And yes, “We need to have three hymns during the ceremony. Which hymns 
should we choose that are the least hallelujah?” So it doesn’t get too religious.  
 
Olof: We have heard that from friends that got married.  
 
Rebecka: You want the wedding there but not the religious part.  
 
 
These non-religious church traditions demonstrate yet another example of cultural 
religion201 (e.g. Demerath, 2000; Zuckerman, 2008). The fact that Swedes hold on to 
a church that represents a historical past while they do not believe in the supernatural 
aspect is, according to Demerath (2000) an example of the last remnants of a 
religious past in a secularising society. The tradition of recognising key points in life 
in the church still holds a strong sense of meaning to Swedes even if it does not serve 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 See Chapter 3.7.3 (pp. 83-85).  
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a religious purpose. Hervieu-Léger (2006:48) argues that religion provides a “distant 
shared memory, which does not necessarily entail shared belief, but which still – 
even from a distance – governs collective reflexes in terms of identity.” Participation 
in rituals therefore serves to recognise this collective identity in line with Durkheim’s 
(1912/1995) ideas on the connection between religion and society. This relationship 
between secularisation, a ceremonial sense of occasion, and the church as a cultural 
means to belong is discussed further in the next section. 
 
8.2.2 Importance of the Sacred 
	  
That ceremonies in the church may be largely non-religious, cultural 
practices, further exemplify that just because Swedes value these church traditions, it 
does not mean that they are religious. Davie (2002a) and Stark and Finke (2000) use 
a high prevalence of church rituals in the Nordic countries as evidence of enduring 
importance of religion when it is clear that it is rather an expression of a cultural 
heritage. To suggest that Swedes are implicitly religious is unconvincing given that a 
majority do not explicitly believe in God or define themselves as religious (Chapter 
5) and rarely do those who do believe in something place any religious meaning in 
their church participation or identification. Arguably, Davie (2002a) and Stark and 
Finke (2000) appear to confuse the religious with the sacred.202 In Sweden, a church 
wedding gives a ceremonial sense of occasion as it represents a sense of belonging to 
something bigger even for the non-believer. This is illustrated by my conversation 
with Alice and Ludvig. 
 
Alice: My thought is that humans create meaning and the church is a place that creates 
meaning. But I don’t think there is a god in that house.  
 
Ludvig: I don’t think there is a god there either. We are both convinced the church is created 
by people. 
  
Alice: Even if nothing happens after death, you can create a similar meaning in your life. 
Traditions are generally more important than religious faith. For me, traditions create the 
meaning that others might get through religion. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Defined as carrying “a quality of mysterious and awesome power…attributed to the objectivations 
of human culture” (Berger, 1967:25). 
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This illustrates that, in secularising Sweden, the National Church provides rituals that 
are sacred, but to a large extent non-religious. Just as argued by Durkheim 
(1912/1995), these rituals do not necessarily represent God but have the purpose of 
raising awareness of a collective sense of belonging to a social group. This form of 
belonging is reinforced by participating in these traditions, generating “reassurance 
and dependence that are created in consciousness through the workings of society” 
(Durkheim, 1912/1995:328).203 This is arguably a key reason for why many non-
religious Swedes are of the opinion that a church wedding is more special than a civil 
ceremony or even a wedding on the beach with a minister. However, church 
ceremonies feel special because of their association to tradition and heritage rather 
than to faith or belief in the supernatural.  
Nevertheless, a ceremony in the church inevitably involves references to 
religion. Interestingly, while several interviewees would have preferred a ceremony 
without any mentioning of God, for many non-believers, this aspect was an 
important factor in creating a sense of occasion. This may, on the surface, look like 
these individuals believe. Why else would you want to hear about God in your 
wedding ceremony? Interestingly, the reference to God meant something else to the 
participants, but they could not explain what this was specifically. This was 
discussed in the interview with Caroline and Magnus. 
 
Isabella: So, since you don’t believe in God or anything supernatural, what did the church 
ceremony mean to you if it wasn’t about God? 
 
Caroline: Well, for me it was about God during the ceremony.  
 
Isabella: But you said you don’t believe? Could you explain that further? 
 
Magnus: God, yes. When the minister raised the rings and said something religious, I was 
almost terrified.    
 
Caroline: Then I felt “Wow!” Then God was there! (laughter) 
 
Isabella: So God was an important part of the ceremony for you? 
 
Caroline: Yes, it made it meaningful. It was more real and important. It is really hard to 
explain. I was a bit surprised with my own feeling, that it has so much importance when I 
don’t believe…  
 
Magnus: Yes, well… I don’t know. 
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Caroline: He did a blessing of the rings and I’m sitting here as a neutral person thinking it’s 




In other words, Caroline and Magnus felt that including God in the ceremony was a 
key aspect of recognising a special occasion. This is in line with Durkheim’s 
(1912/1995) notion that society needs holidays and rituals to acknowledge the sacred 
over the profane, and that God may serve as a symbol of the social group rather than 
religious faith. This was a common aspect in the interviews. Just like Caroline, Alice 
does not believe in God or a supernatural power. Unlike their husbands, they do not 
call themselves spiritual and do not believe in fate. Nonetheless, Alice also feels like 
the religious aspect is important to the ceremony. She speculates that this must be as 
a result of a Christian upbringing.    
 
Alice: God adds another level to it, even if I don’t believe. If we had had the ceremony in our 
garden at home it would have been nice, but in the church it is even more... It’s hard to 
describe why it feels so powerful with God in the ceremony when you’re not religious, but it 
is simply something you have grown up with. It is within us… 
 
 
This further suggests that the inclusion of God in the ceremony serves the purpose of 
recognising a cultural heritage. Lars described a similar sentiment. He related the 
meaning of God to important societal traditions.  
 
Lars: I’m not baptised or a member but it is natural that when you are standing there in the 
church, it is very powerful. It’s a feeling you don’t get anywhere else. You grow up with 
Christianity even if you’re not religious and in the ceremony, this feels special. I don’t think 
we have had that feeling at any other point. For me it’s not about God, it is about something 
else. I didn’t think I would feel so touched, but it was powerful in the moment. But I didn’t 
have God in my thoughts when I left if you know what I mean. 
 
 
In relation to the arguments made by Durkheim (1912/1995) this suggests 
that these sacred events are celebrations of a cultural identity and that they can, in 
fact, be largely non-religious. Furthermore, Durkheim’s (1912/1995) argument also 
suggests that sacred cultural celebrations do not need to be conducted in the church 
and even those who no longer belong to the National Church find meaning in 
ceremonies and tradition. In other words, as a society changes, so does the way in 
which its cultural practices are celebrated. The strong connection between the 
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Church of Sweden and the Swedish state was severed in 2000, leaving Swedes in the 
position to re-evaluate their relationship with the Church.  
 
8.2.3 Current Levels and Changing Trends 
	  
As presented above, typical Swedes state that they are neither religious nor 
regular churchgoers, but that they do identify with the Church of Sweden and have a 
formal chain of contacts with the church throughout life. In line with this, Figure 8.1 
shows that in 1970, 4 out of 5 weddings took place in the State Church, 4 out of 5 
newborns were baptised, 4 out of 5 15 year olds were confirmed, and over 95 percent 
of all funerals were conducted by the Church of Sweden. Meanwhile, each week, 
only a few percent of the Swedish population attended church (e.g. Gustafsson, 
1990:6). 
The phenomenon of Swedes having a passive sense of belonging with only 
occasional interaction with the church at key points in their lives is arguably a result 
of the relationship between the former state church and the Swedish welfare state 
(see Chapter 2). The role of the Church has first and foremost been to carry out key 
civil functions while its spiritual mission has remained in the background. Since the 
Church of Sweden had a near monopoly until relatively recently and given that 
Swedes were automatically enrolled as members at birth, it meant that active choices 
in relation to life-cycle ceremonies were seldom required, a reality that is largely 
different from the Scottish case.204 However, as the State Church was deregulated in 
2000, its relationship not only to the state but also to the Swedish people has changed 
dramatically. Suddenly, Swedes have to re-evaluate their church membership and, as 
a result, where to turn to as they recognise key moments in their lives. Although 7 
out of 10 Swedes are still members of the Church of Sweden, this number has seen a 
steady decline since the disestablishment, and while these church ceremonies 
generally play a crucial role in the life of a typical Swede, there are signs that things 
may be changing.  
 Several interviewees, particularly those who themselves chose a civil 
wedding, recognise the declining importance of religious ceremonies in Sweden.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 See section 8.3 (pp. 248-261). 
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This is illustrated by my conversation with Elin and Axel. They were both married 
previously in a church ceremony and Elin baptised her children from her previous 
marriage. They mention that things are different today. They are not active in the 
church and while they do not reject the possibility of a higher power, they do not 
believe in the Christian God. They wish to leave the Church, but as explained in 
Chapter 7, have not considered it urgent enough to complete the required paperwork. 
They married in a civil ceremony, and have made the choice to not baptise their new 
baby.  
 
Elin: I was baptised and confirmed in the same church and I have baptised my other two 
children in the Church of Sweden.  
 
Isabella: Have you or will you baptise Maja? 
 
Axel: No, we haven’t baptised her and we will not do so.   
 
Elin: She can do it later herself if she wishes to.  
 
Isabella: How did you come to this decision when you baptised your older children? 
 
Elin: It feels a bit like that time when you just automatically baptised your children into a 
parish is in the past. It’s history. Conservative, old traditions don’t feel as important 
anymore.   
 
 
In line with Elin’s idea that social expectations on church rituals are changing, Figure 
8.1 shows that, in addition to a decrease in belief and church attendance, the 
percentage of Swedes taking part in these rituals has declined since the 1970s and a 
more substantial drop can be observed after year 2000. In 1999, 75.3 percent of 
newborns were baptised in the Church of Sweden. In 2012, the same figure was 51.0 
percent. Similarly, in 1999, 62.2 percent of all weddings took place in the former 
state church, a percentage that had gone down to 43.9 in 2012. Moreover, 45.4 
percent of all 15 year olds were confirmed in the Church of Sweden in 1999, and in 
2012, this ceremony only attracted 31.3 percent. Funerals have seen a less drastic 
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Figure 8.1: Rituals in the Church of Sweden as a percentage of all 
newborns, all marriage ceremonies, all 15 year olds, and all deaths  
 
Data source: Svenska Kyrkan, 2013 
 
 
Bäckström et al (2004:43) agree that the percentage of Swedes who go 
through the Church of Sweden for life cycle ceremonies is decreasing, but argue that 
if the extensive immigration to Sweden is taken into account, the decline is marginal. 
This was investigated by examining the number of (as opposed to percentage of) 
people participating in these formal rituals. As seen in Figure 8.2, up until the time 
when Bäckström et al (2004) published their book, the decrease in these church 
rituals was in fact small. However, since then, there has been a much steeper decline. 
Since 2005, the number of confirmations has decreased from 47 570 to 30 959 per 
year, the frequency of baptisms went from 69 694 to 57 673 per year, while the 
number of weddings has seen a less drastic decline from 22 305 to 19 271 per year. 
As mentioned above, funerals have only marginally decreased over the last 42 years. 
In 1970, the Church of Sweden conducted 77 825 funerals, a figure that was 72 413 
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Figure 8.2: Frequencies of rituals in the Church of Sweden 
 
The peak in marriages in 1989 is a result of tax legislation introduced January 1, 1990. Couples who 
married before that date received certain tax benefits. Data source: Svenska Kyrkan, 2013 
 
As discussed in Chapter 7, while the effect may be smaller than in Scotland, 
the older generation is less likely to have left the Church of Sweden than those who 
are younger. This is, as noted, not necessarily for religious reasons, but perhaps a 
result of a lifelong relationship with the church and its traditions. In the first half of 
the 20th century, the Church of Sweden had a stronger position than it does today, 
meaning that a majority of those who reach the end of life now have been baptised 
and confirmed, have married in the church, and have baptised their children and 
grandchildren. This suggests that as more and more individuals who have made the 
decision to exit the church approach the age at which they begin contemplating the 
end of life, the number of funerals in the Church of Sweden will see a more 
substantial decline. As they are not currently in high demand, the availability of 
alternative forms of funeral services and other forms of life cycle rituals is low.  
 
8.2.4 Availability of Alternatives 
	  
 Swedes have a very limited choice in terms of weddings and funerals. While 
a civil option exists, up until 2000, the state in essence endorsed the celebration of 
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disestablished, a majority of Swedes are still members of the Church of Sweden 
meaning that there has not yet been a strong demand for alternative means to perform 
these ceremonies. This is different in Scotland where there not only are more 
options, but people are also more aware of the diverse range of ceremonies that are 
available.  
As a ceremony, a wedding is particularly interesting as it is the only life cycle 
ritual that carries official and legal implications. There are around 40 religious 
denominations that hold the right to perform marriage ceremonies in Sweden 
(Kammarkollegiet, 2013). Unlike in Scotland, the Humanist Society of Sweden is not 
considered a belief based organisation and is therefore not one of them.206 Today, 
roughly 60 percent of all marriage ceremonies are civil (Haraldsson, 2011).207 A civil 
ceremony is conducted either in the registrar’s office or at a location of the couple’s 
choice by an officiant appointed by the local county administrative board. Many 
interviewees expressed dissatisfaction with such a ceremony, mentioning that it is 
“less meaningful and too quick” (Caroline), and “the ceremony is just 5 minutes and 
you’re done, which is a bit unexciting” (Lars).  
Filippa and Nils, who had a destination wedding in Croatia, portray how 
limitations to the availability of options have affected their fundamental choices in 
relation to the wedding. Filippa mentioned that she would have liked a wedding in 
the Church of Sweden because “the church is doing such a great job at delivering 
ceremonies, the beauty of the buildings, and the sense of occasion.”  Nevertheless, 
since Nils did not feel comfortable having their wedding in the church when he does 
not believe, to them, the only other option was going abroad for a civil ceremony. In 
line with Nils and Filippa, several other participants agreed that, in Sweden, there are 
few options to a church ceremony. Gabriella and Jonas mention several reasons for 
why they believe this is the case.  
 
Isabella: Do you know anyone in Sweden who married in the Church of Sweden even though 
they don’t believe in God?   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 There are, however, a very limited number of humanists who are ordained to conduct civil 
ceremonies (Humanisterna, 2013).  
207 With 36 percent of weddings take place in the Church of Sweden - see Figure 8.1 (p. 243), this 
means that less than 5 percent of weddings are conducted in a religious denomination other than the 
former national church.  
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Jonas: Yes, almost all the weddings we have been to. In Sweden it is difficult to marry 
outside the Church and get a nice ceremony. The default option is to marry in the Church and 
tell the minister to not talk that much about God.  
 
Isabella: Why is it like that? 
 
Jonas: Partly because there’s nothing else. Here in Scotland there are more and more 
humanist weddings. In Sweden, you think of a civil ceremony and having to go to the 
registrar’s office and it’s not that nice. People aren’t even aware that you can make them 
personal, that the option exists.  
 
Gabriella: The Humanist Society offers something that people want; weddings, funerals. It’s 
an alternative. The reason why almost everyone gets buried in the Church of Sweden is 
because there are no alternatives. Well, there are alternatives, but no one knows they exist. 
Funeral homes barely know. The fact that the Church of Sweden has completely removed all 
their religious requirements, that you don’t need God in the ceremonies, means no 
alternatives are requested they way they are in Scotland. I think people are members of the 
Church just for the sake of the ceremonies. We definitely need more options in Sweden.  
 
 
In other words, Gabriella and Jonas note two reasons for why there is little demand 
for other options. Not only are church rituals a strong marker of a cultural heritage 
and traditions, the Church of Sweden has also maintained its role as serving all 
Swedes even if it means that their spiritual mission has been kept in the 
background.208 They have therefore created a type of ceremony that both believers 
and non-believers appreciate. This clearly illuminates the limitations to Davie’s 
(2002a:19) idea of vicarious religion, assuming that Swedes are implicitly religious 
since a majority return to the Church at select moments in life. 
Furthermore, Gabriella also points out that people are just not aware of other 
options. My conversation with Filippa and Nils illustrates this.  
 
Isabella: Have you ever been to a civil funeral?   
 
Nils: No, only weddings. I did not know you could have a civil funeral.  
 
Filippa: I knew about it. I saw it on TV!  
 
Nils: What do you mean? Do you have the ceremony in someone’s house or what? 
 
 
Interestingly, Nils, who does not believe in God and who, as mentioned, was against 
marrying in the church for this reason, was not aware that there are any alternatives 
to a church funeral. This is in line with figures 8.1 and 8.2 showing that weddings 
outside the Church of Sweden are becoming more common but that the Church of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 See section 2.3 (pp. 22-35). 
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Sweden still completely dominates the provision of funeral services. As mentioned, 
this is likely due to the fact that most individuals who are at the age where they 
contemplate end of life choices are committed members of the Church of Sweden. 
As a result, the strong position that the Church of Sweden holds as a funeral 
provider, and to a lesser extent as a provider of life cycle rituals more generally, will 
decline as it loses members. The Humanist Society of Sweden has picked up on this, 
something that they highlight in their annual report. 
 
As the Church of Sweden continues to lose members and participants in its ceremonies, a 
growing demand for alternative ceremonies has emerged. Here, the Humanist Society plays 
an important role in being able to offer options where ceremonies are formed based on a 
content that rests on humanist values (Humanisterna, 2013:50, my translation).  
 
 
This demand for more personalised alternatives or more suitable options for 
non-believers was mentioned by several interview participants, particularly those 
who had a civil ceremony. As Olof and Rebecka exited the church some time ago, it 
made less sense for them to marry in the church and with this, they recognise a 
generational shift. They mentioned that their generation has grown up with a state 
church, and that significant changes will be seen in the next decade or two as those 
who were born around the turn of the millennium reach the age at which they marry. 
Rebecka recognises that as the Church loses members and status as a national 
church, young adults have to make more informed choices in regards to these rituals 
to a much larger extent than their parents and grandparents.  
 
Rebecka: I know there are civil funerals as I have seen advertisements saying you can make 
your funeral personal, however you want to have it, like anything goes. But I don’t know. 
For me it is more the practical aspect. I don’t know how it works. I can imagine that our 
generation will make more active choices and plan for that we might want a different type of 
ceremony. It will become more and more common in the future. 
 
 
 The aspects discussed in this section represent long-lasting effects of a state 
church. The close, historical, relationship between the Church of Sweden and the 
Swedish state has formed a bond between the church and a cultural identity, meaning 
that few alternatives have been requested as most Swedes, for this reason, use the 
church for life cycle rituals. Ironically, this religious monopoly has restricted options 
to the extent that older Swedes have little choice but to turn to the Church of 
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Sweden, a practice that is mentioned by Davie (2002a:19) as evidence of believing 
and e.g. Stark and Finke (2000) as an innate human desire for religion.  
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 2, the Church of Sweden has functioned 
as a key component of the Swedish welfare model folkhemmet, and one of its core 
missions has been to serve all Swedish citizens throughout the nation. This has led to 
both an encouragement from the state as well as a willingness within the church to 
accommodate to religious as well as non-religious members. However, since the 
Church of Sweden has been disestablished as a state church, things are changing. To 
an increasing extent Swedes have to make active choices about their life cycle 
ceremonies, suggesting that this is a key period of transition. It is possible that, in 
time, Sweden will resemble Scotland in this matter, where there is a wider range of 
options around which individuals make more active decisions. This is discussed 
further in the remainder of the chapter.  
 
8.3 Scotland: Diversity and Family 
	  
8.3.1 Current Levels and Patterns 
	  
 Unlike in Sweden where various dimensions of religion have a seemingly 
weaker association to one another, in Scotland, participation in rituals follow similar 
patterns to religious beliefs, church attendance, and identification. As seen in Figure 
8.3 below, not only has the Church of Scotland experienced a steep decline in 
attendance (Chapter 6) and identification (Chapter 7), the percentage of Scottish 
marriages celebrated in the Kirk has decreased rapidly over the last 50 years. In 
1961, 55.7 percent of marriages were conducted in the Church of Scotland, and in 
2011, the corresponding figure was 19.1 percent. Similarly, the percentage of 
married couples that went through the Catholic Church has decreased from 17.1 in 
1961 to 5.9 in 2011. This decline in ritual participation in Scotland’s two largest 
religious organisations is a clear indication that Scotland is secularising. Together 
with relatively low levels of belief (Chapter 5), declining levels of attendance 
(Chapter 6), and religious membership and identification (Chapter 7), this makes any 
argument that Scotland is not secularising very difficult to sustain. 
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Figure 8.3: Marriages in Scotland by method of celebration 
 
N= Between 27 524 and 43 696 with an average of 35 588. *Includes Humanist weddings.209 
Data source: General Register Office for Scotland, 2011 
 
Table 8.1: Scottish marriages by method of celebration, 2011 






*The five most common other denominations are all Christian: Assemblies of God (3.0 percent of all 
marriages),	  Scottish Episcopal Church and other churches of the Anglican communion (2.4 percent), 
Methodist Church in Scotland (1.7 percent), Baptist Union of Scotland (1.0 percent), and the Bathgate 
Community Church (0.7 percent). The remaining 33 listed denominations include, among others, 
other Christian, Muslim, Jewish, and spiritualist congregations. Data source: General Register Office 
for Scotland, 2011 
 
This is further illustrated by the fact that in 2011, 60.3 percent of marriage 
ceremonies were non-religious, with 51.8 percent civil, and 8.5 percent Humanist 
(see Table 8.1). This means that Humanist weddings, only considered legally binding 
since 2005 (General Register Office for Scotland, 2013), have surpassed Catholic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 The time series data does not break other down into specific denominations, see Table 8.1 for the 
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weddings as the third most common provider of wedding ceremonies after civil 
marriages and weddings in the Church of Scotland.210 Humanist weddings have seen 
a steep increase from 82 ceremonies in 2005 to 2486 in 2011.211 
 Using statistics on baptism in Scotland between 1930 and 2001, Voas 
(2006:113) makes a number of noteworthy assertions. First of all, he shows that there 
has been a consistent decline in baptism rates in the Church of Scotland from roughly 
45 percent of newborns in the 1950s to below 20 percent at the end of the 20th 
century. At the same time, figures for the Catholic Church have remained steady at 
around 15-20 percent. This is in line with the notion that the Church of Scotland is 
experiencing particular difficulties in attracting and retaining participants (e.g. 
Brown, 1997). This also suggests that cultural Catholicism is fairly common in 
Scotland.  
Second, levels of upbringing in the Church of Scotland have been 
consistently higher than baptism rates. Interestingly, the difference between the two 
was larger until the mid 1950s. Voas (2006:113) speculates that this is due to the fact 
that in the past, baptism was commonly considered to be a ceremony only for the 
most committed Christians. He states that “Many people would have identified 
themselves with the church without feeling sufficiently confident of their standing to 
bring their children to be baptised. In recent decades that strictness has moderated” 
(Voas, 2006:113). This aspect was discussed in my interview with James, 37, and 
Lily, 34 from Glasgow. Lily is a full-time mum and James is a minister in the Church 
of Scotland. He affirms that baptism is, within the Church of Scotland, a symbol of a 
promise to bring up a child in the Christian faith, while a wedding is between a man 
and a woman regardless of religious beliefs. Therefore, he would feel uncomfortable 
baptising a child of a non-believer.  
 
James: We have a service where we pray for the wee one, but I wouldn’t actually baptise, 
and then they can go off to their party. Some ministers in the Church of Scotland would 
baptise, but I couldn’t in good conscience…Baptism is just for the children of believers. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Humanist weddings are legally categorised as religious weddings. However, a new proposition is 
being put forth involving belief based ceremonies as a third category, which would include humanists 
(British Broadcasting Corporation, 2012).  
211 2005: 85 ceremonies, 2006: 434, 2007: 710, 2008: 1026, 2009: 1544, 2010: 2092, 2011: 2486 
(Total number of marriages range from 27524 to 30881 yearly) (General Register Office for Scotland, 
2011). 
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In other words, in Scotland, baptism is primarily a religious ritual contrary to the 
case of Sweden. Nevertheless, as mentioned by James and in line with Voas (2006), 
some ministers are now less strict.  
In comparison with the Church of Sweden (which as seen in Figure 8.1, 
baptised 80 percent of newborns in 1970 and 51 percent in 2012), the Church of 
Scotland baptises a relatively small share of newborns. Similarly, as seen in Figure 
8.3, the National Church has not conducted a majority of Scottish weddings since the 
1960s,212 highlighting that relative to Sweden, Scotland is more religiously diverse. 
In 2011, the Kirk performed 48 percent of all religious weddings in Scotland 
(excluding Humanist ceremonies), followed by the Catholic Church with 15 percent. 
Furthermore, in 2011, 29 percent of legal marriage ceremonies in Scotland were 
neither civil nor within the National Church,213 while the same statistic for Sweden is 
roughly 5 percent.214 Interestingly, religious diversity and the availability of non-
religious options have, as seen in the next section influenced how Scots relate 
religious beliefs to practices of life cycle rituals.  
 
8.3.2 Rituals and Belief 
	  
 As discussed in Chapter 7, religious belonging has largely different meanings 
in Scotland and Sweden. Belonging for the sake of a cultural heritage external to 
religious beliefs is much less prevalent in Scotland, particularly among 
Presbyterians, where individuals are more likely to belong for religious reasons and 
to some extent to a local community. While Swedes typically choose a religious 
ceremony primarily for the sake of culture and tradition, just as described earlier, 
Scots seem more likely to make a choice that corresponds to their religious 
convictions. A majority of interview participants in Scotland who chose a religious 
service mentioned that they did so because at least one person in the couple is 
religious. Sophia expressed the importance of having a religious ceremony for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 The Church of Sweden provided a majority of Swedish weddings until 2005.  
213 If including Humanist weddings, this figure is 80 percent.  
214 As seen in Figure 8.1 (p. 243), the Church of Sweden conducted 36 percent of weddings in 2011 
(Svenska Kyrkan, 2013), a year in which roughly 60 percent of marriage ceremonies were civil 
(Haraldsson, 2011), suggesting that less than 1 in 20 weddings were performed elsewhere.   
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religious reasons and also because of a sense of belonging associated with a religious 
upbringing.  
 
Sophia: I did want a religious ceremony. It was probably more important to me. Thomas was 
quite happy to go along with it. I was brought up in going to church, and I think, whilst I 
wasn’t going to church when we met, but it had always been important to me that it would be 
religious. And since then I started going back to church.  
 
 
Similarly, those who chose a non-religious wedding ceremony mentioned their lack 
of belief as a primary reason. Susan and John describe this. 
 
Isabella: How come you didn’t want a religious ceremony? 
 
John: I wouldn’t be able to… 
 
Susan: I don’t think I could really do a religious ceremony these days, I think I am possible 
more of an agnostic, but wouldn’t say atheist, but I wouldn’t be comfortable with some of it. 
I would have to kind of bite my tongue through bits of it.  
 
 
In other words, unlike many Swedes, non-religious Scots often express that 
they would feel very uncomfortable with religious vows and prayers in their 
ceremony. When I mentioned to the Scottish interview participants that it is very 
common in Sweden that even non-believers choose to conduct life cycle rituals in the 
National Church, almost all interviewees felt that this was odd, and a phenomenon 
rarely seen in Scotland. James and Lily express this sentiment. 
 
Isabella: What do you, as a minister, think of non-religious people marrying in the church? 
 
James: That is bizarre to me. I don’t see the… I don’t know why people would get married in 
a church… There is no logic in getting married in a church if you don’t believe in it.  
 
Isabella: Do you think its okay that they do that? 
 
James: Well I think it’s bizarre, I don’t see the sense in it. 
 
Lily: For me it is also because you are making vows.  
 
 
This is a sharp contrast to the Swedish norm of asking for a secular church 
ceremony, which further highlights the importance of context in research. James’ and 
Lily’s thoughts exemplify the importance of religious convictions in the decision-
making process and several participants mentioned that it is inappropriate to use the 
church for ceremonies without religious faith. Lucy describes this as she states that, 
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“I want it written in my will that I would like a humanist funeral…I would feel as 
though I was a hypocrite to get a church service.”  
 Others mention that a church ceremony for a non-religious individual is 
disrespectful to those who believe, a sentiment that never came up in Sweden.  
 
Isabella: So what was the main reason why you wouldn’t want to have a church ceremony?  
 
Olivia: It would have felt a bit hypocritical, ‘cause neither of us have been to church at all. 
To get married and never go again didn’t seem right, ‘cause its sort of disrespectful to what 
the people who believe in the church believe in. 
 
 
This suggests that, in Scotland, the Church has a stronger association to religion, 
while, in Sweden, it is the norm “to get married and never go again.”  Similar to 
Olivia, Henry describes how the religious foundation of churches needs to be 
respected by others.  
 
Henry: Neither of us are religious, so… Even though I would consider myself an atheist, I 
still think that people should respect churches. And I think that it is weird the way people use 
them as venues. I think that you should only get married in the church if you believe in the 
religion.  
 
Isabella: How come you think that you can’t use them for other reasons? 
 
Henry: Because I think it makes the whole thing sort of a sham, something false about it. 
Like it’s such an important event and I don’t think there should be some sort of artificial 
quality to it. And that they are pretending to believe in these things, it’s just a bit strange and 
I have found it a bit uncomfortable. 
 
 
The national differences in the relationship between rituals and religiosity are likely 
due to the different historical trajectories described in Chapter 2. The fact that Scots 
were never unified on the basis of a particular religious denomination to the extent 
that Swedes were means that Scots to a lesser extent see one specific church as a 
“default option.” This has led to Scots having to take a stand where it is more 
common to “opt in” to a religion, in contrast to Swedes who, until very recently, and 
to some extent still, have to “opt out.”  
 Furthermore, the Church of Scotland has not had a role as a public service 
provider to the extent that the Church of Sweden has. This means that it serves 
religious individuals to a further extent than the Church of Sweden that provides 
services to all Swedes. As a result, the Church of Scotland may be stricter in terms of 
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whom it marries (see Chapter 5). Furthermore, while the Church of Scotland is less 
likely than its Swedish counterpart to encounter individuals who wishes to marry in 
the church for reasons of tradition and cultural belonging, the Church of Scotland 
typically performs rituals such as weddings and funerals for non-religious individuals 
if they have a family connection to a church. This shows that while the Church of 
Scotland attempts to retain its religious ideology, it also understands its important 
connection to family and community. Even though many interviewees mentioned 
that non-religious church ceremonies are “hypocritical” but rare, as seen in the next 
section, family reasons and social expectations were mentioned as explanations for 
why this occasionally happens in Scotland.215 In line with this, the interviews gave 
the impression that family wishes are generally taken very seriously by the Scottish 
couples.  
 
8.3.3 Family Expectations 
	  
 Previous chapters have described how religious belief and belonging differ in 
Scotland and Sweden. Cultural religion (e.g. Demerath, 2000; Zuckerman, 2008) 
characterised by a non-religious sense of belonging to religion as part of a wider 
cultural identity, is much less prevalent in relation to the Church of Scotland.216 
Instead, Scottish religious belonging is more closely associated with a sense of 
community, which, to a limited extent also attracts non-religious individuals (e.g. 
Hervieu-Léger, 2006). In line with this, several Scottish participants expressed that 
they chose a religious ceremony or included religious elements in their non-religious 
ceremony as a “sign of respect” to those who were religious or active in a church. 
My conversation with Pamela and Ben illustrate how family members’ opinions 
were considered in the decision-making process around their wedding. As mentioned 
earlier, Pamela and Ben are both non-believers, but Pamela grew up in a religious 
family. This influenced their choice of ceremony. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 For this reason, this may still be relatively common in rural areas. However, current data is unable 
to confirm this.  
216 It may, as mentioned, be more common among Scottish Catholics.	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Ben: We wanted summer of 08, so then we started shopping around for places to marry... 
And Pamela’s mum had a say in that. She has probably had the biggest influence on our 
decision to marry in the church.   
 
Pamela: Her and my dad go to church but I wouldn’t say they’re extremely religious, but she 
would always kind of prefer if we married in the church. Neither of us go to church but the 
church has been a big traditional thing, a childhood experience as well.  
 
Ben: So that’s why it was going to be Pamela’s mum’s church.  
 
Pamela:  Yeah, she’s quite traditional so… I suppose it was just a nice thing to do, a nice 
thing for your parents as well.  
 
Ben: Pamela’s mum always had it in her head that it was going to be perfect and it was as 
much for her as it was for Pamela. There’s no question about that. And I knew that from 
early on and because I didn’t have a strong feeling either way, I just let them have a church 
wedding. 
 
Isabella: Were you able to have an input on what was said in the ceremony? 
 
Pamela: We had options of hymns and readings.  
 
Isabella: How did you make those decisions?  
 
Pamela: To be honest, I wasn’t really that bothered about what was going to be in there. She 
(her mum) suggested some readings rather than us coming up with our own thing.  
 
Isabella: So how did you decide the hymns? 
 
Pamela:  My mum suggested the hymns. I wouldn’t know what hymns to choose because I 
don’t go to church. 
 
 
In other words, to Ben and Pamela, their wedding was not only about their 
commitment to each other, it was also important that her mother had her day too, that 
she was involved and had her wishes heard. Similarly, while Lucy and Simon had a 
humanist wedding and are atheists, they recognise the importance of acknowledging 
beliefs and expectations of friends and family.  
 
Lucy: We did actually have a prayer at the wedding during the meal. We asked our friend’s 
husband to do it (a minister), but that was more a mark of respect for other people at the 
wedding who were religious, like your aunty, you know like other people. Like I said I’ve 
got some Christian friends so we thought that would be nice for them to do that. 
 
 
While some participants chose to go along with their family’s wishes, others, who 
themselves had non-religious wedding ceremonies, expressed frustration with this 
practice. This is similar to how those who had a non-religious ceremony in Sweden 
expressed that they felt about others marrying in the church for traditional reasons 
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alone. Katie, 28, a PhD student, and Matthew, 27, a forklift driver, married in a 
Humanist ceremony in Edinburgh. They are both non-religious and Matthew rather 
bluntly expressed what he felt about fellow Scots who marry in a church without 
being religious.  
 
Matthew: I think they are stupid. If you are going to do something, at least know what you 
are doing instead of just walking into it blindly, just because social restrictions. Like, “It’s 
what we are expected to do, so lets just do it.” Make your own mind up! How do you actually 
feel about this? Rather that just saying that “Society has handed me this, and that’s what I am 
expected to do.”  
 
 
Nevertheless, as seen above, a common sentiment from the interviews was that many 
non-religious individuals who choose a religious ceremony consider it carefully and 
come to the conclusion that they wish to honour family wishes, while others may 
want to avoid a conflict altogether. In line with this, several participants discussed 
the tension and conflict that could potentially arise by going against wishes of family 
members. Amy and Keith acknowledge how opinions of family members may be a 
source of conflict when organising important ceremonies such as weddings and 
christenings. 
 
Amy: My friend who got married on the side of the mountain, her parents were really 
adamant that she should have a church wedding. She was brought up in the church, and she 
went against them when she said, “Well I don’t feel like I am in that place anymore and I just 
don’t want that.” And it took ages to organise their wedding because she had a bit of an 
argument with them. They really wanted it! 
 
Keith: And that’s probably why most people who have family connections to the church just 
go along with it for their parents’ sake, to save arguments and rifts within the family. They 
probably do it for just that reason. 
 
 
Family expectations never came up as an issue in the Swedish interviews. 
Arguably, the differences can be explained by the different stages of secularisation in 
the two nations. While it appears to be declining steadily, the social significance of 
religion is seemingly stronger in Scotland (Chapter 5). With this come social 
expectations, not the least in relation to traditionally religious rituals such as 
weddings and baptisms. Jonas and Gabriella mention these differences between 
Scotland and Sweden.  
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Gabriella: I don’t think religion and religious ceremonies always are about God here in 
Scotland. Often it is about family “What will they think?” The whole family and all the 
relatives are expecting this. Going against that, choosing something different, means 
distancing yourself from your family.  
 
Jonas: I don’t think you take your parents as seriously in Sweden.  
 
 
Gabriella and Jonas’ comments about parental expectations likely relate to distinct 
generational differences in Scotland. Since the older generations are more religious 
(Chapter 5) and active in the church (Chapter 6) than those who are younger, a clash 
between different values and practices are likely to appear. Furthermore, while they 
may not currently be religious, with relatively religious upbringings, many couples 
express that the Church has a strong association to their childhood. This is in line 
with Bruce’s (1996) claim that churches are oftentimes used for rituals regardless of 
belief as they hold a sense of nostalgia. This applies well, but differently, to both 
Scotland and Sweden. As religion plays an important role in their parents’ and 
grandparents’ lives, this means that couples find it appropriate to recognise this in the 
ceremony. There seems to only be minor generational differences on key measures 
of religiosity in Sweden and even parents and grandparents can be described as 
largely indifferent towards religion. As the older generations of Swedes generally do 
not seem to have strong opinions either for or against a church ceremony, conflicts 
and disagreements are much less likely to emerge.  
 To accommodate to different values and opinions, there are, as mentioned 
earlier, a wider range of options of ceremonies in Scotland than in Sweden. While 
Humanist weddings are becoming increasingly common, they are still a relatively 
new form of celebration, and, as a result, couples encountered a wide range of 
thoughts and perceptions from friends and family. As seen in the next section, such a 
discussion also highlighted that even if the couple requested a non-religious 
ceremony, most of them mentioned that it was still important to include traditional 
elements to their wedding.  
 
8.3.4 Non-Religious Rituals and Importance of Traditions 
	  
 Similar to the Swedish interviewees, several Scottish participants held rather 
negative perceptions about civil ceremonies. However, Scots have the option to 
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choose a legally recognised humanist wedding. Amy mentioned that this type of 
ceremony offers a sense of occasion with a “personal approach.” Along with this, 
Olivia and Connor explained how they came to the decision to have a humanist 
wedding over a ceremony in the registrar’s office or in a church.  
 
Isabella: How did you decide on a humanist ceremony?  
 
Olivia: Connor said he would burst into flames if he had it set in a church.  
 
Connor: It’s not exactly true.  
 
Olivia: Neither of us is from Edinburgh, but we decided to get married here. Connor is from 
Wick, on the very north coast of Scotland, which would have been nice but it is a little too far 
to ask my granny to come there from Southampton. I’m from St Andrews and my granddad 
was actually an Episcopalian priest. Had he still been alive, I would have probably tried to 
get married in his church, cause that would be like a family connection… I mean we never 
go to church, I don’t really believe in God at all, so we decided on a humanist ceremony. I 
wanted something with a bit more feeling than a registrar’s office. I’ve been to a humanist 
funeral before and it was quite nice. It was different, but still having the songs and the 
speeches and stuff that you get with a church service, without the “bish bash, bosh, you’re 
married” of the registrar’s office. William and Maggie’s wedding was like, “Do you want to 
marry him? Yeah, okay, bye!” It felt a bit soul-less, so that’s why we chose humanism.  
 
 
In other words, Olivia and Connor equate a humanist ceremony with a church service 
devoid of religious reference. It has many of the aspects of a church ceremony that 
are appreciated by the couples, such as songs, poems, and personalised readings and 
speeches. Like Olivia and Connor, Thomas and Sophia further express their thoughts 
on the differences between civil and humanist weddings.  
 
Isabella: Have you ever been to a non-religious wedding, funeral, or naming ceremony?  
 
Thomas: We have been to two and they were very contrasting. One of them was like being in 
a court of law. 
 
Sophia: Very legal. And the registrar kept saying that this is a legally binding agreement. It 
was very much like they had gone to sign a contract. That was in the registrar’s office. Whilst 
that one was lovely, the humanist one was about love and companionship, and obviously no 
talking about God. And that was a very different feel to the registrar’s one. 
 
Thomas: The registrar one seemed more like a legality than a celebration. 
 
 
Similarly, Katie and Matthew spoke about the importance of personalising their 
wedding ceremony. A marriage ceremony in the registrar’s office would not do 
justice to what they wanted.  
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Katie: Originally we were going to do a civil ceremony with the registrar, but then we found 
out that… I didn’t want it to be just a random person, I wanted it to be a real personal 
ceremony, and they said that we wouldn’t know who would marry us until about 15 minutes 
before the ceremony is actually happening. And that it just is what it is ‘cause it is a legal 
thing. There is no real room to move. So I said I didn’t want that. So, we are atheist. So they 
said that you might want to contact the Humanist Society, they might be in line with what 
you want. They perform a quasi-mocking religious ceremony and can still be very personal. 
 
Matthew: I wouldn’t say mocking religion. There is nothing religious about it. 
 
Katie: Well, I know, but it is the same kind of style. Very personal, very, you know, poetic. 
 
Isabella: It’s traditional in a way? 
 
Katie: Yes, we had a lot of readings and poetry and family got up and spoke. Even, when my 
sister got married at the Catholic Church they did the same thing, so rather than people 
getting up and reading prayers and scripture, people got up and read different poems by 
people that we picked. You know, gave different talks. 
 
Matthew: It was just a typical wedding. It was the people we invited and just about me and 
Katie, we just never praised a god.  
 
Katie: Yes, there was none of that. It was a very personal ceremony.  
 
 
From the interviews with Scottish participants and as seen in Table 8.1, it is 
clear that humanist weddings are in high demand in an increasingly secular 
society.217 The Scottish interview participants, among those Olivia and Connor, 
explained that this relatively new method of celebrating these rituals evoked a wide 
range of reactions from family and friends. 
 
Olivia: It was nice, and people still say how they enjoyed the service, but there was a lot of 
confusion about it. Your dad didn’t think it was going to be legal. My granny who was quite 
religious was like, “is it real?” She was very confused by this, like a weird “new religion” 
type of thing that she didn’t understand.   
 
Connor: There was more confusion for all the older generation, you know our parents, and 
then much more acceptance after the fact. They were actually like, “this is really nice.” 
 
 
In line with Olivia and Connor, Matthew and Katie expressed that there seems to 
have been a generational difference in relation to the opinions on their humanist 
ceremony.  
 
Katie: We actually had to have the celebrant put a paragraph in there to explain to the 
audience what the humanist thing is all about. Because most people were like, “what the hell 
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weddings. 
	   260	  
is humanist?” 
 
Matthew: My friends are especially ignorant. They see it as you just get married in a church. 
They were very confused by it and didn’t expect it. There was a very mixed reaction. The 
people in their 40s and 50s said that “it wasn’t my cup of tea, not my sort of wedding or the 
way it should be.” But everybody my age or younger were like “It was a great ceremony, not 
what we are used to, with some guy in a robe talking nonsense.”  
 
 
Section 8.2 explained that traditions are a key aspect of Swedish rites of 
passage and that, as part of a cultural heritage, the Church of Sweden has a 
longstanding association with ceremonial traditions. The Scottish interviews revealed 
that traditions are of high importance to them as well, but that, interestingly, these 
traditions are rarely linked to the Church of Scotland or to religion more generally. 
Several participants expressed this sentiment. While they had humanist ceremonies, 
Simon and Lucy and Chris and Helen emphasised that traditional, but not religious, 
elements of a wedding were very important to them. Helen’s father gave her away, 
they had written vows, exchanged rings, they did not spend the night before the 
wedding together, and she wore a traditional white dress.  
 
Chris: I think we still wanted that sense of occasion, that sense of ceremony and you know 
it’s a template that works and it’s what my… 
 
Helen: And people identify with it… I think we just thought that we could have something 
where everyone could come to and it would be more recognising… 
 
 
Simon and Lucy also included many traditional aspects of a wedding in their 
ceremony, but they also wanted to involve more elements from their background or 
culture.  
 
Lucy: She [the celebrant] talked a little bit about how we met. It was quite humorous I would 
say. We had my uncle and Simon’s aunty both do readings for us, my uncle did Robbie 
Burns, and Simon’s aunty did an Irish poem, cause he’s got Irish descendants…And we also 
drank from a quaich, which is a Scottish cup. It had Bacardi in it and we both had a sip, 
‘cause this is like a tradition that, ehm, a king from Norway and a Scottish wife, it was what 
they did, so... so that’s what we did. 
 
Isabella: So you felt that traditions were important? 
 
Simon: Yes, it was a traditional type of service, bar the religious element. 
 
 
In line with Simon and Lucy, Katie further highlights the importance of family 
background and cultural traditions.  
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Katie: I wore my mother’s wedding dress, since I promised her since I was in my 20’s that I 
could, ‘cause I had three sisters, and I was the only one that is the same size as her. And I had 
my grandmother’s wedding gloves. I have my other grandmother’s engagement and wedding 
set and he has my grandfather’s wedding band. So we had a lot of heirlooms linked in. We 
did a traditional handfasting thing for the Scottish and Celtics. We kind of decided to do that 
for the Scottish culture.  
 
 
As presented here, traditional aspects are perhaps just as important whether couples 
married in a religious or non-religious ceremony. This is in line with the idea that 
recognising and “repeating” history through traditions are core components of rites 
of passage and that celebrating a social past is an important aspect of socialisation 
and group membership (e.g. Van Gennep, 1909/2010; Bell, 1997). The difference 
between Scotland and Sweden is that while traditions are important to Scots, they 
have a much weaker association to a national church. This further suggests that 
Durkheim’s (1915/1995) claim that society needs traditional rituals and holidays to 
separate the sacred from the profane can successfully be applied to a secularising 
society. As seen here, sacred, but not necessarily religious, rituals that mark special 
occasions in life remain a cornerstone of social life even where religion has lost 




 This chapter explored participation in rituals as a third measure of religious 
belonging. This dimension follows roughly similar patterns of decline as religious 
identification discussed in Chapter 7. In both Scotland and Sweden, levels of 
participation in religious ceremonies are decreasing steadily, serving as yet another 
confirmation that both Scotland and Sweden are secularising. Nevertheless, there are 
key contextual differences on opinions of and experiences with religious rituals and 
secular alternatives in the two nations.  
 The first part of the chapter focused on rites of passage in Sweden. In 
addition to religious identification and membership (Chapter 7), this is another aspect 
in which Swedes belong to the National Church. Just as suggested with 
identification, this is essentially a secular form of belonging to a wider Swedish 
culture. Because of this and the role of the Church of Sweden as a state endorsed 
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provider of key life cycle rituals (until 2000), there has until recently been a very low 
demand for alternatives, with civil ceremonies serving as the only legal non-religious 
option. Furthermore, as it conducts largely non-religious functions as well as being 
associated with a cultural heritage, the Church of Sweden has remained relevant in a 
highly secularised society. It is nevertheless clear that this relevance has seen a steep 
decline since the disestablishment.   
 The second part of the chapter focused on rituals in Scotland. Here, it is 
suggested that reasons for choosing religious or non-religious ceremonies are more 
closely associated with a religiously diverse society. Unlike in Sweden, Scots are 
more aware that they have an active choice to make among a wider range of options. 
Because of this, church weddings for non-religious individuals are thought of as 
either hypocritical or as respectful to religious family and friends. The latter may be 
due to a later Scottish secularisation, where parents’ and grandparents’ generations 
are considerably more religious and active in the church (Chapter 5 and 6).   
Moreover, many Scots and Swedes participate in largely non-religious, but 
sacred and traditional ceremonies. The difference is that Scots typically do so with a 
humanist ceremony, while many Swedes ask the Church of Sweden for a service 
with little emphasis on religion. In other words, Scotland and Sweden are in some 
aspects similar, but just as seen with belief, church attendance, and religious 
identification in the previous three chapters, diverse historical and political 
trajectories have shaped contemporary patterns and experiences of traditionally 
religious rites of passage in two secularising societies.  
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This thesis set out to compare contemporary religious trends and experiences 
in Scotland and Sweden, two case studies from the relatively secularised Protestant 
Europe. More specifically, a key objective was to investigate the extent to which 
national context influences key processes of religious change in this region. 
Protestant Europe consists of nations that, to some degree, have a common historical 
background and that are perceived to share some similarities in relation to current 
trends of global religious change.  
Two questions were posed in response to gaps in current literature, 
particularly concerning the limited understanding of diverse contextual process and 
experiences of secularisation:  
 
To what extent are Scotland and Sweden secularised and how does this fit 
into previous conceptualisations of religious belief and belonging?  
 
How can national context explain differences in religious belonging and how 




The next two sections address these questions with a summary of findings and key 
arguments. This is followed by a reflection on limitations of the research and 
suggestions for future research. Finally, the last section offers some concluding 
remarks.  
 
9.2 Secularisation in Protestant Europe 
	  
Sweden appears further secularised than Scotland with lower levels of belief 
on seven different indicators, and a particularly large difference observed on 
measures of “traditional beliefs,” such as heaven and hell (see Chapter 5). 
Nevertheless, analysis of the relationship between age and religiosity showed 
secularising trends in both nations as lower levels of religiosity were observed in 
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younger cohorts, arguably a result of generational shifts rather than an effect of 
aging. Moreover, an examination of respondents’ beliefs about God did not reveal 
particularly high levels of belief in either nation, as claimed by scholars who reject 
the classical secularisation theory (e.g. Davie, 1990, 1994, 2002a; Stark and 
Bainbridge, 1987; Stark and Finke, 2000). Nevertheless, such authors assert that 
society is characterised by an increasing prevalence of spirituality, and findings 
cautiously confirmed the notion that traditional beliefs are declining for 
individualised perceptions of the supernatural. However, qualitative data exposed a 
vast range of interpretations of the term spirituality, many of which seem entirely 
non-religious. To claim that most Swedes and Scots believe (Davie, 1990, 1994, 
2002a) is therefore an exaggeration, as it does not take such meanings and 
interpretations into consideration. In fact, it appears as though one needs to stretch 
very far from orthodox belief in order to reach the conclusion that nearly all Scots 
and Swedes in fact believe. Furthermore, both qualitative and quantitative data 
indicated that religion makes a small difference in the lives of many Scots and 
Swedes. This is in line with secularisation theories (e.g. Bruce, 1996, 2002a; Wilson 
1982, 1988) that suggest that secularisation means a declining social significance of 
religion, rather than atheism.  
 With a discussion on church attendance, Chapter 6 confirmed the perception 
that Scotland and Sweden are secularising. Just as described with religious beliefs, 
relative to Scotland, Sweden is further secularised with few frequent churchgoers. 
About 1 in 5 Scots claim to attend church at least monthly (SSAS, 2011), a figure 
that is just over 1 in 20 in Sweden (ISSP, 2008). This may serve as evidence for the 
idea that Sweden is at a later stage of secularisation. While both nations have seen 
decreasing levels of church attendance, there seems to have been a later and more 
drastic decline in Scotland taking place around the mid 20th century, possibly as a 
result of World War II (Bruce and Glendinning, 2010) and political and cultural 
changes (such as women’s rights, re-housing schemes, and diversification of leisure 
activities) in the second half of the 20th century (Brown, 1997). In Sweden, on the 
other hand, church attendance levels were exceptionally low throughout the 20th 
century, suggesting an earlier initial decline, cautiously dated to the social structural 
and political changes at the second half of the 19th century (Chapter 2).   
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 In Chapter 7, figures of religious identification and membership once again 
validated the notion that Scotland and Sweden are secularising. Fewer and fewer 
Scots and Swedes identify themselves with a religion, and the situation is particularly 
severe for the national churches. While a majority of Swedes are still members of the 
Church of Sweden, and as such belong, these figures have also seen a steep decline 
since the disestablishment of the state church in 2000. Nevertheless, levels of 
identification with the Church of Sweden remained constant between 1998 and 2008. 
Identification with the Church of Scotland has seen a sharp decline in the last decade 
going from 35 percent in 1999 to just about 25 percent in 2011 (SSAS, 1999-2011).  
 Similar patterns were observed on levels of participation in religious life 
cycle rituals as seen in Chapter 8. In both countries, religious ceremonies are in 
decline. While the Church of Sweden still has a strong position as a provider of 
funerals, baptisms, marriage ceremonies, and confirmations, it has, just as seen with 
membership and identification, seen a steady downturn since 1970 and a more 
dramatic decline after 2000. In Scotland, 3 out of 5 marriage ceremonies are now 
non-religious, three times the level of half a century ago (General Register Office for 
Scotland, 2011). Moreover, the Church of Scotland has experienced a particularly 
steep decline as a provider of marriage ceremonies.  
 Evidence presented in this thesis suggests that while Sweden may be further 
down the path of religious decline, both Scotland and Sweden are indeed 
secularising. Nevertheless, it is difficult to clearly discern the underlying causes. 
Both nations are secularising despite the fact that, since the Reformation, they have 
had considerably different experiences of religion as a result of diverse historical, 
political, and cultural trajectories. This validates the notion of secularising effects of 
modernity (Chapter 3) and Protestantism (Chapter 2), two aspects that these two 
nations share. While it is important to bear in mind the different positions of 
Scotland and Sweden in relation to statehood and the theological differences between 
Lutheranism and Calvinism, it is plausible that Protestantism is a secularising agent 
(e.g. Anderson, 2006; Llobera, 1994; Marx, 2005; Taylor, 2007; Weber, 1904/2009), 
that a close connection between church and state makes the church ineffective218 
(e.g. Iannaccone, 1998; Stark, 1999; Stark and Bainbridge, 1987; Stark and Finke, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Though, notably, this supposed weakness does not hold in Catholic Europe. 
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2000), and that modernity does bring a decreasing social significance of religion (e.g. 
Bruce, 1996, 2002a; Wilson 1982, 1988). 
However, in the light of the findings, it is clear that even with certain 
similarities, national context does matter, and that speaking of general characteristics 
of religion in Europe, Western Europe, Northern Europe, or Protestant Europe only 
reveals a very limited picture of processes of religious change. While it may be the 
case that Protestant Europe is, overall, secularising, religious decline has taken 
different paths in different contexts. This becomes particularly clear when applying 
Davie’s (1990, 1994, 2002a) typology of believing and belonging to Scotland and 
Sweden. Davie (1994:93-94) purposefully avoids conceptualising the terms as she 
believes it can distort the overall picture. However, breaking the terms down into 
various measures of belief and belonging and consequently applying them to specific 
contexts uncovers both inaccuracies and limitations to the typology. Scotland and 
Sweden are two secularising, Protestant European nations that on measures of belief 
and belonging are considerably different. Swedes typically fall into the categories of 
belonging without believing or believing and belonging,219 while Scots believe and 
belong or neither believe nor belong (Chapter 7). In contrast to what Davie argues, 
this clearly illustrates the value of conceptualising the terms. A thorough 
examination of measures of religious beliefs and belonging offers an important 
contribution to the debate on key concepts in the contemporary sociology of religion 
as it provides a more nuanced and detailed understanding of patterns of religious 
change.  
 
9.3 Remaining Roles of the Church 
	  
In light of the findings that Scotland and Sweden appear to be secularising on 
multiple accounts, a closer look at the meanings that Scots and Swedes attach to 
religious belonging revealed how processes of religious change have shaped the 
contemporary role of national churches in these two nations. Historical, cultural, and 
political events have intervened to give the Church a place where it has otherwise 
lost much of its former status. Along with this, Bruce’s assertion that “Religion 
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diminishes in social significance…except where it finds work to do other than 
relating individuals to the supernatural” (2002a:30), rather neatly applies to the 
Swedish case, but to some extent also to Scotland. Most importantly, this thesis has 
shown that these enduring functions of the churches differ largely in the two 
contexts. 	  
Through its close connection to the state for much of its history, the Church 
of Sweden has maintained a strong position in a secularising society by serving many 
secular roles on behalf of the state. However, it does so at the cost of relegating the 
importance of theology and the supernatural. The secular character of the Church of 
Sweden is likely both a contributor to and a result of the rapid and early 
secularisation in Sweden. Throughout the 20th century, the Church served a largely 
non-religious purpose associated with a cultural heritage, welfare, solidarity, and 
provided a sense of belonging to a wider social group. This is much more limited in 
Scotland where the Kirk has retained more of its focus on religious doctrine, partially 
as a result of being able to operate with little influence from a secular state.220 
Additionally, religious diversity has played an important role in shaping religious 
belonging in today’s Scotland. Historically, the Church of Scotland was not able to 
unify Scots under one religion, and religious identification was instead often a 
statement of belonging to an ethnic group or a local community.   
Perhaps as a result of a limited understanding of the diverse interpretations of 
what it means to be a part of a national church, Davie (2002a, 2007) assumes that 
identification with a church and participation in its rituals generally springs from a 
religious motivation. Chapter 5 showed that those who identify with the Church of 
Sweden are largely non-religious particularly in comparison with those who identify 
with other religions. In Scotland, a small majority of individuals who identify with 
the Church of Scotland claim to be at least somewhat religious, which is only slightly 
lower than for those with other religions. Regression modelling revealed a positive 
relationship between religiosity and identification with the National Church in 
Scotland, a relationship that was insignificant in Sweden. This clearly suggests that, 
in line with the concept of cultural religion (e.g. Demerath, 2000; Zuckerman, 2008), 
the Church of Sweden holds a non-religious meaning to the typical Swede, whilst, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 The Church of Scotland has, unlike the Church of Sweden, not been involved in the provision of 
national welfare as British welfare is governed by the state.  
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Scotland, there is a closer connection between the Church and its traditional function 
of relating individuals to a higher power. Furthermore, interview participants in both 
Scotland and Sweden were under the impression that the national churches 
themselves are less firm on religious principles than other denominations. This was 
particularly true in Sweden, where the Church was perceived as having little concern 
about the beliefs of its adherents. 
 Along with this, Chapter 6 showed that many Swedes claim to attend church 
occasionally for non-religious reasons, while Scots typically claim to attend either 
regularly or never. Swedish interview participants expressed that they attended 
church occasionally for non-religious activities, for traditions, and for emotional 
well-being. This was less common among non-religious Scots, some of whom, 
nevertheless, attend church occasionally with friends and family. It was argued that, 
in both Scotland and Sweden, the Church serves a religious purpose for regular 
participants, an assertion that, for the most part, appeared to hold also for occasional 
participants in Scotland. On the other hand, occasional participants in Sweden 
typically attend for non-religious reasons, such as for ceremonies, traditions, or for 
the atmosphere. 
 A similar notion was observed in Chapter 7. While Swedes are, relative to 
Scots, less religious and less active in the Church, a majority of Swedes have a 
strong connection to the Church through formal membership and identification with 
the Church of Sweden. For many, this offers a non-religious sense of belonging to a 
wider culture. In comparison, only about 1 in 4 Scots identify with the Church of 
Scotland (SSAS, 2011), and less than 1 in 10 are members (Church of Scotland, 
2012) of a church that seems to uphold a stronger commitment to religious doctrine. 
Arguably as a result of different positions and purposes of the national churches in 
the two nations, Scottish and Swedish interview participants offered different 
interpretations of the term Christianity. Swedish interviewees described Christianity 
as having an ambiguous association to either a religious or a cultural identity. 
Scottish interviewees, in turn, perceived the term Christianity as having a religious 
meaning or a largely non-religious connection to morality.   
Chapter 8 examined participation in rituals as a third dimension of religious 
belonging. Despite secularising trends, the Church of Sweden remains a key provider 
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of life cycle ceremonies, above all funerals, for the religious and the non-religious 
alike. Interview participants expressed that a church is a beautiful building, it offers a 
special sense of occasion, and gives a feeling of belonging to something bigger. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that these individuals, or that “something bigger,” 
are religious. In fact, it is commonplace to marry in the church and ask the minister 
to remove much of the religious elements in the service. This again shows that the 
Church of Sweden has a largely secular role in the lives of many non-religious 
Swedes. By contrast, several Scottish participants expressed that marrying in the 
Church for non-religious reasons is odd or hypocritical, but that it is nevertheless 
done occasionally to respect the wishes of family members. However, for Scots, a 
religious conviction (or a lack thereof) seems to be an important aspect in making a 
decision among a wider range of alternatives.  
This thesis has, as suggested, uncovered diverse meanings of religious 
belonging arguably due to different historical paths of the national churches in 
Scotland and Sweden. Swedish participants were genuinely surprised to see a church 
maintain its commitment to religious doctrine while Scots could not wrap their heads 
around the idea of a non-religious couple that, at their own will, would choose a 
church wedding. With this in mind, Davie’s (1990, 1994, 2002a) typology of 
believing and belonging also fails to account for these contextual differences in 
interpretations of religious belonging that have emerged despite the fact that both 
Scotland and Sweden are increasingly secular, Protestant European, nations. This 
thesis, again, illustrates just how important context is when attempting to describe 
and categorise various aspects of religion in seemingly similar nations.  
 
9.4 Limitations and Further Research 
	  
 Due to the complex nature of religious beliefs and belonging, this thesis 
draws attention to the importance of a comparative study that picks apart the 
conventional generalisations of religious change in our contemporary world. This 
also highlights the strengths of mixed methods research, a valuable methodological 
approach that is surprisingly underused in the field of sociology of religion. Such a 
research design also serves to offset several issues with the data. Comprehensive 
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survey data on religion is limited. This is particularly true for data on life cycle 
ceremonies, which meant that the conclusions reached on this aspect rest heavily on 
interview data. Additionally, to my knowledge, there are no comparative national 
surveys with a large Scottish sample size, since such data is usually collected with 
Scotland as a smaller sub-sample of the United Kingdom. As a relatively current 
survey on religion specifically, the ISSP (2008) would have been an ideal dataset for 
a more direct comparison of the two nations. To compensate for the low Scottish 
sample in the ISSP (2008), data from the SSAS (2001) (which has an extended 
module on religion) was emphasised for Scotland. While a newer data set would 
have been ideal, the larger sample size outweighed the potential issues with using 
older data. Additionally, newer versions of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 
(without extended variables on religion) were used where possible.  
 This thesis has problematised some often very broad generalisations in the 
contemporary sociology of religion. While an attempt has been made at describing 
Swedish and Scottish trends of religion, this thesis does not deny the potential 
problems of speaking of “a” Swedish or Scottish experience and it by no means 
assumes that all perspectives and patterns are accounted for. It also does not 
undermine the value of quantitative research and its ability to generalise to wider 
population, but it does show the importance of acknowledging contextual differences 
and applying caution when attempting to describe broader patterns across different 
populations influenced by diverse cultural, historical, and political trajectories. 
Similarly the purpose of the in-depth interviews was not to serve as a representative 
sample of Swedes and Scots, but merely to offer contextualised interpretations of 
broader trends.  
 The specific focus of the research comes with a number of limitations that 
may serve as suggestions for future research. First of all, the key objective of this 
thesis was to study Sweden and Scotland as case studies from Protestant Europe and 
as a result, attention was given to how Swedes and Scots relate to respective 
Protestant national churches and the place of the national churches in the process of 
religious decline. This thesis does not give a similar attention to how secularisation 
has affected other religions and their adherents, and there are countless possibilities 
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for additional research on how Swedish free churches,221 the Catholic and 
Episcopalian churches of Scotland, and other denominations experience and adapt to 
religious change. Additionally, only relatively recently married couples were 
selected for in-depth interviews, many of which shared many characteristics with one 
another and as such, it is likely that other individuals who did not meet this specific 
criteria have different thoughts on and experiences of religion. Along with this, most 
interviews were conducted in a relatively narrow geographical area in each nation. 
An interview sample where a majority of participants are located in the cities of 
Edinburgh or Glasgow leaves out the largely different role that the Church may play 
in the countryside, particularly in the Scottish Highlands. Therefore, additional 
research that focuses on the importance of local contexts within Scotland and 
Sweden would be beneficial. Last of all, Sweden and Scotland are just two case 
studies from Protestant Europe and a broader study of other nations in this region 
could strengthen the research findings of diverse patterns of secularisations at the 
national level.  
  
9.5 Concluding Remarks 
	  
 The results of this thesis indicate that Scotland and Sweden are secularising, 
but that the two nations have experienced largely different trajectories of 
secularisation that come with diverse interpretations and experiences of religious 
beliefs and belonging. In Scotland, the National Church was disestablished almost a 
century ago, while in Sweden, it happened very recently. It is difficult to predict the 
particular effect of the disestablishment as an isolated event, especially considering 
the impact that wider social structural changes have had on religion. Nevertheless, it 
is likely that, in time, Sweden will resemble Scotland in terms of the availability of 
alternative ceremonies and the notion that religious belonging is a relatively active 
choice. Similarly, Scotland is expected to undergo further secularisation, similar to 
Sweden, leading to a decreasing significance of religion in Scottish society.  
While Scots and Swedes may, to an extent, adopt new ways to believe and 
participate, there is little reason to expect that secularisation will reverse in the long 
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term. It is also highly likely that the bonds that Swedes, and to some extent Scots, 
have to their national churches will continue to fade. As Demerath argues, “cultural 
religion may represent the penultimate stage of religious secularisation – the last 
loose bond of religious attachment before the ties are let go altogether” (2000:136-
137), this suggests that now is the right time to study the connection between 
religion, state, and culture in Protestant Europe, as, in not too long, this opportunity 
will vanish. Only time will tell if Demerath (2000) is right in his assertion that a non-
religious attachment to a church is the final remnant of religion in a secularising 
society. Nevertheless, it is clear that all aspects of religion are undergoing profound, 
irreversible, and contextualised changes in our modern world. 
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Appendices 
	  
Appendix I: Interview Schedules 
	  
Interview Schedule Scotland 
 
Thank you both for your willingness to participate. The purpose of this interview is 
to serve as part of my data for my doctoral research with which I aim to improve the 
understanding of the connection between religious belief, rituals, and identity in 
contemporary society. In order to capture everything that we are talking about today, 
I would like to use a tape recorder if you are both okay with this. Before we start, do 
you have any questions?  
 
Marriage Ceremony  
• First, could you tell me a little bit about your relationship? How did you 
meet?  
• Could you tell me about your decision to get married? How did it happen? 
• Could you describe how you went about to choose your venue. How did you 
come to this decision?  
• Could you tell me a bit more about the rest of the planning process and the 
choices you made? What do you feel influenced your choices? 
• Now, could you, with as much details as possible, tell me about your wedding 
ceremony?   
• How did you feel that day? Did everything turn out the way you had hoped?  
 
(Back-up questions: How important was it for you to marry in this specific venue? 
Was this location equally important to both of you? Did you have an alternative 
venue in mind? Was it important for you that it was a Church of Sweden/Church of 
Scotland/civil/humanist ceremony? How much time did you need to plan your 
wedding? How many people did you invite? How did you choose your dress? Did 
anyone help you with your wedding planning? Do you feel your choices were 
traditional or non-traditional and in what ways? How many guests did you have? 
Who performed the ceremony? How did you “walk down the aisle”? What type of 
music was played and why? What was said in the ceremony? Did you write your 
own vows?)  
 
Other Rituals 
• First of all, were you two baptised as children?  
• Could you describe what baptism means to you? (If they have children:) Did 
you baptise your children and why did you come to this decision? 
• How do you feel about confirmations? What do they mean to you?  
• What are your thoughts on what a funeral service is supposed to involve? Can 
you describe this in detail? 
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(Back-up questions: What does your extended family think about baptism? What role 
does the religious aspect play in your thoughts on baptism (and the decision of 
whether or not to baptise children)? What are your thoughts on alternative naming 
ceremonies? Were you confirmed and why? Have you attended any confirmations, if 
yes, can you describe them? Do you feel like it is important to have a Church of 
Sweden/Church of Scotland funeral? Why or why not? What are your thoughts on 
civil funerals?) 
 
Religious Background, Affiliation, and Practice 
• Could you tell me about your experience with religion in your childhood?  
• Do you recall how often you went to a church with your parents? How did 
you feel about it? 
• Which religion, if any, do you identify with today and why?  
• Are you a member of a church and why or why not? 
• Could you tell me about the last time you went to church? Where did you go 
and for what reason? How was your experience? 
• Could you describe your frequency and reasons for church attendance in the 
past year? How do you feel about this? 
 
(Back-up questions: As a child, did religion play a big role in your everyday life and 
in what ways? What did your parents tell you about God? Who do you normally go 
to church with? Are there any specific services that you prefer? Do you attend 
because of your faith or for other reason?) 
 
Religious Beliefs 
• Could you describe your religious beliefs in as much detail as possible? 
• Would you call yourself religious? Why or why not? Could you describe how 
important your beliefs (or lack thereof) are to you?  
• Are you open about your beliefs to others or is it more of a personal matter? 
Why or why not?  
• Do you feel like your religious beliefs correspond to your religious belonging 
and participation that we discussed earlier? Do you think believing in God 
and attending church are equally important? Why or why not? 
 
(Back-up questions: Do you believe in God? Are you spiritual? Do you believe in 
heaven and hell? Do you believe that Jesus was the son of God? Is it important to go 
to church if you believe in the Christian God? Is it important to believe in the 
Christian God if you go to Church? How important is it to you that others share your 
beliefs?) 
 
Religion in the Wider Community 
• They sometimes say Scotland is a Protestant nation. What do you think about 
this? 
• What are your thoughts on public school graduations in church? Why?  
• What do you think of government-recognised religious holidays, such as 
Christmas and Easter? Why?  
• In relation to other religious denominations, do you feel that church of 
Scotland/Church of Sweden has a specific role in society? Why or why not?  
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(Back-up questions: What do you think about “the Christian heritage”? Should we 
maintain Christian values in society? To what extent? Should we maintain church 
buildings?)   
 
Do you have anything else to add before we end the interview? Do you have any 
questions? Thank you so much for participating.  
 
Interview Schedule Sweden 
 
Tack till er båda för att ni ställer upp på den här intervjun. Målet med intervjun är att 
den ska utgöra en del av min doktorandforskning i sociologi, med vilken jag hoppas 
kunna förbättra kunskapen om sambandet mellan religiös tro, deltagande och 
identitet i dagens samhälle. Jag skulle vilja spela in intervjun om det är okej för er? 
Innan vi börjar, har ni några frågor?   
 
Vigsel 
• Berättade lite om ert förhållande. Hur träffades ni? 
• Hur bestämde ni er för att gifta er? När var det och hur gick det till? 
• Beskriv hur och varför ni valde att gifta er borgerligt/i Svenska Kyrkan och 
varför valde ni just den kyrkan/lokalen/platsen? 
• Berätta om bröllopsplaneringen och alla val ni gjorde.  
• Beskriv ert bröllop så detaljerat som möjligt. Hur gick allt till den dagen? 
• Hur kändes det den dagen? Gick allt enligt planerna och blev dagen som ni 
hade hoppats?  
 
(Extrafrågor: Hur viktigt var det för er att gifta er i just den lokalen? Var det lika 
viktigt för er båda att gifta er just där? Hade ni något alternativ? Var det viktigt att 
det var ett borgerligt bröllop/bröllop i Svenska Kyrkan? Hur lång tid tog det att 
planera ert bröllop? Hur många gäster bjöd ni in? Hur valde du klänningen? Hjälpte 
någon till med bröllopsplaneringen? Tycker ni att era val var traditionella eller ej? 
Hur många gäster hade ni? Vem var vigselförrättaren? Gick ni in tillsammans? 
Vilken musik spelades under ceremonin och varför? Vad sades under vigseln? Skrev 
ni era egna äktenskapslöften?) 
 
Andra Ceremonier 
• Döptes ni som barn? 
• Vad betyder dop för er? (Om de har barn:) Döpte ni era barn och varför eller 
varför inte? 
• Vad tycker ni om konfirmationer? Vad betyder en konfirmation för er?  
• Vad är era tankar kring hur en begravning ska vara? Beskriv gärna så 
detaljerat som möjligt.  
 
(Extrafrågor: Vad tycker era familjer om dop? Hur spelar er religiösa tro in i ert val 
att döpa eller inte döpa era barn? Vad tycker ni om alternativa 
namngivelseceremonier? Konfirmerades ni och varför? Har ni varit på en 
konfirmation? Om ja, kan ni berätta hur ni upplevde det? Tycker ni att det är viktigt 
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att ha en begravning i Svenska Kyrkan? Varför? Varför inte? Vad tycker ni om 
borgerliga begravningar?) 
 
Religiös Bakgrund, Medlemskap och Deltagande 
• Beskriv hur ni upplevde religion under er barndom.  
• Minns ni hur ofta ni gick till kyrkan med era föräldrar? Hur kändes det? 
• Vilken religion, om någon, identifierar ni med idag och varför? 
• Är ni medlemmar i Svenska Kyrkan eller något annat religiöst samfund? 
• Berätta om senaste gången ni gick till kyrkan. Vilken kyrka gick ni till och 
varför? Hur var det? 
• Beskriv hur ofta ni gått till kyrkan det senaste året. Vad tycker du om det? 
 
(Extrafrågor: Som barn, spelade religion en stor roll i er vardag och på vilket sätt? 
Pratade era föräldrar om gud? Vad sa de? Vem går ni normalt sett till kyrkan med? 
Är det några särskilda aktiviteter i kyrkan som ni föredrar? Går ni till kyrkan på 
grund av er tro eller av annan anledning?) 
 
Religiös Tro 
• Beskriv er religiösa tro så detaljerat som möjligt.  
• Skulle ni kalla er själva religiösa? Varför eller varför inte? Hur viktig är er tro 
för er?  
• När ni pratar med vänner och bekanta, är ni öppna med er tro eller är det mer 
en privat angelägenhet? Varför? 
• Känner ni att er religiösa tro sammanfaller med ert religiösa medlemskap och 
deltagande som vi pratade om tidigare? Är tro på gud och att gå i kyrkan lika 
viktigt? Varför? 
 
(Extrafrågor: Tror ni på gud? Tror ni på något annat? Tror ni på kristna himlen och 
helvetet? Tror ni att Jesus var guds son? Är det viktigt att gå till kyrkan om man tror 
på den kristna guden? Är det viktigt att tro på den kristna guden om du går till 
kyrkan? Hur viktigt är det för er att andra delar er tro?) 
 
Religion i Dagens Samhälle 
• Vissa säger att Sverige är ett kristet land. Vad tycker du om det?  
• Vad tycker ni om skolavslutningar i kyrkan? Varför? 
• Vad är era tankar kring att staten uppmärksammar vissa kristna högtider så 
som jul, påsk, pingst och Kristi himmelsfärd? Varför?  
• I jämförelse med andra religiösa samfund, tycker ni att Svenska Kyrkan har 
en speciell roll i svenska samhället? Varför eller varför inte? 
 
(Extrafrågor: Vad tycker ni om ”det kristna arvet”? Ska vi behålla kristna 
värderingar i samhället? Ska vi bevara kyrkor (byggnader) som inte används?) 
 
Har ni något mer att tillägga innan vi avslutar intervjun? Har ni några frågor? Tack 
så mycket för ert deltagande! 
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Appendix II: Demographic Questions 
	  
Demographic Questions Scotland 
Date:  
 




Did either you or your parents grow up in a different country? If yes, which country?  
 
What is your highest level of education? 
 
What is your occupation? 
 
 








Växte du eller dina föräldrar upp i ett annat land? Om ja, vilket land? 
 
Vad är din högsta utbildningsnivå? 
 
Vad har du för yrke? 
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Appendix III: Interviews and Participants 
Interview Participants: Scotland 
 
Name* Age Nationality Occupation Wedding 
Type 
Date Place of 
Interview 
Jessica 25 Scotland Dance Teacher 








Joanne 25 Scotland Lawyer 






Katie 28 United 
States 
PhD Student 





Sophia 30 Scotland Nurse 








Gill 26 Scotland Career Advisor 







Lily 34 Scotland Full-Time 
Mum 
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Amy 32 England Environmental 
Consultant 








Julie 32 Scotland Police Officer 





Pamela 36 Scotland Optometrist 








Susan 38 Scotland Lawyer 





Sharon 35 Scotland Chartered 
Accountant 









Ellie 29 Ireland Research 
Assistant 







Lucy 34 Scotland Physiotherapist 





Helen 31 Scotland Archivist Humanist 
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Helen 31 Scotland Archivist 








Nicole 46 Scotland Banking 
Industry 








Olivia 31 Scotland Photographer Humanist 





*All names have been altered. 
 
Interview Participants: Sweden 
 
Name* Age Nationality Occupation Wedding 
Type 
Date Place of 
Interview 
Maria 36 Poland Chef 








Gabriella 32 Sweden Violin Teacher 





Elisabeth 29 Sweden Teacher 
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Malin 32 Sweden English Teacher 








Petra 27 Sweden Teacher 







Lydia 29 Sweden Speech 
Therapist 







Rebecka 32 Sweden Guidance 
Counsellor 







Natalie 48 Sweden Science Teacher 








Caroline 42 Germany Clothing Sales 








Birgitta 75 Sweden Retired Chef 








Alva 30 Sweden Teacher 
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Alice 28 Sweden Librarian 







Ida 35 Sweden Teacher 







Amanda 34 Sweden Dietician 







Elin 43 Sweden Entrepreneur 







Filippa 27 Sweden Nursery Worker 







*All names have been altered. 
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Appendix IV: Key Survey Questions 
	  




Swedish: Tillhör Du själv någon kyrka eller religiös församling? 
(Om ja) Vilken kyrka, församling, samfund eller religion är det? 
 
English: Do you belong to a church or religious parish? 




Swedish: Vilken var din egen religiösa hemvist, om någon, under din uppväxt? 
 
English: What religion, if any, were you raised in? Was it Protestant, Catholic, 




Swedish: Hur ofta brukar Du delta i gudstjänster eller andra religiösa möten? 1. 
Aldrig. 2. Mindre än en gång om året. 3. En eller två gånger om året. 4. Flera 
gånger om året. 5. En eller två gånger i månaden. 6. Två till tre gånger i månaden. 
7. Nästan varje vecka. 8. En gång i veckan. 9. Flera gånger i veckan.  
 
English: How often do you attend religious services? 1. Never. 2. Less than once a 
year. 3. Once or twice a year. 4. Several times a year. 5. Once a month. 6. Two or 




Swedish: Ungefär hur ofta brukade du själv delta I gudstjänster eller andra religiösa 
sammankomster när du var I elva-tolvårsåldern? 1. Aldrig. 2. Mindre än en gång om 
året. 3. En eller två gånger om året. 4. Flera gånger om året. 5. En gång i månaden. 
6. Två till tre gånger i månaden. 7. Nästan varje vecka. 8. En gång i veckan. 9. Flera 
gånger i veckan.  
 
English: When you were around 11 or 12, how often did you attend religious services 
then? 1. Never. 2. Less than once a year. 3. About once or twice a year. 4. Several 
times a year. 5. About once a month. 6. 2-3 times a month. 7. Nearly every week. 8. 
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Belief in God 
 
Swedish: Vilket av nedanstående påståenden ligger närmast din egen uppfattning om 
Gud? 1. Jag tror inte på Gud. 2. Jag vet inte om det finns någon Gud och jag tror 
inte det finns någon möjlighet att ta reda på det. 3. Jag tror inte på en personlig Gud 
men jag tror på en Högre Makt av något slag. 4. Ibland tror jag på Gud, ibland inte. 
5. Även om jag har mina tvivel känner jag att jag tror på Gud. 6. Jag vet att Gud 
finns och jag har inga tvivel om detta.  
 
Vilket av följande beskriver bäst vad du tror om Gud? 1. Jag tror inte på Gud och 
har aldrig gjort det. 2. Numera tror jag inte på Gud men tidigare gjorde jag det. 2. 
Numera tror jag på Gud men tidigare gjorde jag inte det. 4. Jag tror på Gud och det 
har jag alltid gjort.  
 
English: Please indicate which statement below comes closest to expressing what 
you believe about God. 1. I don’t believe in God. 2. I don’t know whether there is a 
God and I don’t believe there is a way to find out. 3. I don’t believe in a personal 
God but I do believe in a Higher Power of some kind. 4. While I have doubt, I feel 
that I do believe in God. 5. I know God exists and I have no doubts about it.  
 
Which best describes your beliefs about God? 1. I don’t believe in God now and I 
never have. 2. I don’t believe in God now, but I used to. 3. I believe in God now but I 




Swedish: Skulle du vilja beskriva dig som… 1. Mycket djupt religiös? 2. Djupt 
religiös. 3. Ganska religiös? 4. Varken religiös eller icke-religiös? 5. Ganska icke-
religiös? 6. Djupt icke-religiös? 7. Mycket djupt icke-religiös? 
 
English: Would you describe yourself…extremely religious, very religious, somewhat 
religious, neither religious nor non-religious, somewhat non-religious, very non-




Swedish: Vilket av följande beskriver dig bäst? 1. Jag bekänner mig till en religion 
och betraktar mig som en andlig person intresserad av det heliga eller 
övernaturliga. 2. Jag bekänner mig till en religion men betraktar mig inte som en 
andlig person intresserad av det heliga eller övernaturliga. 3 Jag bekänner mig inte 
till en religion men jag betraktar mig som en andlig person intresserad av det heliga 
eller övernaturliga. 4. Jag bekänner mig inte till en religion och betraktar mig inte 
som en andlig person intresserad av det heliga eller övernaturliga.  
 
English: What best describes you? 1. I follow a religion and consider myself to be a 
spiritual person interested in the sacred or the supernatural. 2. I follow a religion, 
but don’t consider myself to be a spiritual person interested in the sacred or the 
supernatural. 3. I don’t follow a religion, but consider myself to be a spiritual person 
	   285	  
interested in the sacred or the supernatural. 4. I don’t follow a religion and don’t 
consider myself to be a spiritual person interested in the sacred or the supernatural.  
 
 




Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion?  




In what religion, if any, were you brought up? 
 
Ever Regular Attendance 
 
Apart from such special occasions as weddings, funerals and baptisms and so on, 
how often nowadays do you attend services or meetings connected with your 
religion? 1. Once a week or more. 2. Less often but at least once in two weeks. 3. 
Less often but at least once a month. 4. Less often but at least twice a year. 5. Less 




Has there ever been a period of at least a year or so when you went to religious 
services or meetings regularly? 
 
Religious or Spiritual 
 
Whether you attend religious services or not, would you say you are religious, 
spiritual, or neither? 
 
Belief in God 
 
Do you believe in God?  
 
Belief in the Supernatural 
 
Which of the statements comes closest to your beliefs? 1. There is a personal God. 2. 
There is some sort of spirit or life force. 3. There is something there. 4. I don’t really 
know what to think. 5. I don’t really think there is any sort of God, spirit or life force. 
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